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In addition to this general uncertainty and mobility of labour, Uganda 
has had to contend with three particular difficulties. In the first place, the 
supply of labour has tended to vary inversely with the demand. High world 
prices for raw materials prompt an increase in the demand for labour at the 
very moment when peasant farmers themselves earn higher incomes from 
the sale of their crops and are therefore less inclined to offer their services in 
the labour market. Secondly, a majority of workers have tended to be 
migrants from a distance. The greatest demand for labour has been in those 
regions where the supply is least, i.e., in the regions most favoured with a 
good climate, fertile soils, and easy access to the world's markets. But it is 
in these very regions that the indigenous people have themselves had ample 
opportunity to earn incomes from the sale of crops grown on their own 
farms or smallholdings, and their supply price to potential employers has 
therefore been far higher than that of migrants from a distance. Conse-
quently, the supply of labour is very largely a supply of migrants from the 
less favoured to the more favoured regions. The migrant workers who come 
each year from Ruanda-Urundi to Buganda are a typical example. The 
importance to the Uganda economy of these Banyaruanda immigrants in 
fact confronts Uganda with a third particular difficulty. Because they come 
from outside Uganda's boundaries, the Government's employment policies 
have been wrecked time and again, as Powesland shows, by sudden fluctua-
tions in the number of immigrants, occasioned by circumstances or events 
which might have been amenable to control had they occurred within 
Uganda. 
A feature that distinguishes Uganda and other similar areas from the 
economically advanced countries of the West is not only that their income is 
low, but that it is very unevenly distributed between one region and another. 
In the central area of Buganda and Busoga, the early introduction into the 
indigenous farming system of crops like cotton and coffee, grown not for 
subsistence but for sale, has by now created a volume of money income which 
is in marked contrast with the level of farm incomes reached in the remoter 
parts of Uganda. Moreover, the infusion of money into the economy of this 
central area has been amplified with the wages paid by employers. Buganda 
and Busoga contain the two principal towns, Kampala and Jinja, the two 
large sugar estates, and a variety of other large-scale, alien businesses. Of 
the total enumerated labour force of some 225,000, over one-half are em-
ployed in Buganda and Busoga, and the enumerations do not include an 
estimated 20-30,000 who are employed mostly in one's and two's by Baganda 
cotton and coffee farmers. Only a minority of this labour force are Baganda 
and Basoga ; the overwhelming majority have come to the central area from 
the less favoured outlying districts or from across the Belgian border. Their 
willingness to come has tended to depress the wage level in the central area 
below the point at which it is attractive to the local indigenous population. 
The geographical origin of these migrant workers in Buganda and 
Busoga has changed from time to time as the extension of economic agricul-
ture has reduced the supply of labour from one place, or as a new or higher 
tax had initiated a supply from another. But throughout the period covered 
by this study, migrant labour as such has remained the characteristic feature 
of the labour market and, furthermore, the inflow from Ruanda-Urundi has 
assumed ever greater proportions. 
Migrant labour tends to be inefficient and to generate for the com-
munity as a whole heavy social and medical burdens. Time and again the 
Uganda Government has therefore attempted to pursue policies which would 
free the economy from its dependence on migrant labour and to create in each 
of the employing regions a stabilised labour force or " permanent working 
class ". 
In Kenya and Tanganyika some degree of stability has begun to emerge. 
But it has not been the result of measures the Governments have taken. 
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L U E H E O P L E S O F n r . A M n . 
C H A P T E R I 
THE IMPACT OF MONEY 
From the standpoint of economics, human migration may be regarded 
as an attempt to substitute one geographical environment for another, tem-
porarily or permanently, in pursuit of a higher level of real income, or, more 
precisely, of a new equilibrium between economic activity and the enjoy-
ment of leisure. 
Migration may, of course, be the outcome of motives not primarily 
economic. Religious persecution or power of attraction may be responsible. 
The dispersal of the Huguenots is a classic example of the first, and the vast 
journeys made by pilgrims from French Equatorial Africa and even Nigeria 
across the Sudan to Arabia provide a present-day example of the second. 
In such movements as these, the economic aspects, though they may be of 
great importance, are a consequence rather than a cause of the movement 
itself. Fear, feud, or oppression may also be the impulse setting a migration 
in motion, and in the history of migration into and within Uganda examples 
of such motives are easy to find. 
Nevertheless, in the past fifty years in East Africa it is the economic 
motive that has been by far the most important stimulus to internal migration. 
Migration through and within East Africa is certainly no new phenomenon. 
Its complex and disputed course has left visible evidence in the distinguishing 
physical characteristics of different tribes and, most notably in Uganda and 
Ruanda-Urundi, in the varying extent to which the successive waves of cattle-
owning Hima have produced a more or less clearly defined element of caste 
in the communities found at the terminus of migratory movements. 
The migrations of more recent times clearly differ in character from the 
older ones in many ways, though less, perhaps, in basic motivation than might 
at first be assumed. In the extent to which members of different tribes have 
intermingled, in the directions which the more recent moves have followed, 
in the diversity of the objectives pursued, in the speed with which new dis-
placements of population begin and gather momentum, and in the attraction, 
for the first time, towards growing towns and industrial areas, the population 
movements of the modern colonial period have little in common with the 
shifts of population that occurred in earlier centuries. 
Most of the distinctive features that characterise the East African migra-
tions of the twentieth century can be seen as repercussions, of one sort or 
another, of the native inhabitants' gradual recognition and adoption of 
modern money as part of the indispensable apparatus of life. In Uganda, 
some of the chief effects of the impact of money upon different tribes can be 
traced fairly well by piecing together scattered references from the early 
literature and from administrative records. 
At the turn of the century, concurrently with the establishment of 
settled British Administration in Central Uganda, modern money took 
effect upon the Baganda with remarkable rapidity, and within a short space 
of time many of these people were stirred by the lure of money to a variety 
of unaccustomed activities, including a willingness to travel far and wide in 
search of profitable trade or paid employment. The exceptional eagerness 
with which the Baganda reacted to the introduction of a stable medium of 
exchange and to the greatly increased influx of trade goods—especially after 
the arrival of the railway at the Lake Victoria port of Kisumu in 1901—can 
best be appreciated in the light of earlier Buganda history. 
There is much evidence for the view that a people whose material cul-
ture has hitherto been sheltered from outside influences and has remained 
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relatively undeveloped will react to the sudden opening-up of lines of com-
munication with the outside world in a characteristic manner. They will at 
first be most interested in types of imported goods that can be readily and 
advantageously substituted for goods they have already been in the habit of 
employing and that therefore seem unlikely to involve a serious disruption 
of their accustomed way of life. They may also react favourably to goods 
which, while not desired as improved substitutes for something already in 
use, catch their fancy as curiosa and can easily find a suitable niche in the 
fabric of their culture.1 
In the early days of the opening-up of the Lake Victoria area, when 
costs of transport by head-porterage over hundreds of miles were extremely 
high, cloth, beads, and brass and copper wire were at first the chief articles 
brought in by the traders from the coast who visited Uganda in increasing 
numbers after the middle of the nineteenth century. The cloth brought by 
the Arabs was highly prized by the Kabaka, or ruler of Buganda, and the 
members of his entourage. Native barkcloth was not by any means entirely 
superseded, but cloth was adopted as a finer substitute by persons holding 
high office, and at the time of Chaille Long's visit to Kakaba Mutesa's palace 
in 1874, only members of the court were allowed the privilege of dressing in 
white cotton.2 The Baganda were by tradition punctilious in matters of 
dress : the explorer Speke had, in the early 1860's, noted the dire penalties 
which might be inflicted for breaches of sartorial etiquette.3 The adoption 
of white cloth as a mark of exclusive privilege in a country controlled by a 
powerful, numerous, and status-conscious feudal hierarchy of chiefs made it 
the more probable that later, when cloth, along with other foreign manu-
factures, became rather less rare and expensive, and when the native govern-
ment came to exercise a less arbitrary power over its people, imported tex-
tiles would be among the goods in most popular demand. The prestige 
attaching to cloth was increased with the introduction and adoption of 
Christianity, especially in the eyes of the women. It is not surprising that by 
1904 public opinion in Buganda had come to demand that cloth, exclusively, 
should be worn in church on important occasions.4 
Beads and wire, which in Speke's time (around 1860) were in brisk 
demand in Buganda as in other parts of East Africa, later became of little 
importance in trade. By 1876 Emin Pasha noted5 that in Buganda they were 
not much in demand. Beads no doubt shared the well-known economic 
characteristics of diamonds, so that when communications improved and 
they became abundant, they lost much of their allure. Wire, similarly, went 
out of favour for personal adornment as foreign influence increased and 
Europeans were observed not to use it for such purposes. But the Baganda's 
long familiarity with traffic in these and similar goods possessing some of the 
characteristics of money must have facilitated their ready adoption of 
modern currency when it was introduced in the course of the last decade of 
the nineteenth century. 
Felkin, one of the very first Christian missionaries to work in Uganda, 
in describing the barter carried on in the 'eighties between the Zanzibar 
traders and the Baganda, mentions " an arm's-length of calico and a string 
of 100 cowries" as " the standard articles ". A fat cow cost about 2,500 
cowries or three arm's-length of cloth or two needles, or fifty percussion caps, 
or twenty charges of powder. A young boy-slave was worth 100 caps, four 
needles, or about 4,000 cowries. A young girl-slave was worth about a third 
more. (But the price of slaves at the time was " rising enormously ", f) The 
awkward calculations which such a list of relative values might seem to imply 
probably did not often prove troublesome in practice, for, as Dr. Mair has 
1. Cf. G. St. J. Orde Browne, The African Labourer, London, Oxford University Press, 1933, p. 34. 
2. C. C. Long, Central Africa, London, Sampson Low, 1876, pp. 104, 113. 
3. J. H. Speke, Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile, Edinburgh, Wm. Blackwood and Son, 
1863, p. 255. 
4. The Church Missionary Intelligence, Vol. LV, 1904, p. 494. 
5. I was unable to trace the source of this. Ed. 
6. R. W. Felkin, " Uganda," Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. II, 1886, p. 217. 
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pointed out, trade was to the primitive Muganda a means of acquiring 
specific objects for which some need arose, rather than a perpetual process 
of increasing his total possessions by profitable exchanges.7 
Nevertheless, one important type of exchange—the exchange of labour 
for a wage to the best advantage of both parties—could scarcely have 
established itself so long as rewards were only receivable in kind, at rates 
that were constantly subject to wide variations, because employers would 
time and again have to negotiate and re-negotiate agreements with each 
individual concerned. It was not, in fact, until the rupee began to circulate 
from the last years of the century onward that the growth of a supply of 
voluntary, paid labour became possible. 
At a missionary gathering in 1900 the collection consisted of " thirty-six 
rupees, 25,383 shells, cloth and a can ".8 The rupee was coming in ; but it 
did not immediately displace the earlier media. The cowrie, in particular, 
though it ceased to be acceptable for tax payments in 1901, long continued 
to circulate among natives for the settlement of small transactions9 and also 
to be used in estimating the value of domestic goods, such as cows or bark-
cloth.10 But for the purposes of wage-earning, the payment of taxes, and 
obtaining imported goods, the rupee soon became the unit in terms of which 
people made their calculations. Ham Mukasa recalls how, early in the cen-
tury, the surrounding tribes were increasingly attracted by rumours from 
Buganda to the effect that the old money was no longer of any use, and that 
the Europeans had brought new and better money with them, and how some 
of them therefore came into central Buganda to try to obtain it.11 
The rupee, unlike the earlier cloth and other primitive money, possessed 
comparatively little intrinsic commodity value and was therefore from the 
start likely to be a more stable medium than the items it was superseding. 
The pressure of demand on limited quantities of trade goods that were used 
as quasi-money might raise their internal value far above their value at the 
port plus the costs of transport, very heavy though these were. The relative 
value of the needles referred to by Felkin is an extreme illustration of this. 
In these circumstances a sudden influx of new supplies might speedily reduce 
their relative purchasing power as the commodity demand became in-
creasingly satisfied. Since the rupee was not demanded as a commodity its 
exchange value was therefore less likely first to become fixed at a very high 
level, only to fall suddenly as supplies increased. On the other hand, so 
long as transport costs accounted for a large and variable part of the cost of 
conveying imported goods to Uganda, as was the case with all but the most 
compact and valuable items before the arrival of the Uganda Railway at 
Kisumu in 1901,12 the purchasing power of the rupee must still have been 
very uncertain. 
Despite this uncertainty, the prestige of European goods in the eyes of 
the Baganda in the last decade of the century was such that between 1895 
and 1900 there was an adequate supply of paid labour available for all the 
needs of the time. It was said that by 1897 the Baganda had begun to develop 
" a very considerable readiness " for voluntary work. Roughly 600 were 
being used as labourers at Entebbe and Kampala, at a wage equivalent to 
Shs. 6/- a month. 
Undoubtedly the presence and the teaching of the Christian mission-
aries, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, was a potent influence behind 
7. L. P. Mair, An African People in the Twentieth Century, London, Routledge and Co. Ltd., 1934, p. 144. 
8. Held to mark the sending out of a group of twenty-nine Baganda missionaries to "distant outlying 
districts " : an illustration of one of the chief ways by which the legend of Baganda superiority was 
being powerfully reinforced at this time, and therefore a factor contributing to Buganda's later magnetic 
power as the main centre of attraction for immigrant labour. 
9. H. B. Thomas and R. Scott, Uganda, London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1935, p. 231. 
10. Mair, op. cit., p. 144. 
11. Former Saza chief of Kyagwe county, Buganda, and author of Uganda's Katikiro in England, London, 
Hutchinson & Co., 1904. (Probably a personal communication to the author. Ed.) 
12. In 1896 the cost of bringing loads to Uganda was described as " almost prohibitive ". It cost £8 and took 
2b months to bring a load of 65 lbs. from Mombasa. A similar load could be brought from Bagamoyo 
to Bukumbi, south of the Lake, but it was liable to take much longer and there was the risk of total loss 
on the Lake. (Letter from Bishop Hanlon, Journal of the Manchester Geographical Society, Vol. XII, 
1896, p. 81.) 
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administration in Buganda. Bishop Tucker, who fully recognised the objec-
tions to the tax on grounds of morality and hygiene, saw in it none the less 
this great merit : " it stirred to action and electrified into life the whole 
nation. Men knew that by a certain date the requisite rupees must be forth-
coming . . . They set to work immediately to raise the needed amounts. Men 
from the more distant parts of the country poured into such centres of popu-
lation as Mengo and Entebbe seeking work, the reward of which would be 
rupees. Thus it came about that the element of wages was introduced into 
the life of the Baganda, and another revolution—the economic one—was 
effected".20 It was also recorded : " Where before labour was not easy to 
get, for some months now men have been crowding round asking for work, 
for loads to carry, and bringing all kinds of things for sale ",21 
Hattersley, looking back in 1904 on the changes brought about in the 
space of a few years, said, " It was the imposition of the hut tax . . . and the 
new Treaty, that gave the first great impetus to work and paid labour. It 
became at once understood that whatever the peasant got for his work 
belonged to himself, and had not to be handed over, wholly or in part, to his 
chief. . . Serfdom came practically to an end, and very soon even chiefs had 
to pay for labour to build their own houses ".22 
This reference to the new immunity of the emergent wage-earner from 
unlimited exactions by his chief, brings out another of the pre-conditions of a 
voluntary labour supply : a sufficient measure of personal security. In 
former days and, indeed, almost down to the time of the Uganda Agreement, 
the peasant would have had little incentive to offering his labour for hire, in 
the absence of any certainty of being allowed to keep the proceeds of his 
efforts for his own enjoyment. At the time of Speke's visit, the peasant was 
forbidden to have in his possession any articles of foreign manufacture other 
than beads and brass wire (exchanged, as they were, for ivory or slaves). 
Should cloth, for example, be discovered in his possession, his property 
would be confiscated and his life taken.23 So late as 1896 an explorer who had 
recently visited Uganda expressed the view that the chiefs would undoubtedly 
oppose their people's wishing to work for the white man and would take 
from them part of their wages. Without the security in which to enjoy the 
fruits of his labour, no one would trouble to work for more than a bare 
living. " At present Europeans practically pay the chiefs, who tell their men 
to do the work . . . "—a practice the explorer strongly criticised.24 Writing 
a few years later, another observer said, " The system of paid labour came 
only gradually into force [in Buganda] owing to the passive hostility of the 
chiefs who declined to send labourers . . . they prevented their peasants 
from accepting the paid labour offered by the Government. In 1894 a few 
natives applied voluntarily for work and when they found . . . that they were 
allowed to keep what they had earned, more and more came forward. . . . "26 
Increasing familiarity with modern monetary habits was one of several 
simultaneous developments which, in Buganda at least, quickly began to 
break down these restraints upon the free movement of potential labour. 
The 1900 Agreement, by bringing the exercise of power by the chiefs more 
closely under the surveillance of Her Majesty's representative in Buganda, 
directly promoted the personal security of the peasant. But the land settle-
ment incorporated in the Agreement was also responsible for lessening the 
ties which formerly bound the peasant to his chief, and thus for facilitating 
the mobility of labour. 
In the days before the settled administration of Buganda under the Pro-
tectorate Government's over-rule, the chiefs would have had reason enough 
for discouraging their people from wandering off in search of wealth (to the 
20. A. R. Tucker, op. cit., p. 288. 
21. Mengo Notes, December, 1900, p. 32. 
22. Uganda Notes, June, 1904, p. 85. 
23. J. H. Speke, op. cit., p. 345. 
24. G. F. Scott Elliot, A Naturalist in Mid-Africa, London, Innes, 1896, p. 53. 
25. W. J. Ansorge, Under the African Sun, London, Heinemann, 1899, p. 92. 
limit set by the risk of driving them to shelter under a less exigent rival). 
Chiefs would have been motivated not by mere covetousness but by the 
desire to have their adherents close at hand. The merits of a chief were 
judged very largely by the popularity indicated by the number of his peasants, 
and a chief whose following was noticeably on the decline might be removed 
by the Kabaka to a lesser station.26 Moreover, a chief's wealth consisted 
mainly in personal services and tribute in kind contributed by those claiming 
his protection and the right to cultivate land under his jurisdiction. The 
greater the number of contributors, the better off the chief, and the better 
able to display the degree of lavishness and liberality in feast-giving and other 
manifestations of generosity on which his popularity in turn to a large extent 
depended.27 
With the implementation of the land clauses of the Uganda Agreement 
of 1900, which allocated 8,000 square miles to be distributed amongst 
1,000 chiefs and private landowners (the number had increased to about 
3,700 by 1905),28 the more important chiefs acquired a new source of wealth 
and therefore had less reason to restrain their people from going off to seek 
their fortune in rupees. Besides, the older forms of tribute were no longer 
the only forms of wealth the chiefs could derive from their peasantry. It was 
among the chiefs that the desire for European goods was strongest, and 
many soon began to accept personal tribute in rupees instead of in the form 
of personal services, which did not possess the novel attraction of ready 
convertibility into the marvels of European manufacture which the traders 
were bringing into the country in ever-increasing variety. 
As early as 1905 the payment of a money " r e n t " by tenants seems to 
have become an established practice : it was decided by the Government in 
that year to fix a rental of two rupees per annum for allotments of Crown 
Land held under temporary occupation by natives, on the principle that if 
they were occupying " the land of a native chief" they would pay him a 
similar amount.29 A few years later, when the profitable possibilities of 
cotton-growing came to be recognised and when, partly as a consequence, 
the current wage rate had risen, the chiefs discovered to their embarrassment 
that their tenants were getting the better of them. For a tradition had in-
cautiously been allowed to spring up of commutation being accepted at the 
fixed rate of two rupees. Despite their early acceptance of a money payment 
from tenants in lieu of labour services, the chiefs clung to the idea that they 
had a right to receive their due in the old form if it suited them better. It is 
significant, however, that when in February, 1910, the Buganda native 
authority placed the predicament of the landlords before the Provincial 
Commissioner, it did not suggest going back on the newly established tradi-
tion of commutation at the option of the tenant : it simply asked for 
authority to increase the rent from two to three-and-a-half rupees, this sum 
to be paid by "any tenant who refuses to work for his landlord", so as to 
enable the latter " to get a porter [labourer] to do his work in place of his 
tenant ". The request was granted, and the Government, taking its cue, pro-
ceeded to raise the rental on Crown Land plots in Buganda to the same level.30 
This meant the removal of a large stumbling-block in the way of labour 
movement at an early stage in Buganda's development, whereas elsewhere— 
in Busoga for example—the labour tribute owed personally by peasants to 
their chiefs continued much longer to hinder the free movement of labour. 
Even in Buganda the peasant was still subject to luwalo, the traditional corvee 
of one month's unpaid labour for the upkeep of local roads and native public 
works, an obligation which did not become universally commutable by the 
Baganda until 1930. 
The consensus of contemporary writing leaves little doubt that, in the 
26. W. J. Ansonge, op. cit., p. 158. 
27. L. P. Mair, op. cit., p. 177. 
28. A. B. Mukwaya, Land Tenure in Buganda, Kampala, East African Institute of Social Research, 1953, p. 23. 
29. Entebbe Secretariat Archive, Circular No. 8 of 1905, dated 31st March, 1905. 
30. Entebbe Secretariat Archive, Secretariat Minute Paper (henceforth E.S.A. SMP) 451 (O.S.)/la ; 40. 
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first decade of the present century, it was the Baganda who attracted attention 
as the great travellers of the day, as a result of the new freedom from restraint 
and of the unprecedented demand for cash for buying imports and for 
meeting the hut tax. Baganda were frequently to be found far from home, 
in search of some attractive way of earning money, although later they 
themselves were to become the chief employers of others on a similar quest. 
Statistics that would illustrate the range of their movements are, unfortu-
nately, almost totally lacking, but the unusual activity of the Baganda in 
unaccustomed ways and places gave rise to considerable surprised comment. 
Hattersley, who was an acute observer of the economic aspects of the con-
version of the Baganda to the Christian faith, commented in 1904 : " Now 
great numbers of men are constantly employed carrying about goods for 
barter, and for various expeditions. Not only foreign traders but Baganda 
send out large trading caravans to the Congo Free State and to German 
East Africa . . . and require a large number of porters to carry their barter 
goods and ivory ".31 
Another writer in 1904 likened the Baganda to the Jews : they were no 
longer confined within their own country, but were to be found in every im-
portant trading centre in and around the Protectorate, in isolated stations 
down the railway line and in unexpected corners of remote districts—as far 
north as the Sudan border, in Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole, and eastwards as 
far off as the coast. They were there trading or working as labourers.32 In 1906 
the same story was being told : " Wherever houses are to be built, Government 
stations established, roads constructed, there the Baganda will be found. 
Not only in British territory on both sides of the Lake, but in German terri-
tory to the South and Belgian to the West . . . wherever prospects of trade 
open up, the Baganda will go ",33 There are several references to a substantial 
labour force of Baganda working at Kisumu during this early period. 
Estimates of their number varied between 200 and 500. Most of them stayed 
there for a few months at a time, working as porters or general labourers. 
The inducement was a rate of pay more than double what could be earned in 
Buganda, although food prices were correspondingly higher.34 
The long-established habit amongst travellers and missionaries of com-
paring the Baganda favourably with other tribes was further confirmed by 
the initiative they were displaying in seeking out the best markets for their 
services. " The Baganda have ambition, and the Kavirondo [on the opposite 
side of Lake Victoria] have none. The Baganda travel widely in search 
of wealth, while the Kavirondo stay at home. The Baganda are keen to learn 
new trades, to build better houses, to gain a better education ; they are 
willing to pay the price for these things, and to go through the drudgery neces-
sary for their acquisition. . . . "36 
The fact that so many Baganda were at this time willing to forsake the 
comforts of home and to go abroad in search of money reward, and that they 
were quite willing on occasion " to engage themselves for six months at a 
time to carry loads or work as labourers "36—work of a type that formerly 
and subsequently they were reputed to despise—can be seen as evidence of 
the exceptionally large gap between new and consciously felt wants and the 
domestic or local means available for their satisfaction, rather than as any 
indication, either that they were migrating far from their own country because 
they enjoyed travel for its own sake, or that their prejudices against certain 
types of work were undergoing a permanent change. After the middle of the 
first decade of 1900, Baganda Odysseys seem to have become less common. 
They first took to growing cotton at home ; later, in the years immediately 
preceding World War I, the opening-up of European plantations provided 
31. C. W. Hattersley, " Uganda, Progress of Commerce," Mengo Notes, 1904, pp. 85-6. 
32. " The Eastern Province : from Mengo to Masaka," Uganda Notes, November, 1904, p. 160. 
33. J. J. Willis, " The Mission of the Uganda Church," Uganda Notes, April, 1906, p. 60. 
34. J. J. Willis, " Christian or Mohammedan," Uganda Notes, May, 1904 ; cf. also Native Labour Commission 
Report, 1911-12 (Nairobi), pp. 101, 140. 
35. " Kavirondo, a Comparison and Contrast," Uganda Notes, January, 1906, p. 15. 
36. J. B. Purvis, op. cit., p. 53. 
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them with opportunities to earn money nearer home, although the predilec-
tion of many Baganda for occupations requiring literacy or skill undoubtedly 
still held a considerable number in distant stations and towns. 
The great ambition of many Baganda, however, whether earning money 
away from home or growing cotton or coffee as tenant farmers, has long been 
the same : to save sufficient cash for the purchase of a plot of freehold land. 
In Buganda, the easy transferability of land has, indeed, provided a powerful 
additional incentive, of a kind which in the past has rarely been operative in 
tropical Africa, to economic activity in general. It has not only spurred some 
Baganda to seek remunerative employment, if need be in urban centres away 
from home, but it has also stimulated others to a more intensive development 
of their rented acres, often with the aid of immigrant labourers drawn from 
other tribes, in order to provide the savings required to purchase land.37 
Outside Buganda, the reaction to the opening-up of trade and to pene-
tration by modern money came later, but in the Eastern Province especially 
the first changes associated with such contact occurred rapidly. North and 
east of Lake Kyoga, where Baganda influence had been little exerted, or had 
only recently begun to make itself felt through the arrival of Baganda mis-
sionaries, administrative intermediaries, or colonists,38 there was evidently 
much less familiarity at first with the idea of money and its uses than there 
had been in Buganda itself. In 1906, when the first Governor of Uganda, Sir 
Hesketh Bell, visited Acholi in the remote Northern Province, there was 
clearly not much scope for the displacement of native goods by European 
substitutes : household possessions were limited to " a few calabashes and 
pots and a grass mat or two " ; and the taste for imported objects was still 
in the embryo stage of " small white beads " and " turkey red cloth ".39 
Among the less remote Bakedi40 in the Eastern Province, there were already 
signs of change : the vast majority, as their name implied, still did without 
clothing altogether, but a desire for it was growing, and there were cotton 
goods on sale in the Mbale bazaar, as well as such items as looking-glasses 
and brass wire,41 characteristic of the earliest stage in the evolution of 
African commercial tastes. 
The Governor also commented that year on the willingness of the Bakedi 
to work on the roads for nothing ; this " happy state of affairs", he said, 
could not be expected to last very long. The facilities for trade which were 
being brought to these people would soon give them a sense of the value of 
their time, and each year would show a slackening in their willingness to give 
their due to the State.42 Only four years later, in 1910, the Bakedi were 
selling " enormous crops " of cotton.43 
This swift change owed much to the stimulus given to cotton-growing 
by the administrators and by the Baganda agents whom they were using with 
marked success as demonstrators and intermediaries, although there was 
at first a formidable barrier of incomprehension to be overcome. The District 
Commissioner at Mbale had recently commented upon how difficult it was 
to get the people to take up a new crop, and more especially cotton, because, 
" owing to their entire indifference in money matters ", they could not see 
any object in growing anything but food products.44 Even when baskets of 
cotton were brought into the buying-posts in 1910, it was said that some of 
the " sellers " had to be held back so as to be paid.45 But this was the very 
37. The present-day role of the Baganda as employers of immigrant labour is described in detail by Dr. 
Audrey Richards in Chapters V and VII of Economic Development and Tribal Change, Cambridge, Heffer, 
n.d. 
38. Notably the outstanding chief Kakunguru and his Baganda followers who established themselves near 
Mbale in 1901-2 and paved the way for British administration in that region. (Thomas and Scott, op. cit., 
pp. 445-6.) 
39. Sir Hesketh Bell, Glimpses of a Governor's Life, London, Sampson Low, Marsten and Co. Ltd., n.d., pp. 
138-9. 
40. The term, meaning " the naked people " was often used somewhat indiscriminately in the early days to 
describe a whole group of tribes living westward from Mount Elgon roughly as far as Serere and Pallisa. 
41. G.B. Colonial Reports, Misc. No. 57, Uganda. (London, H.M.S.O., 1909) Cd. 4524, p. 9. 
42. E.S.A. SMP 1054 (O.S.)/Report on His Excellency's tour through the Eastern Province. 
43. Uganda Notes, July, 1910, p. 107. 
44. Supplement to the Uganda Gazette, 1st June, 1909, p. 156. 
45. Uganda Notes, July, 1910, p. 107. 
8 
end of the pre-monetary age for these tribes : the Poll Tax Ordinances had 
been proclaimed operative in Bukedi from 1st April, 1909,46 and henceforth 
there would always have to be at least a bare minimum of cash for all able-
bodied adult males to find. There were signs, too, that apart from an incipient 
demand for cloth there would soon be interest in some of those imported 
goods that could most advantageously replace indigenous ones. News soon 
spread of some of the outstanding bargains to be obtained for rupees. For 
example, in 1909, one of the first requests made by some of the Teso chiefs 
in Eastern Province, with whom the Baganda agents had been making pre-
liminary administrative contacts, was that traders might be sent up into their 
country so that their people might obtain iron hoes.47 But these remoter 
tribes were unlikely to catch up at one step with the Baganda in the extent and 
diversity of money needs. Where the range of indigenous equipment was very 
narrow, the demand for imported substitutes, like iron hoes or enamelled 
ware, was unlikely to be large. A more varied demand for imports had to 
await the spread of literacy, and there were as yet far fewer schools in these 
newly encountered areas than in Buganda, where one estimate put the number 
of children in school by 1913 at the remarkable figure of 80,000.48 
The need to find money for the payment of tax often gave the first im-
pulse to entering the exchange sphere of the country's economy. The two 
chief methods by which the money could be found were to grow cotton or to 
work for wages. The fact that they were not equally available to all meant 
that the real burden of any given tax obligation could vary greatly between 
one person and another and even more between the inhabitants of different 
districts. 
While in Buganda, for example, by 1908 there were still those who pre-
ferred to earn money by trading or hawking cloth and other goods up and 
down the country, cotton was being grown by increasing numbers, and Hat-
tersley commented on the ease with which Baganda could earn the hut tax 
by growing cotton.49 For some of the neighbouring tribes, however, accidents 
of geography—unsuitable climate or soil, and remoteness from communica-
tions—meant that the real cost of finding the tax was much greater than for 
the Baganda or Eastern Province peoples, whose soil and climate happened 
to suit the cotton plant. And this was true in spite of the fact that poll-tax 
rates have always varied in amount from one district to another, so as to 
allow for differences in the average capacity to pay. These disparities between 
one tribe and another and between one part of the country and another in 
the relative availability of opportunities for cash earning, whether for taxes 
or for other money needs that developed, very largely explain the tribal com-
position of the immigrant labour force on which Buganda, and most recently 
the Jinja zone, have come to depend. 
The imposition of the poll tax in the districts surrounding Buganda was 
undoubtedly of first importance in setting in motion this supply of migrant 
labour for the central employment areas. Thus, in 1922, when Alur tribes-
men of the West Nile District in the north were first beginning to come down 
into Bunyoro and Buganda in search of employment, it was said that for 
many of them it was the only way of finding their tax.60 
Many Ankole people, too, at about the same period, found themselves 
in great difficulties over poll tax, in striking contrast to the neighbouring 
Baganda who could rely on cotton to produce the cash they required— 
though even the cotton-growers were not immune from the risks of bad 
weather or a capricious market. The difficulty in the case of the people of 
Ankole was that the inhabitants, like the Bagisu living on the cool slopes of 
Mount Elgon, had really nothing but their livestock to convert into money, 
and even this—" the only riches of our country ", as the Omugabe, ruler of 
46. Uganda Gazelle, 1st April, 1909, p. 72. 
47. Supplement to the Uganda Gazette, 1st June, 1909, p. 183. 
48. The Uganda Herald, Kampala, 1st August, 1913, p. 13. 
49. C. W. Hattersley, The Baganda at Home, London, Religious Tract Society, 1908, p. 114. 
50. E.S.A. SMP 2002 (O.S.)/569. 
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Ankole, had described them in an appeal to the Governor against any im-
mediate tax increase—had recently been decimated by rinderpest.51 By 1920, 
however, the way seemed open for the imposition of the higher tax, which 
was accordingly raised from Rs. 5/- to Rs. 7/50 from January 1st, 1921, with 
the agreement of the Omugabe and his council. The effects of the increase soon 
began to make themselves felt on the Banyankole with a severity that was 
quite unforeseen, for the increase coincided with the first post-war depression. 
The Bishop of Uganda, in August, 1921, called the Government's 
attention to the grave repercussions of the tax on Ankole life. Losses among 
herds through disease had almost eliminated the trade in hides and in salt 
for the cattle. There were no European plantations in Ankole, and neither 
cotton nor coffee had proved a success. In order to find the necessary money 
for the poll tax, the majority were compelled to make the journey of about 
250 miles each way to Buganda, and even there, the depression was severely 
restricting the field of employment open to casual immigrants from other, 
still more impoverished, districts. Many, therefore, returned, having failed 
to earn the full amount for the tax required, while others remained in 
Buganda—often with a disastrous effect on domestic life. The severity of the 
tax also caused people to migrate in the opposite direction, to Kigezi in the 
far south-west corner of Uganda, where the tax was lower, and even over the 
border into Ruanda. In many parts of Ankole people had reverted to skins 
for clothing. 
As a result of this and other reports in the same vein, the Provincial 
Commissioner was instructed in October, 1921, to exercise wide discretion 
in collecting outstanding taxes for the current year, and the rate was cut to 
Florins 5/- for 1922.52 The reduction did not, however, make it any less 
necessary for large numbers of Banyankole to seek work in Buganda. 
As Ruanda-Urundi came under closer administration by the Belgians, 
the effect of taxation there was likewise to stimulate movement into Buganda 
to earn the cash required, and in subsequent years immigrants from this 
region have constituted numerically the most important single element in 
the alien population which the Baganda have drawn into their country. The 
fact that an international boundary crosses the path of the immigrants from 
Ruanda-Urundi interposes the additional variable of the Congolese franc-
sterling exchange rate into the nexus between tax obligations and their ful-
filment. So far as can be judged from statistics whose reliability, especially 
for the early years of the movement, leaves much to be desired, the Banya-
ruanda and Barundi have generally reacted sensitively to changes occasioned 
by variations in the exchange rate, as to the relative advantages of money-
earning in Uganda or in Ruanda-Urundi. 
Migration is in a sense dependent upon the existence of money as a 
unit of account or a measure of value. A measure of value is necessary to 
enable people to assess the relative advantage of migrating or of staying put. 
Yet it is precisely in this role of a measure of value that money also intro-
duces a number of concealed tendencies, which distort the judgement of all 
concerned in a labour market : the judgement of would-be workers, of 
employers, and of the Government in its capacity as the final arbiter of what 
is in the public interest. 
The individual tribesman is prone to suffer from a peculiar form of 
" money illusion ". He tends to regard money as belonging to a fund to be 
exclusively reserved for a clearly demarcated category of uses—for paying 
tax and buying imported goods, or for bride-price (either through the pur-
chase of cattle or directly), or for similar special purposes. He is often reluc-
tant to reconcile himself to the necessity of paying money for native-grown 
food, which he has always taken for granted as, if not a free food in the sense 
of being available at no real cost, at least something supplied independently 
51. E.S.A. SMP 3841 (0.s.)/20c and 5355 (0-S.)/20b. 
52. E.S.A. SMP 5355 (O.S.)/37. The rupee had been converted Into the florin in July, 1920, but the change 
was short-lived and the florin was superseded by the shilling currency as from 1st January, 1922. (Thomas 
and Scott, op. cit., p. 232). 
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of the restricted monetary sector of his personal or domestic economy. His 
attitude may, perhaps, be likened to the irrational irritation of an English 
motorist who comes to a toll road in a remote part of the country. A wage 
differential between town and country, or between one district and another, 
has therefore a tendency to stimulate movement into the high money wage 
area to a greater extent than would be the case if the money cost of food and, 
in some cases, of shelter were given due weight in the migrant's calculations. 
The " money illusion " may show itself in another form. The migrant 
may discover that he now has to pay for everyday necessities—food, beer, 
fuel—which he had always assumed belonged outside the monetary sphere, 
and that, in addition, urban working conditions impose heavier demands for 
clothing (notwithstanding the extreme leniency of African public opinion in 
the matter).. He may try to maintain his accustomed consumption standards 
and in consequence find himself as far away from the mirage of his original 
intentions as he was when he first arrived. His exposure to unexpected temp-
tations to buy merely aggravates his predicament. Thus the District Com-
missioner, Ankole, complained in 1914 of the " extreme difficulty " of getting 
poll tax from the Banyankole who went to Buganda plantations with the 
object of earning the sum required. " As a general rule these men return here 
with only one or two rupees, having spent the rest of the money on clothes or 
meat in Buganda or Buddu, and are as far off paying their tax as when they 
left Ankole ",53 Pages, similarly, writing in 1930 of the inhabitants of Bugoyi 
in Ruanda, says : " Les jeunes gens et meme les hommes faits avaient durant 
ces dernieres annees une tendance a aller chercher fortune en territoire 
anglaise, oil les salaires sont plus eleves a cause de la valeur du shilling. lis 
reviennent generalement avec des economies tres modestes car ils depensent 
sur place presque tous leurs gains en nourriture et en habillement. On cite 
des pauvres diables qui sont rentres au logis familial plus pauvres qu'ils ne 
l'etaient au depart ".84 
The money wage also helps to create something of an illusion in the 
employer's eyes. In depersonalising the link between himself and his employ-
ees, it tends to reduce labour in his mind to an aggregate of equivalent units— 
in fact, to the African analogue of the English labouring class which Ricardo 
saw as a race apart, and to the " labour " of the elementary economic theory.68 
The outcome of such an attitude tends to produce its justification. The partial 
nature of the commitment between employer and employee is not readily 
understood by the African migrant fresh from his tribal environment ; and 
the employer who does not take a personal interest in the labourers he 
employs, and thus fails to supplement the contractual link from which the 
unsophisticated labourer derives so little effective satisfaction, is apt to be 
faced with a rapid rate of labour turnover. 
A rapid labour turnover, whether for this or other reasons, such as the 
unfamiliar nature of the tasks to be performed, the pursuit of a higher wage 
elsewhere, or difficulties over the food supply, in turn tends to confirm the 
reputation of migrant labour as inexperienced and unreliable, with an average 
worth per man so small that a serious attempt at differentiation often does 
not seem worth while. 
The effects of modern money and exchange, upon the habits of thought 
and behaviour proper to a pre-monetary economy are not, of course, the sole 
cause of the characteristic mobility of the newly emergent labour force in a 
country in the early phase of the disruption of its tribal organisation. In 
Uganda the mere establishment of law and order over areas that had been 
53. E.S.A. SMP 1493 (O.S.)/l(2). 
54. P. PagAs, Un Royaume Hamite au Centre de VAfrique, Brussels, 1933, p. 637. 
55. See, for instance, P. Saffra (Ed.), The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Vol. I, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 93. 
It is true that employers may readily distinguish between labour originating from different tribes and may 
recognise the differences in the quality associated with these distinctive elements in the general labour 
supply. For example, in Uganda the West Nile tribes have long been regarded as the best source of labour 
for such heavy work as sugar-cane cutting, and are usually paid at substantially higher rates than, e.g., 
Banyaruanda, who tend to be allocated to lighter tasks. But within any one tribal group of this sort, a 
similar absence of differentiation is likely to be found. 
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perpetually in dispute, coupled with the opening-up of communications, made 
unhindered movement possible to an extent previously unknown. The 
Foreign Office Commissioner Sadler, for example, observed that the fact that 
natives of, say, Ankole and Bunyoro in the West could move as freely through 
Buganda as in their own country struck them as " perhaps the most direct 
evidence of our rule ". Carrying arms became unnecessary, and caravans of 
porters could now traverse the Protectorate without escort and without fear 
of molestation.66 
Moreover, the message of Christianity and the " liberating and energising 
philosophy of life implied in its teaching ",57 where it penetrates below the 
level of mere imitation and outward form, stresses the supreme value of the 
person and at the same time the personal accountability of the individual for 
the life he leads. An individualistic conception of society is made the more 
comprehensible, and less daring is required of those who decide to " use their 
initiative " and embark on a course not previously traced out by custom. 
Thus Christianity in its own right, quite apart from concomitant influences 
working in the same direction, helps to detach the individual temporarily from 
his native society and thereby facilitates the mobility of tribesmen seeking 
paid employment. 
Yet, however effectually the penetration of money, the lure of trade, and 
the influence of Christian teaching may continue to facilitate and stimulate 
the growth of a labour force, the size and structure of that labour force and 
the nature of the economy which it sustains, and by which it is itself sustained, 
can only be understood in relation to the demand for labour and to the 
policy of the Government both as an employer and as a law-giver. 
C H A P T E R I I 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE ATTRACTION OF LABOUR, 
1900-1921 
Although the British protectorate in Uganda was provisionally pro-
claimed in April, 1893, and finally ratified in August, 1894,1 the settled 
administration of the country really dates from Sir Harry Johnston's period 
of office as H.M. Special Commissioner at the turn of the century. Johnston 
reached Kampala in December, 1899, and lost no time in negotiating the 
Uganda Agreement with the Buganda Regents on behalf of the infant Kabaka 
and the Baganda chiefs and people. The signing of the Agreement on 10th 
March, 1900, did much to disperse the fog of uncertainty which had hitherto 
made it difficult to establish a workable system of administration. 
The small Protectorate staff had until then been pre-occupied with 
military operations necessitated by the {Intrigues \of Kabarega, the ruler of 
neighbouring Bunyoro, and latterly by the mutiny of the Sudanese troops 
garrisoning the country. As Johnston explained, until the British power had 
completely shown its strength by the capture of the rebellious Kabaka 
Mwanga and Kabarega in April, 1899, no native assemblage of chiefs would 
ever have agreed to contributing taxes in support of the British administra-
tion.2 There was in any case little possibility of raising revenue so long as 
external trade remained dependent on porterage between the coast and the 
Lake, and there was the further obstacle that lack of any assurance of security 
in the tenure of land inhibited the cultivation of new crops.3 
The 1900 Agreement defined the political and administrative relation-
ship between the Protectorate Government and the Kabaka and his Council, 
and incorporated the unique form of land settlement out of which developed 
the " mailo " system of tenure in quasi-freehold, peculiar to Buganda.4 
From the economic point of view the most significant clauses of the Agree-
ment were those defining this land settlement and providing for taxation. 
The tax agreement was of immediate importance, whereas the land settlement, 
apart from its immediate psychological effect in removing uncertainty, only 
gradually revealed its full implications for Buganda's economic development. 
^ Thg_remarkable impetus, given _to the-formation _ofa voluntary labour 
/ supplyJbyJkeJm^sit ioimLthe hut tax in Buganda under the terms of the 
- Agreement has already been referred to.5 The fact prompts the question as to 
whether the tax rate was generally used as a deliberate means of creating a 
labour force. Reading some of the comments of contemporary observers 
on the " shock " effect of the first hut tax of three rupees, one might conclude 
that here was a method open to the authorities for producing a voluntary 
labour supply by administrative fiat. The potentialities of the tax as a 
stimulus to effort were certainly appreciated by the Government in the early 
days of administration in Buganda. Johnston's successor, Lt.-Col. J. H. 
Sadler, told a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute in December, 1904, 
" I have no hesitation in saying that this tax will prove to be the making of 
1. The Protectorate at first related only to Buganda. but was formally extended in June, 1896, to Bunyoro 
and other outlying portions of the British sphere of influence. (Thomas and Scott, Uganda. p 36.) 
2. Report by H.M. Special Commissioner on the Protectorate of Uganda. Africa No. 7, 1901, Cd. 671, p. 6. 
3. The anxiety over land is illustrated in a letter of June, 1896, from Bishop Hanlon in which he refers to 
rice seed and wheat seed being distributed among the chiefs as an inducement to " the peaceful and 
profitable labour of agriculture ". Some had taken to it kindly, but " others refused to take it up on the 
grounds of insecurity of tenure in their holdings " . (Journal of the Manchester Geographical Society, Vol. 
XII, 1896, p. 81.) 
4. Limited areas of freehold land were also granted, under the Toro and Ankole Agreements of 1900 and 
1901 respectively, to the native rulers of each of these kingdoms and a few dozen leading chiefs. (Thomas 
and Scott, op. cit., p. 101.) For a description of the " mailo " system in Buganda see Mukwaya, Land 
Tenure in Buganda, passim. 
5. See pp. 4-5. 
13 
the country, not only because of the revenue it brings in but because of the 
habits of work it inculcates. . . . " 6 Whether applied to the cultivation of 
saleable produce or to wage-earning, the growth of " habits of work " 
benefited the revenue by providing the means for paying the tax in cash.7 
^ I n 1905 a poll tax of two rupees was added to the hut tax, apparently at 
the suggestion of the Buganda Regents themselves. The new tax was levied 
on those adult males in Buganda who had so far been able to avoid the hut 
tax ; and on this occasion the Government justified the extra levy, on 
grounds not only of equity, sanitation (by reducing overcrowding in taxed 
huts), and morality, but also of industry. The effect of the poll tax, it was 
explained, would be to increase the number of those in search of work.8 
But it had also been made quite clear that although it was " a matter of the 
first importance . . . to raise revenue ", this was to be done without pressing 
severely on the natives or hampering European commerce. The utmost 
patience and forbearance were to be shown in the collection of the tax until 
its bearing had been thoroughly ascertained in practice.9 
Johnston, who was present at the meeting Sadler addressed in 1904, 
explained the administrator's difficulties in trying to strike a balance between 
the conflicting opinions currently held on the taxation of natives. He had 
always felt that " . . . whilstiLwas^our privilege to bring bloodshed to an end 
and introduce safety and a civilised government, it was equally the duty of 
the negro to play up to that policy by providing what share he was able to 
afford of the expense of governing his own country ". Such a view hardly 
suggests that Johnston regarded taxation as the prime mover in the genera-
tion of economic power in a new country like Uganda. 
There are in any case various practical limitations to the extent to which 
it is possible to rely on taxation as an effective spur to economic activity, to 
say nothing of the moral aspects of such a course. Unless the tax is kept low 
enough to be payable without much difficulty by the less prosperous, the 
result will be, either to inflict serious hardship on those least able to pay, or 
to cause them to move to another part of the country or across the frontier. 
If arrangements have to be made for many exemptions or partial exemptions, 
a heavy additional administrative burden will be created. The various pos-
sible effects of an excessively high rate of tax were illustrated in the case of 
Ankole in 1921, discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, a rise in the 
poll tax will generally be used as a lever for securing a higher normal wage 
rate. This tendency seems to have been particularly marked in Uganda, 
where the consensus of public opinion very soon became wedded to the 
view that there was an almost automatic connection between a rise in the 
poll-tax rate and an equivalent rise in the monthly wage rate. During the 
period when cash was .still only beginning to circulate, the Government's 
willingness to accept one month's labour from those unable to produce rupees 
probably did much to establish in the minds of natives the idea of a fair price 
"Tor labour, and thatThe. period of work necessary for meeting the tax ought 
not to^exceedr a month. 
As more positive incentives to wage-earning grow, and increasing num-
bers seek work for more than a month or two during the year, in order to 
provide themselves not only with a poll-tax receipt but also with imported 
goods, the proportion of total labour supply attributable to the tax demands 
of chief or collector must steadily diminish. In Major Orde Browne's view : 
" Probably the first introduction of taxation in afra w j n b e l n a y serve as the 
preliminary inducement to many of them to seek work, but after they have 
formed the habit it seems very doubtful if a few shillings added to the tax will 
6. Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, Vol. XXXVI, 1904-1905, p. 72. 
7. As an alternative in the early days, the Government accepted a month's labour in lieu of the cash pay-
ment, and while the rupee currency was still very scarce a large proportion of the taxes had to be accepted 
in this way. By 1904. however, partly as a result of Government initiative in facilitating the disposal of 
native-grown produce to the traders, taxes were being largely paid in cash. 
8. A. R. Cook, Uganda Memories (1897-1940), Kampala, The Uganda Society. 1945, p. 201. 
9. Instructions to Lt.-Col. J. H. Sadler on appointment as H.M. Commissioner and Consul-General in the 
Uganda Protectorate, Africa No. 2, 1902, Cd. 910, p. 2. 
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really influence the decision of many men as to whether they should remain 
at home or not ".10 In Uganda, nevertheless, poll-tax obligations remained a 
major spur to temporary wage-earning for many years, especially among the 
more remote tribes. There can be little doubt that the " demonstration 
effect " of the consumption of imported goods by members of other races or 
by wealthy and educated Africans very much affects the rate at which the 
poll tax is superseded as the chief incentive to wage-earning. The effect will 
vary between tribes, according to the degree of contact with peoples accus-
tomed to a higher level of consumption of such goods. 
It seems probable that while the early administrators levied poll tax in 
full awareness of its advantages from the point of view of stimulating per-
sonal exertion, there was no single-minded policy of making frequent adjust-
ments to the rate so as to call forth the maximum possible amount of labour. 
For the first few years of the century, the exceptionally keen interest of the 
Baganda in cloth and other imports, and the new taxes, were enough to pro-
duce a local labour supply that sufficed to meet the needs of the Government 
and of commercial employers, especially as even at this early stage the supply 
was supplemented by migrants coming in from up-country districts, notably 
from Toro, Bunyoro, and Ankole.11 The authority of the chiefs was still 
virtually unimpaired, and this, too, reacted favourably on the labour supply. 
The Colonial Office was informed in 1906 that in Buganda " practically the 
whole of the land is in the hands of its chiefs and their influence over the 
peasantry is at present sufficiently strong to ensure a steady and abundant 
supply of unskilled labour ",12 
Real difficulties over labour supply only started to trouble the Govern-
ment as the cumulative processes it had set in motion began to run into con-
flict with one another. The lines on which development was proceeding were 
directed by certain basic assumptions about the aims to be pursued by the 
protecting power. These assumptions were rarely set forth in explicit terms, 
and they seem to have been still less frequently consciously related to one 
another in detail. 
There was first the predominant idea informing '^mperia!_policy ", and 
^colonial policy in particular at the time, which was that the newly acquired 
• tropical territories were "undeveloped estates", which had to be taken in 
hand and developed so that their resources might be made available to the 
world at large and that the moral and material well-being of their native 
inhabitants might be advanced through contact with civilisation. " We, in 
our colonial policy, as fast as we.acquire new territory and develop it, 
develop it as trustees of civilisation for the commerce of the world ", said 
Chamberlain.13 The British Government had only reluctantly agreed to the 
assumption of a protectorate over Uganda in 1893-94, and at that time 
philanthropy probably weighed more heavily in the balance of decision than 
the claims of overseas commerce and investment.14 But during the following 
decade views on the policy to be adopted in Uganda were swept along in the 
train of the Chamberlain philosophy of development. As Lord Olivier has 
recalled : " That word [development] recurs incessantly in State papers and 
governors' speeches as describing the principal aim to which regard must be 
had . . . not only in the interests of European adventurers in these new colonial 
enterprises, but in framing conceptions of the interest of natives, which are 
presumed to be bound up with ' development,' in determing ' native policy ' 
and deciding what manner of obligations shall be primarily imposed on 
natives . . . and what attitude shall be adopted . . . towards the question of 
their own indigenous economies ",16 
10. G. St. J. Orde Browne, The African Labourer, p. 32. 
11. Despatch No. U.P. 233 or December, 1906. 
12. Despatch No. U.P. 236 of December, 1906. 
13. Joseph Chamberlain quoted in Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa, Edinburgh & London, 
Blackwood, 1929, p. 60. 
14. See D. A. Low, " British Public Opinion and the Acquisition of Uganda," Uganda Journal, Vol. 18, 
1954, pp. 81-100, passim. 
15. Lord Olivier, White Capital and Coloured Labour, London, Hogarth Press, 1929, p. 56. 
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Johnston's view in 1901 was that although the British were in Uganda 
for political and philanthropic reasons, the Administration and the people 
of Uganda were under an obligation to relieve the British taxpayer as soon 
as possible of the necessity for providing subventions to balance the country's 
budget. In his view the British taxpayer should be helped to profit from the 
interest he had taken in providing funds for the administration of the Pro-
tectorate. This profit would be in the marked development of British com-
merce in the countries of the Protectorate—although he made it clear that 
he was not in favour of restricting trade between Uganda and other 
countries.16 
But the word " development" could cover important differences of 
meaning when used by different persons. Thus Johnston was not in favour 
of handing over large districts as exclusive concessions to companies for 
plantation development—not, at least, until other expedients had been tried. 
He evidently hoped that with security of life and property guaranteed there 
would be good prospects of a substantial trade in low-priced native products, 
which would at once benefit the native himself, the European trader, and 
the finances of the Administration.17 
Sadler, on appointment as Johnston's successor, was told to continue 
to encourage all measures tending to the improved welfare of the natives and 
the increase of commerce. The two objectives were closely and rather cur-
iously associated in the instructions of the Foreign Office. He was asked to 
bear in mind that, although administration was to be firmly established in the 
south and west of the Protectorate, " in the opinion of His Majesty's Govern-
ment, it is not desirable to push too quickly amongst tribes in the outlying 
districts who have little to offer at present in the way of commerce, and who 
have not yet become accustomed to the sojourn of white men in their midst. 
Such tribes should be attracted to larger centres where they will see the work 
of civilisation in progress and begin to appreciate its advantages". His 
mandate, in brief, was " to carry on the administration of the Protectorate 
with the utmost economy consistent with its efficiency and the welfare of 
those entrusted to [his] care ",18 
The general " duty " upheld at the time to develop uncivilised tropical 
resources for the benefit of the outside world was thus strongly reinforced in 
the case of Uganda by the immediate necessity of increasing revenue in order 
to lighten the burden of the subsidy contributed by the Imperial Treasury, 
although it was accepted that there was no immediate prospect of dispensing 
with this assistance.19 Within the wide limits set by such a mandate, there 
was ample scope for different individual interpretations. Sadler, when 
writing his report for the year 1903-04, had reached the conclusion that 
" the development of the Protectorate will be by native agency under 
European supervision, and with the help of European capital. Land was 
available on favourable terms, and money could be profitably invested in the 
cultivation of rubber ; the work would be done by paid native labour under 
the supervision of the European ",20 Concurrently, however, experiments 
with cotton seed imported by the Government and by the Church Mis-
sionary Society's industrial arm were already showing very promising results, 
and cotton was about to reveal its enormous potentialities as a purely native-
grown crop. There is an indication in Sadler's 1903-04 report of early signs 
of labour difficulties. 
As has frequently been the case since then, there was at this time a close 
connection between labour and medical problems in Uganda. The somewhat 
incautious reference in Sadler's original instructions from the Foreign 
Office, recommending that the remoter tribes should be attracted into the 
larger centres, showed no awareness of the medical hazards entailed by large 
16. G.B. Report . . . on the Protectorate of Uganda, Cd. 671, pp. 7-8. 
17. H. H. Johnston, The Uganda Protectorate, London, Hutchinson, 1902, Vol. I, p. 296. 
18. G.B. Instructions to Lt.-Col. J. H. Sadler . . . Cd. 910, pp. 2-3. 
19. Ibid., p. 3. 
20. G.B. General Report on the Uganda Protectorate, Africa No. 12, 1904, Cd. 2250, p. 28. 
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movements of population. Sadler soon encountered them in full force in 
a sleeping-sickness epidemic, which wrought havoc in the Lake areas of 
Uganda for more than ten years. One of the consequences of the epidemic 
and of the attempts to localise it was that " hut-tax labour " was rendered 
much less useful to the Government, since men could no longer be brought 
in from the remoter districts to work at headquarters at Entebbe. Deprived 
of these supplements to the local labour supply at Entebbe and Kampala, 
the Government was experiencing increasing difficulty in procuring sufficient 
labour for transport.21 The Regents' suggestion that a poll tax should be 
introduced as a complement to the hut tax was, therefore, opportune, and 
its imposition after 1904 seems to have given a further boost to the labour 
supply sufficient to keep the problem in abeyance for another two years. 
In the meantime, the control of Uganda had passed from the Foreign 
Office to the Colonial Office. Sir Hesketh Bell, who reached Uganda in May, 
1906, and became the Protectorate's first Governor the following year, re-
garded the Protectorate as " one of the greatest of our ' undeveloped 
estates ' ",22 but his policy for developing it showed a distinct shift in empha-
sis. He had been given to understand, at the Colonial Office, that he would be 
allowed " a fairly free hand",23 and his personal conception of the nature of 
his task left a distinctive mark on the course of development during the period 
of his governorship. " I am concerned ", he recorded in his diary (28th June, 
1906), " that every effort should be made to avoid the intrusion of alien 
interests in land, and that our policy should be the creation of an essentially 
African state. . . . "24 It was to be expected, therefore, that he would en-
courage the nascent cotton industry. " I think there can be no doubt of the 
suitability of this country for a really large production of cotton. The soil, 
rainfall and labour conditions all seem to be ideal, and I am going to con-
centrate on this matter ",25 He did so, and cotton-growing during his tenure 
of office became quickly and permanently established as the leading cash 
crop for the peasant farmer, notably in Buganda, and increasingly in the 
Eastern Province. 
The enthusiasm with which the Baganda took to cotton-growing soon 
had its repercussions on the labour supply. Early in 1907, Sir Hesketh Bell 
was lamenting his inability to carry out the various schemes in his mind for 
developing the territory, owing to " miserably inadequate " financial re-
sources. The total revenue that could be raised locally was barely £100,000 a 
year : this allowed for little beyond official salaries and the maintenance of 
the armed forces. " I am tired of impressing on the people at home that now 
is the time for spending money on essential public works. With natives willing 
and anxious to work for only threepence a day, we can do, for £1,000 now, 
what will cost ten times that sum in twenty years' time ",2S Later in the same 
year, however, there were unmistakable signs of a falling-off in this willing-
ness to work for the wages offered. 
Contributions to the mission journal, Uganda Notes, now tended to 
stress the inadequacy of the " wants " of the Baganda, in marked contrast 
to earlier approving comments on their advanced tastes. Observers in the 
past had probably been prone to generalise rather too readily from the 
spectacular eagerness of some of the leading chiefs to buy English suits, 
typewriters, furniture, etc. Now there was a reaction. " Before we can get 
what is required in regard to the labour market, we must first develop the 
wants of the working population. How to develop such wants is a most 
difficult problem. . . . "2 7 In September, 1908, Uganda Notes commented : 
" The porterage difficulties increase from month to month. . . . The popula-
tion of Buganda is not what it was, yet the local demand for labour in Kam-
21. Ibid., p. 2. 
22. Sir Hesketh Bell, Glimpses of a Governor's Life, p. 155. 
23. Ibid., p. 117. 
24. Ibid., p. 122. 
25. Ibid., p. 146. 
26. Ibid., p. 155. 
27. T. B. Fletcher, " Notes from Masaka," Uganda Notes, 1908, p. 61, 
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pala district has increased enormously in the last few months. Natives 
evidently find it far more profitable nowadays to carry their own cotton to the 
factories in Kampala, than hiring themselves out at the current porterage 
rates. . . ,"28 The numbers of men needed for porterage at the main centres 
had by this time grown to an alarming extent. In November, 1907, it was 
estimated that over 10,000 porters were in daily demand in Kampala alone,29 
and the implications for the Government's constructional programme were 
obvious : road-building claimed priority. It was also clear that the further 
expansion of cotton acreage depended on transport facilities being provided 
to link the inland agricultural centres with the Lake ports. Although the 
cotton-grower was quite willing to bring his crop in over reasonable distances, 
it was reported in 1908 : " Every peasant in the country appears to be willing 
to grow cotton on condition that he be not obliged to carry his crop on his 
head for more than a two days' journey ". For lack of transport there was 
already a tendency to leave cotton to rot in the fields.30 But the Government 
itself, as employer, had suffered from an " unexpected dwindling " of the 
labour supply during 1907,31 which did not augur well for rapid progress 
with new projects for road construction. 
By December, 1908, the mounting complaints from the various Govern-
ment departments of the difficulty of obtaining an adequate supply of labour 
moved the Governor to introduce a new administrative procedure, which was 
immediately and remarkably successful in solving the Government's labour 
problem—at least for the next few years. The chiefs had already been using 
their influence in support of the Government's labour needs, but latterly 
without much effect.32 Sir Hesketh Bell's innovation was to place this assis-
tance on an organised basis for the first time. He pointed out that if Buganda's 
estimated population of 150,000 able-bodied men was drawn upon to the 
extent of one month's work per man each year, this would put at the Govern-
ment's disposal a supply of some 12,000 labourers—a number that could 
certainly be expected to meet requirements. There were, in addition, a con-
siderable number of people from Toro, Bunyoro, and Ankole who found their 
own way down to Entebbe and Kampala in search of work, and they would 
relieve the strain on the Baganda. The chiefs would be responsible for in-
ducing their people to work " for the usual wages, for at least one month in 
each year ", the names of those liable to the call being read off from the tax 
registers. The exemption provisions allowed those who could show that they 
were in permanent employment to claim to be excused the call. The Governor 
concluded, " I think we can reasonably expect the native chiefs, who are 
supposed to have such authority in the country, to show that they possess 
sufficient moral influence over their people^ to induce each man to work for 
one month at a reasonable wage ",33 
The scheme ran very smoothly at first. It was even reported that some 
of the Buganda county chiefs had sent in applications on behalf of their 
people, asking to be allocated a greater percentage of the labour required so 
that they could earn their poll tax.34 (The counties referred to were probably 
some of those less favourably situated from the point of view of cotton 
marketing.) Though at first designed to meet the labour difficulties in Buganda, 
the scheme was also extended, in varying degrees of application, to other 
districts as the voluntary labour supply became insufficient for official 
requirements. The introduction of the new system, which became known in 
official as well as native parlance as kasanvu,35 meant that for some fourteen 
years (1909-1922) the labour market in Uganda was no longer open to the 
free play of demand and supply. 
28. Uganda Notes, September, 1908, pp. 129-130. 
29. E.S.A. SMP 1437/07/la. 
30. G.B. Colonial Annual Reports : Uganda 1907-8, Cd. 4448, p. 4. 
31. Despatch No. U.P. 100 of July, 1907. 
32. Uganda Notes, September, 1908, pp. 129-130. 
33. E.S.A. SMP 2002/08/1/1. 
34. E.S.A. SMP 2002/08/11/55. 
35. The origin of the word, which in Luganda means " 7000", is not known. Probably it related to the 
number of men required at one of the earlier levies. 
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Uganda was not, of course, exceptional among the African colonial 
territories in finding it necessary to resort to a system involving compulsion 
in order to meet its labour needs in the early stages of development. Un-
doubtedly, if the Treasury had given Sir Hesketh Bell further rein, the imple-
mentation of his numerous plans and projects for the development of the 
country would have precipitated a labour crisis even earlier than in 1908. 
There is no need to recount the circumstances that in many of the African 
territories in the past have given rise to compulsory systems of one kind or 
another. 
In Buganda, where the burden of kasanvu fell most heavily, the Pro-
tectorate Government was unusually fortunate in having a strongly organised 
native administration at hand, able to give effect to the compulsory system, 
at first without great difficulty. But other elements in the many-sided develop-
ment policy of the protecting power were at the same time gradually reducing 
the personal authority of the chiefs. Formerly, they had exercised direct and 
unquestioned authority over the peasants' daily comings and goings. Now 
their power to do so was being impaired ; it was threatened by new criteria 
of personal eminence, related to a man's style of living rather than to his 
position. It was also undermined by the peasant's power to commute at will 
the tribute he formerly owed in personal services. Chief and landlord were 
in any case gradually separating into different persons, the private landowner 
carrying with him, and devaluing in the process, some of the prestige formerly 
attached uniquely to the chief. These changes were obvious to the Baganda 
themselves. A contribution to the Buganda missionary journal, Ebifa, in 
1913, for example, expressed alarm at the manner in which some landowners 
were disregarding the advice of the leading chiefs and were selling land to 
Europeans instead of leasing it. Freedom had ruined the people, the writer 
said, because they no longer listened to the chiefs, nor children to their fathers. 
Peasants before the court would sometimes abuse the chiefs, as though they 
were not aware of their greatness, and this was due to freedom.36 
The date of this contribution is significant : by 1913 a miniature boom 
in plantation development was in full swing in Uganda. After Sir Hesketh 
Bell's departure in 1909, there had been another perceptible shift in develop-
ment policy. During his period of office there had been no great activity in 
planting by non-natives, although information supplied to the Colonial 
Office for the Emigrants' Information Handbook still carried (as it had since 
1902) the statement that " native unskilled labour is plentiful and cheap".37 
But now that kasanvu was acting on the local population as a new incentive 
to seek voluntary paid employment for long enough to provide exemption 
from the call, conditions were especially favourable to an expansion of the 
plantation industry. The District Commissioner, Kampala, reported in 
April, 1910, that " the few European plantations so far commenced upon 
find little difficulty, and for some time to come are scarcely likely to experi-
ence difficulty, in obtaining a sufficient and steady supply of Baganda male 
workers for their development. Such work has so far proved popular 
enough ",38 
By 1911 optimism was running high. Uganda Notes published a series 
of reports on plantation development then in progress. The success of two 
of the earliest estates proved, according to one of the reports, " that Uganda, 
at any rate so far as the county of Kyagwe is concerned, is a planter's country, 
and for rubber is second only to Ceylon ". Labour all over Kyagwe county 
was stated to be " plentiful ".39 But the labour position described by the 
Provincial Commissioner, Buganda, in his report for 1910-11, was much less 
promising. He pointed out that during the 1911 cotton harvest large numbers 
were engaged in carrying the crop, and the fact that peasants from the 
36. Uganda Herald, 28th March, 1913 (which published a translation of the extract from Ebifa). 
37. Despatch No. U.P. 217 of September, 1908. 
38. E.S.A. SMP 103 (O.S.). 
39. Uganda Notes, 1913, p. 53. 
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remoter districts had already paid their poll tax, and therefore had not needed 
to seek work, had produced an acute labour problem.40 
The following year (ending 31st March, 1912) there was a large increase 
in enquiries for land for plantation development. The effects on the availa-
bility of labour were immediately felt, and the demand for labour was now 
rapidly reaching the limits of the available supply.41 Work on the planta-
tions was popular with the peasants, and many were flocking in as " perma-
nent employees " and thus avoiding their chiefs' call for the Public Works 
Department. The Department's own Annual Report (1911-12) confirms 
its difficulties over labour—notwithstanding the fact that the supply in 
Buganda was then being augmented by drafts from other Provinces.42 
This was the opening phase in a prolonged three-cornered contest over 
labour supply and labour policy between Government, planters and chiefs, 
and native suppliers who said less but had the last word. The conflict was 
intense during the whole period when, to an extent that now appears sur-
prising, the idea of Uganda as " a planter's country " rivalled Sir Hesketh 
Bell's view of a " Uganda for the Baganda ". Conflicting arguments were 
rehearsed with monotonous frequency, the monotony being broken from 
time to time by the sudden shifts of fortune which changing world prices were 
liable to bring upon all cultivators of exportable crops, native or non-native, 
and by whether the Government as employer was hard-faced and Treasury-
minded, or solicitous and exemplary. 
By 1913 the labour supply in Buganda had become " the most serious 
question " facing the Provincial Commissioner. The influx of planters he 
considered to be the main cause ; competition among them was pushing up 
the wage rate, although there was no corresponding increase in the amount of 
labour performed. Moreover, so many exemptions were now claimed on 
grounds of " permanent" employment on plantations—some of them of 
doubtful validity-—that the kasanvu system was no longer producing supplies 
adequate for the Government's own needs.43 Not only planters, but many 
leading chiefs were drawing labour away from the Government; in 1913 over 
eighty chiefs were following the European planters' example and planting 
coffee on their own account.44 They were apparently helping themselves to 
such labour as they wanted from the drafts sent in for Government employ-
ment, with the result that the Public Works Department was getting only 
about two-thirds of the labourers asked for. The Government began to show 
an interest in attracting a large voluntary supply. The standard wages and 
conditions were found to be less agreeable than those elsewhere, and an 
attempt was therefore made to bring them more into line with what the plan-
ters were offering. A Public Works Department Circular announcing the 
changes included an instruction that " the wages paid by other employers 
in every neighbourhood where Public Works Department work is going on 
should be carefully . . . watched, and the Public Works Department rates 
adjusted accordingly ". The new arrangements applied only to Buganda, 
Bunyoro and the Western Province. In the Eastern Province there was still 
no difficulty in obtaining labour, but since the number of plantations was 
rapidly increasing and food prices were rising—there too it would later be-
come necessary to offer a higher wage and Saturday afternoons off.45 
In more recent years, the situation has generally been very different : 
the Government, as the largest employer, has consciously and effectively 
established a minimum wage rate at a higher level than would be attained 
without its " wage leadership ". But in 1913 (and until 1915) Uganda was 
still partially dependent on a Treasury grant, a fact sufficient in itself largely 
to explain the Government's cautiousness over wage advances. Moreover, 
40. E.S.A. SMP 1138 A(O.S.)/23. 
41. E.S.A. SMP 1138 C(O.S.)/5, 10. 
42. Annual Report of the Public Works Department for the year ending 31st March, 1912, p. 6. 
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in 1913 the proportion of " target workers ", of those aiming at a fixed 
quantum of money earnings for the payment of tax and similar limited 
objectives, was undoubtedly large, and a forward policy of wage leadership 
might even, on balance, have accentuated the labour shortage. Indeed, the 
wage increases occasioned by the growing demand for labour on the plan-
tations may in themselves have had such an effect. It is impossible to decide 
in view of the other factors involved. For example, with a lower wage rate 
in Buganda, the number of tribesmen finding it worth-while to make the 
journey into the centre from the districts around Buganda would have been 
smaller, and these men were evidently an important subsidiary source of 
supply. In 1913 it was estimated that from Bunyoro alone some 3,000 
migrants were working in Buganda" for settlers and for well-do-to Baganda" ; 
they earned between Rs. 4/50 and Rs. 6/- per month, which was well above 
the rate they could get locally in Bunyoro.46 
In spite of the fact that competition amongst planters was forcing up 
the wage rate, there was at the same time an opposite tendency for the rate 
to be artificially depressed by the exemption provisions of the kasanvu rules. 
Thus the increased wage rate plus food allowance (Rs. 5/- in all) introduced 
by the Public Works Department to keep pace with the planters (who were 
paying Rs. 4/- but who could offer better opportunities for getting food and 
more congenial work)47 was still only just equivalent to the poll-tax rate, 
which in Buganda had been raised to Rs. 5/- in 1910. Before the introduction 
of the compulsory system of paid labour for the Government, the wage 
rate had been above the level of the hut tax (the forerunner of poll tax) : in 
September, 1908, for example, it had been quoted as Rs. 4/50,48 while the hut 
tax was Rs. 3/-. 
The Public Works Department watched its labour statistics month by 
month, hoping to see a marked rise in the number of voluntary labourers as 
a result of improved conditions. No such effect was observed, and in its 
review of the year the Department reported that it had had a good deal of 
trouble, owing to lack of labour in the more settled areas of the Protectorate. 
Victory was implicitly conceded to the planters, who could offer more attrac-
tive types of work than the Department. But cotton, too, was held respon-
sible : " the natives in the cotton-growing areas appear to be obtaining 
sufficient money for immediate needs from the sale of their cotton and are 
becoming more disinclined to work for fixed periods at fixed rates of wages ". 
Doubts were expressed as to the efficacy of raising wages at such a time.40 
The Buganda Annual Report for 1913-14 said much the same. Labour was 
still insufficient for Government needs, because of the planters' demands. 
" Owing to the planters having increased the wages of their labourers, the 
Government have also been obliged to raise the rates of wages from 4 rupees 
to 5, but the increase has not augmented the supply as it was expected to ",50 
The rise in wages in Buganda, though hardly spectacular, was regarded 
with misgivings not only by the Government, for Buganda chiefs found 
themselves in difficulties, as they had earlier, in similar circumstances. In 
June, 1914, the three Regents addressed the Provincial Commissioner, 
Buganda, on the matter. " We have noticed that all the Bakopi (tenants) 
living on the chiefs' land now do not want to work for their chiefs when 
called upon to do so, they always take Rs. 3/50 to their chiefs instead of pre-
ferring to work for them." But it was now impossible, they said, for the 
landlords to obtain " other porters " at the rate of Rs. 3/50. Their proposal 
for dealing with the situation was not simply the straightforward increase in 
authorised " rent " that might perhaps have been expected. " Sir, we trust 
that you will approve of our suggestion . . . which is to make a law to the 
effect that any mukopi who shall refuse to go and work for his chief when 
46. E.S.A. SMP 3430 (O.S.)/ll. 
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called upon to do so shall have to pay a rent of Rs. 5/50 to enable his chief to 
find and pay a substitute, and that any mukopi who has not been asked to go 
and work for his chief should pay Rs. 3/50. . . . "5 1 
Despite their early acceptance of the commutation of feudal services at 
the peasant's option, the Buganda chiefs and landowners were evidently 
still reluctant to regard money rents as payments purely and simply for the 
use of land. But although there was this tendency to want to have it both 
ways, it is also possible to detect, in the Regents' suggestion of a differential 
rate, the notion of a "just price ", which would relate the payments receivable 
by the landlord to the extent to which he was being deprived of the enjoyment 
of his rights. It was decided to agree to a general increase in rents to Rs. 5/-
from 1st January, 1915 : " t h e Regents can be informed that they are at 
liberty to arrange accordingly, but that this should not be dealt with by law 
as they suggest, but by Instructions from the Lukiko [Council] ". As on the 
previous, similar occasion, CrownLandrentswereraisedbya similar amount.52 
This decision probably had more far-reaching consequences than could 
be foreseen at the time it was made. The immediate effect to be expected was 
a rise in the money incomes of landowners, putting them in a better position 
to exploit their property with the aid of paid labour. There was a noticeable 
increase at this period in the area of native-planted coffee and rubber.53 
Substantial numbers of migrants from Ankole were now coming into 
Buganda to earn their tax, and not a few of them worked for the native 
chiefs. 
Other implications of the Government's consent to an increase in rents, 
though indirect and less immediately observable, were probably quite as 
important in their eventual effects on Buganda's agricultural economy and 
labour force. The open-handed authorisation of higher rents by the Pro-
tectorate Government and the intimation that the changes were to be intro-
duced, not by legislation as the Regents themselves had suggested, but by 
instructions from the Lukiko, was a sign to the Lukiko members and to 
landowners generally that the Europeans did not intend seriously to interfere 
in their private affairs, and that the way was clear steadily to increase their 
demands on tenants. This they certainly did over the next twelve years 
until the reins were once again firmly tightened by the passing of the Buganda 
" Rent Restriction Act"—the Busulu and Envujo Law of 1928. 
During this period there was thus a continuous inducement to non-
landowners to become landowners, with perceptible repercussions on the 
composition and distribution of the labour supply. As early as 1917 the 
Provincial Commissioner, Buganda, observed that one of the reasons why 
the kasanvu system was not procuring enough labourers was that, owing 
to the large amount of land sold and bought in recent years, many people 
who were originally liable to kasanvu had now become landlords and there-
fore exempt, and considered themselves chiefs. The attention of the Lukiko 
had already been drawn to the numbers escaping the call in this way, but 
nothing had been done.54 By the middle 'twenties the relative advantages of 
landownership over tenantship were so highly rated, that the tenants' desire 
to own land had become " a primary incentive to work and saving ".55 
After the First World War, the Baganda tended more and more to 
become habitual employers of migrant labour. Tenants who were anxious 
to increase their cash earnings from cotton, yet not eager to undertake the 
actual labour of cultivation themselves, would have good reason to employ 
foreigners, so long as the price of cotton afforded them a sufficient margin 
over the wages they had to pay. Once having purchased, not merely an 
estate, but—however illogically—a share of the prestige attached to chiefly 
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status, such men would be the more likely to continue to attract migrants 
into their service, if only to provide confirmation of their new status. 
In 1914-15, however, Buganda was not yet firmly established as the 
central focus of spontaneous migrant streams converging from all sides. 
Countering the effect of the large numbers of Ankole people coming in to 
earn their tax, there was almost complete cessation of the former influx from 
Bunyoro.66 Banyoro now had opportunities of employment in their own 
district, on the new plantations opened up by Europeans. 
In 1914 the inadequacy of the combined local and migrant labour supply 
in Buganda to meet the needs of the competing employers was accentuated 
by an ominous tendency on the part of some Baganda to migrate, not in 
search of work, but to escape from it. " The natives find that so much is 
required of them, what with labour obligations to the chiefs and the Govern-
ment and increased taxation that life is scarcely worth living in their own 
country. Many therefore go to East Africa [Kenya] and neighbouring 
Provinces where less is required of them. . . . "5 7 The effect of these popula-
tion movements was to aggravate a labour shortage which, by slowing up the 
improvement of communications, could without difficulty be shown to be 
contrary to the interests of the people themselves. 
The planters were concerned about their growing and vulnerable 
dependence on Bagisu labourers recruited or coming down on their own 
initiative from the Eastern Province, and on other workers drawn from out-
side Buganda. The supply of unskilled labour to be obtained locally from 
the Baganda had shrunk to such an extent that without the migrant supply 
many plantations would have been ruined. The Baganda were still willing 
to accept skilled work on plantations ; rubber-tapping, coffee-pruning, and 
work involving the use of machinery they would readily take on. But the 
Provincial Commissioner, Buganda, pointed out in October, 1917, that the 
Baganda had now so many and various means available for obtaining money 
that it was improbable they would ever supply unskilled labour in sufficient 
quantity.68 Some of the Baganda were not slow to see that there was no 
reason why they should not apply their efforts to growing plantation crops 
themselves and were now experimenting with coffee and rubber as well as 
growing the simpler cash crops like cotton and chillies.69 
The planters' associations kept the Government fully informed of their 
views on the labour problem. They conceded implicitly that native-grown 
cotton was important to the country, but argued that its future depended on 
the planting industry as much as on cotton. Although they knew that the 
shortage of labour stemmed largely from the appeal of cotton-growing, they 
could still complain of the idleness of the local population : one planter 
alleged that " only a small part of the Kyagwe population was doing any-
thing at all ",60 
It was not the normal policy of the Government to assist planters 
directly under the kasanvu system, although there were occasions, especially in 
Busoga, when help was given to tide them over periods of exceptional diffi-
culty.61 During 1917, however, when the Baganda Regents and administrative 
officers were urged to tighten up the compulsory system, part of the object 
was to assist the planting industry, if only indirectly. The Baganda chiefs, 
the Provincial Commissioner said, were losing their power, and the first task 
was to get them to eliminate the laxity and excessive granting of exemptions 
that characterised the administration of kasanvu. The ministers drew atten-
tion to the fact that, so far as the younger men were concerned, the chiefs 
could use their influence only to a limited extent, lest bachelors quit the 
Province. The intervention seems, nevertheless, to have resulted in a tem-
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porary improvement, at least in the actual numbers supplied for Government 
employment (97 per cent, of the 10,000 " indented " for in Mengo District 
during the year ended 31st March, 1919).62 In spite of this achievement, and 
indeed in part because of it, the system continued to incur heavy, though 
concealed, social costs, and its unpopularity continued undiminished. To-
wards the end of 1917 there were signs of increasing opposition by leading 
Baganda to the continuance of kasanvu. They agreed, however, to postpone 
the question until the war was over and more normal conditions prevailed. 
In the immediate post-war years, 1919 and 1920, the release of wartime 
restraints and rising world commodity prices brought into the open all the 
repressed conflicts over the labour supply. The planters, for whom the high 
prices of coffee made the labour shortage a matter of greater concern than 
ever, revived the idea of a Labour Conference, which had been mooted in 
1914, and which met in November, 1918.63 TThe Government, no longer 
dependent on an annual Treasury subvention and receiving a larger revenue 
than ever before, was eager to push ahead with development projects long 
held in check, and in October, 1919, set up a Development Commission " to 
enquire into and consider generally the steps which should be taken to for-
ward the commercial and industrial development of the Protectorate, having 
regard to the interests of the different communities resident therein ; and in 
particular to enquire . . . into the question of transport. . . ,"64 Meanwhile 
the African population, who alone furnished the labour on which coffee 
profits and constructional programmes alike depended, were quietly occupy-
ing themselves growing their own cotton, the price of which made self-
employment, for a large proportion of those in need of cash, a much more 
attractive proposition than working either for the Government or for the 
planters. 
The exceptionally heavy demand for labour in Uganda between 1918 
and 1920 was mainly concentrated in the Mengo and Entebbe Districts of 
Buganda and in the Busoga District of the Eastern Province, although in 
1919 a labour shortage was felt even in those parts of the Eastern Province 
where there were no plantations and where the proportionate demand for 
labour was much less. Wherever cotton was grown, employers complained 
of labour difficulties.65 
The proposals brought forth at the long-awaited Labour Conference, 
which was attended principally by the leading officials and members of the 
European employing community, were not remarkable for originality. The 
planters proposed the appointment of an official " to deal with all labour 
matters", the appointment of a Commissioner to recommend legislation, a 
labour census, some system of registration which would enable the amount 
of labour any person had performed to be recorded, and the enactment of 
.ueasures " enabling the Government to deal with non-workers ". They also 
criticised—no doubt justifiably—the manner in which compulsory labour 
was used, both the paid kasanvu used by the employing departments of the 
Protectorate Government and the traditional unpaid luwalo labour called 
out by the chiefs for employment on native public works. They alleged a 
great deal of waste and urged as one method of reducing it that all compul-
sory labour and not merely kasanvu should be paid.66 The Governor 
accepted the proposal to appoint an officer to deal with labour matters, and 
in February, 1919, the chief executive heads were informed that " as the first 
step towards the organisation of the labour supply in this Protectorate, His 
Excellency has approved the secondment of Mr. L. H. C. Rayne, Assistant 
District Commissioner, for work exclusively in this direction ".67 
The task of this officer was " to create and maintain a regular and 
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adequate flow of voluntary labour from populated areas to all employers, 
both Government and private ". The Governor (Sir Robert Coryndon) 
impressed upon him that " it must be assumed from the start that neither this 
Government nor the Colonial Office will permit any legislation authorising 
compulsion. The object, therefore, must be attained by educating the chiefs 
and the people to the necessity and the wisdom of labour ; and all employers, 
to the absolute necessity of feeding, paying, housing and caring for their 
labourers properly ". In the Governor's opinion, every line of development 
and all future progress was dependent upon an adequate supply of cheap 
labour, and he believed there was every prospect of attaining this object, 
because of the large potential supply available. But Rayne was to make clear 
that his job was " to encourage and organise labour, and not to provide it ". 
The Governor was hopeful that regular labour routes, adequately provided 
with good shelters, food, and resident caretakers, might grow up from the 
Uganda slopes of Mount Elgon and from Budama and southern Teso 
towards Jinja, the Busoga Railway and the Busoga planters ; from the West 
Nile and the Acholi country towards Bunyoro ; and from the whole of the 
Western Province towards Kampala.68 
On a map the scheme appeared admirable, because it minimised the 
distances over which migrants would travel between their homes and the 
centres of employment. But Rayne did not take long to discover some of the 
difficulties. The remarkable diversity of customs, prejudices, and preferences 
between one tribe and its neighbours, was a sufficient reason why there 
could be no certainty that migrants from any particular locality would seek 
employment in the labour market nearest them. Rayne found that migrants 
from Budama and Bugisu, for example, ignored the ample employment 
available in Busoga, which lay directly across their path, and preferred to 
make the longer journey into Buganda. The attraction lay not merely in the 
slightly higher average rate of wages paid in Buganda, but also in the oppor-
tunities for making money or earning food by doing casual work for Baganda 
natives. The Basoga could not compete with the Baganda in this respect, 
and in any case the Badama thought it " beneath their dignity to work for 
Basoga in their spare time as they do for Baganda ". 
The Baganda by this time were evidently emerging as formidable com-
petitors for the supplies of migrant labour coming into their kingdom from 
adjoining districts. The idea of being employers came easily to a people with 
a long tradition of martial dominance over their neighbours. They had long 
been used to adopting captive boys and women as slaves and incorporating 
them into their households. Wilson and Felkin observed that " the servants 
in Uganda are all slaves, the majority being born in slavery, and a tolerable 
percentage are prisoners. They are, as a rule, fairly well off, and are not often 
badly treated, but of course they are liable to be sold to the Arab and half-
breed traders for guns, ammunition, cloth, etc. They often live on terms of 
familiar intercourse with their masters, and are treated as part of the 
family . . . ."89 One resulting evil was that all manual labour came to be 
looked upon as derogatory to the dignity of a free man. Another early visitor 
to Buganda noted " the invariable custom for persons of quality when they 
walk abroad to be followed by a number of retainers or slaves ; even the 
poorest peasant will at least have one little slave-boy to grace his presence ",70 
The ease with which the migrant labourer fits into the Baganda household 
derives much from these historical circumstances. Certainly it is an attraction 
with which non-African employers cannot compete. While the days were past 
when the Baganda had occasion to demonstrate in war " that instinctive 
feeling of their superiority over others " which to Dr. Carl Peters was " the 
natural and indispensable condition of sovereignty",71 they were now beginning 
to show a similar natural aptitude for the role of employer of wage labour. 
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At the time of Rayne's investigations, most of the unskilled work on 
estates in the Kyagwe county of Buganda was being done by Badama and 
people from tribes living near them, close to the Kenya border to the south-
west of Mount Elgon. Food habits placed certain limitations on the mobility 
of different tribes. Thus, as Rayne pointed out, the Teso people were grain-
eaters (unlike the plantain-eating Baganda and Basoga) and were sensitive 
to changes in diet, as had been found to their cost during the recent war. 
Language difficulties also presented an obstacle to the free movement of 
tribesmen from Nilotic regions to the Bantu-speaking areas. Most important, 
however, was that, owing to different climatic and soil conditions and to the 
unevenness of communications, different tribes had unequal opportunities 
to earn cash by growing cotton. While the Teso and their neighbours could 
grow cotton without difficulty, the Bagisu, inhabiting the upland valleys 
between the westward buttresses of Mount Elgon, had fewer means of 
earning money, and in order to pay their tax they had either to sell stock, 
work on the distant coffee and rubber estates, or find employment over the 
border in Kenya.72 
An instruction to " encourage and organise a voluntary flow of labour " 
must, in African tribal conditions, come near to being a contradiction in 
terms, unless there are sufficiently strong economic or other underlying 
forces operating independently in favour of the voluntary flow. Nor can 
official " organisation " go far without itself either destroying the volun-
tariness of the flow or causing it to leave its natural course or to dry up 
altogether. It is true that the underlying economic forces are themselves in 
part determined by Government policy, but the types of policy decisions 
likely to be relevant to labour migration would almost inevitably have reper-
cussions taking them outside the immediate range of labour. Moreover, 
once made, decisions may not be susceptible to short-run adjustment in 
relation to their anticipated effects on the labour supply. A poll-tax rate, for 
example, cannot be varied fairly at short notice. Decisions may also by nature 
be practically irreversible, as in the case of one to introduce a new and 
successful economic crop. The scope for organisation, therefore, may be 
more restricted than might at first sight appear. 
Rayne submitted recommendations which reflect these difficulties. In 
them, " encouragement " was indistinguishable from " pressure ", and the 
main remedies proposed required action at the centre. His reports con-
cerning the particular characteristics of the various tribes, considered as 
potential suppliers of paid labour, were factual and illuminating. His 
proposals for the positive encouragement of a labour supply, on the other 
hand, leant too heavily towards compulsion. Coupled with these proposals, 
however, and as a counterpart of them, he put forward recommendations 
designed to remove the existing hindrances to free movement of peasants, 
and these were of significance. His enquiries had convinced him that in the 
cotton-growing regions outside Buganda, the adverse effect of cotton on the 
supply of labour was aggravated by the direct interest the chiefs still pos-
sessed in the size of their personal entourage of taxpayers. Chiefs in the 
Eastern Province, unlike those in Baganda, were still entitled to call on their 
people, not only for native public works, but also, to some extent, for their 
own purposes—a valuable privilege in times of high cotton prices. More-
over, by virtue of a rebate system, chiefs were directly dependent for their 
salaries on the amount of poll tax they collected and they were therefore re-
luctant to see anyone leave home.73 The Governor, on the strength of Rayne's 
report, sought to remove this impediment to labour mobility by introducing 
a system of fixed salaries for chiefs and by the commutation of all customary 
labour obligations for a cash payment.74 These intentions met with con-
siderable opposition from some administrators, who were afraid that the 
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result of permitting a general commuta t ion of personal services might mean 
a dangerously premature loosening of the control exercised by the chiefs over 
their people.75 There was a further danger that the native authorities might 
find that, although they had cash, they could not obtain with it the labour 
required for public works . 7 0 Even in Buganda, where commutation of per-
sonal services to the landlord had been customary since the turn of the 
century free labour for the native authority for local public works was not 
made universally commutable until 1930. Outside Buganda, the extension of 
commutation proved to be considerably more complex and was only 
gradually effected over a period of years. 
In Buganda it had become clear that the increasing emancipation of the 
peasants from the control of their chiefs could be embarrassing at times. It 
weakened the authority of the chiefs and made it difficult for them to induce 
their people to come forward and make up deficiencies in the voluntary labour 
supply The chiefs were even finding it difficult to administer the kasanvu 
regime and in August, 1919, the Provincial Commissioner, Buganda, trans-
mitted to headquarters a letter f rom one of the ministers and eleven of the 
leading chiefs in which they drew attention to their embarrassment. " We 
humbly write this letter to lay before you the continual discontent we have 
heard of existing among [the] people ", the letter began. Kasanvu, they 
explained, was causing a large number of people to leave the Buganda 
Province and go elsewhere, even to Kenya and German East Africa, for the 
reason that " those who are called on for kasanvu . . . are much despised " 
and looked upon as of the lowest peasant class. The writers of the petition 
confirmed what had long been known : whereas the great advantage of the 
system as originally conceived was that it enabled the work to be spread fairly 
and evenly over the able-bodied population, the large number of exemptions 
being granted on grounds of " permanent employment" meant that the 
brunt of the call now fell on " weak people and those . . . nearing old age " 
A constant movement of population was being provoked and was disrupting 
home life ; and it was even alleged that the marriage rate was adversely 
affected because the eligible men liable to be called on for kasanvu were 
looked down upon by young women. The writers added : " The system of 
kasanvu makes a mukopi [peasant] say that the freedom which is said to 
have been brought by the Government only applies to leading chiefs . . . and 
does not extend to him " ; and they urged that the system be abolished.77 
Although it was becoming more and more obvious that the system could 
not be kept much longer, the upsurge of economic activity on all sides in 
1919-20 made it seem less likely than ever that the necessary labour could be 
obtained entirely without resort to pressure. In October, 1919, it was con-
sidered that without kasanvu practically no labour would be forthcoming for 
public works. The plantations would also be badly hit if the compulsory 
scheme were abolished, on account of the stimulus given to natives to volun-
teer'for private employment so as to avoid being drafted into kasanvu levies. 
The exemption provisions were themselves one of the main causes of the 
breakdown of the compulsory system. " Every landowner, however small 
his holding is looked upon as a chief and is considered to be exempt ; 
every possessor of a saw or a few yards of Amencani [cloth] and a needle 
claims to be a craftsman ". A recent examination of the kasanvu registers 
was reported in 1919 to show that 67 per cent, of the population were 
exempt and that of the remaining 33 per cent., only 15 per cent, worked, 
whilst 18 per cent, succeeded in evading their obligations.78 The determina-
tion of so many to escape their turn by any means they could reflects what was 
probably the crucial reason for the breakdown of kasanvu : its intense 
unpopularity because by its very nature it relieved the officials of a large part 
of their responsibilities as employers. There was little pressure on the officials 
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to try to make conditions of work attractive so long as labour was thought 
to be available on demand from the chiefs.79 
It is true that the labour was paid, but there was little stimulus under a 
coercive system to advance the wage rate. In the latter years of kasanvu the 
official wage was below the market rate,80 even though the market rate itself 
tended to be artificially depressed by the augmented supplies provided in the 
" voluntary " market through the exemption provisions. The depressing 
effect of kasanvu on the normal wage rate and the ill-repute it lent to official 
employment did nothing to favour the attraction of voluntary labour to 
replace it, in spite of the hopes which various officials had from time to time 
expressed. In Buganda the numbers required under the compulsory system 
continued to increase. During 1920, the total numbers called for in the four 
Buganda Districts amounted to 20,500, the number supplied falling short of 
this by about 3,000.81 
It is noteworthy that luwalo, the obligation to perform one months' 
labour for the local authority, though unpaid, was said to be regarded by the 
people as less burdensome than the paid kasanvu.82 It is easy to understand 
why this was so. Luwalo was usually performed near a man's home ; he 
was working at something he understood ; and it was a practice sanctified 
by long tradition. Kasanvu, on the other hand, which often meant enforced 
migration far from home, required him to work on tasks that had little mean-
ing for him, for example, on Government buildings or distant roads, which 
he was unlikely to use himself. That compulsory labour need not inevitably 
incur the odium that came to be attached to kasanvu was strikingly shown in 
the Eastern Province in 1923. The kasanvu system had already been abol-
ished, but in order to construct a road urgently needed by the inhabitants of 
the neighbourhood, special authority was obtained from the Secretary of 
State for the use of compulsory labour obtained locally. The outstanding 
success of the scheme made a deep impression on the Director of Public 
Works. " The measures taken by the District Commissioner were radically 
different from those adopted under the old system of kasanvu labour. . . . 
Under Mr. Weatherhead's system all members of the communities, rich or 
poor, important or unimportant, turned out to work side by side. It was . . . 
in fact communal effort for a public service . . . It was difficult to conceive 
that the labour was working under compulsion at all. So far from people 
being hounded from their homes and taken under guard to the scene of their 
labours, they realised the need for public effort as had been explained to 
them by their chiefs and by the District Officers, and took up their tasks 
willingly and gladly. Many of them were at work before the appointed time 
and it was a common occurrence for the people to go to their work, in the 
early morning, singing and blowing horns. The manner in which the people 
were working was to me an entirely new experience ; indeed without having 
seen it, I would not have believed it possible that local labour, voluntary or 
compulsory, could have been so effective ",83 
In recent years the achievements of community development schemes 
in Africa have shown what powerful springs of energy can be tapped, once 
people have been converted to the idea of themselves creating some addition 
to their basic social equipment—a road, a school, or a dispensary, for 
example—which they ardently desire. In the kasanvu days in Uganda, on 
the other hand, the Goverment would have found it difficult to inspire the 
compulsory levies with enthusiasm for the work they were about to perform. 
During the period when kasanvu was in operation, and especially in the 
period of acute labour difficulties between 1918 and 1921, the Government 
would not have found it easy to explain to any enquirer how the various con-
stituent parts of its economic policy fitted together, or how, taken together, 
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they justified the large-scale reliance on compulsory labour that was required. 
Nor is this altogether surprising. Clearly in any country in process of stimu-
lated economic development directed from the centre, the relative impor-
tance of various objectives is likely to be differently assessed by the policy-
makers on the one hand and the beneficiaries on the other. Where the 
educational level of the majority of the people is low and the hold of tradi-
tional beliefs is strong, there may be no means of getting the population to 
understand how certain types of economic development are likely to benefit 
them, e.g., how a scheme for the reafforestation of hill crests may lead in 
time to increasing rainfall. Government and people may differ markedly in 
their estimation of the importance of tomorrow as compared with a remoter 
future. There may be a conflict of interest of the sort already mentioned, in 
which it may be generally agreed that the completion of a development 
scheme would be in the common interest, but an equally general disinclina-
tion on the part of individuals to contribute to its achievement. To aggravate 
these difficulties, the country's political organisation may provide no means 
by which the aspirations of the people and those of the policy-makers may be 
juxtaposed and assimilated in so far as possible. Where the planners and the 
majority of those affected by decisions are of different race, the likelihood of 
such discrepancies in evaluation is much greater. It is further increased when 
the policy-makers have to consider the conflicting interests of the constituent 
groups in a plural society, as Uganda may be considered to have been politi-
cally and economically in the heyday of the European planters. The likelihood 
of discrepancies is even further magnified where thought and policy are still 
coloured by the theory of the " Imperial estates ". 
Locally, the idea that it was a primary duty to develop resources for the 
benefit of the world at large found expression in statements like the following, 
which appeared in the newspaper, The Uganda Herald, on August 23rd, 1918 : 
" Here we have a young country in the tropics, the fringe of the resources of 
which has only just been touched upon ; a country which in this respect has 
probably no compeer in the many Colonies which grace the possession of the 
British Empire ; a country awaiting the opportunity of unfolding its many 
possibilities to the outside world and yet being cribbed, cabined and con-
fined because of the want of proper organisation of the labour which is so 
abundant within its doors ". 
Development for the benefit of the outer world was not an objective 
that necessarily tallied with a native desire voluntarily to supply the labour 
required at a wage that would-be employers could afford. Cotton was an 
exception : by growing it Uganda was able both to contribute to the raw 
material resources of the world and also to benefit directly the native culti-
vators. But in the case of crops grown on non-native estates, the benefits 
that accrued to the native wage-earners were less obvious. There was a ten-
dency to regard the labour required for such production as a subsidiary 
factor, the supply of which must be adjusted as necessary. This tendency 
was most in evidence amongst planters and their spokesmen. Thus, in the 
view of The Uganda Herald, " once the principle is acknowledged that the 
demand for labour is such that the supplying of it becomes an inevitable 
consequence," the whole question of solving the problem was a matter of 
" systematic organisation ",84 
An alternative and closely related dogma, with a similar implication that 
the labour supply must be adjusted to an autonomous need, was that of the 
primacy of the requirements of " the country ". The Uganda Development 
Commission of 1920, dealing with the labour problem, reached the familiar 
conclusion that the main reason for the shortage was the ease with which the 
native could satisfy his wants with the minimum of effort, and that " the 
supply will never be equal to the demand unless properly organised and con-
trolled".8 6 Discussing the means by which the labour supply for " t h e 
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public " might be increased, the Commission considered that the " training 
of the native " in habits of work was a slow process and would never "keep 
pace with the development of the country ", and that therefore other, more 
immediately fruitful measures would have to be taken.86 Although at one 
point the Commission expressed strong opposition to any steps tending to 
force the exploitation of the country and to create a " boom",8 7 it also—after 
making various other recommendations involving the application of indirect 
means to improving labour supplies88—expressed the view that " in Uganda 
where the least possible amount of work is sufficient to keep a native in com-
parative comfort, some form of direct pressure may become a practical 
necessity if the potential wealth of the country is to be developed, and stag-
nation avoided ",89 In such contexts " the development of the country " or 
" the duty of meeting national requirements " 9 0 are implicitly taken as the 
ultimate justification for the labour required. 
Such criteria seem to set no limit to the amount of labour that could be 
shown to be required. In 1919, however, the year in which the Commission 
began its deliberations, the Government, though fully alive to the planters' 
claims, was by no means disposed to underrate the importance of the native 
as his own employer or to overlook the fact that cotton exports had in the 
years 1918-1919 reached a value of £965,951 and accounted for 77.4 per cent, 
of the total value of the country's exports. In spite of the prevailing labour 
shortage, a general circular was issued from Government headquarters in 
September, 1919, stressing " the necessity for extending the existing areas of 
cotton cultivation as well as for introducing and encouraging the production 
of the crop in suitable localities throughout the Protectorate during this and 
subsequent years. . . . His Excellency attached the greatest importance to 
this question. . . . " 9 1 
The Uganda Development Commission was well aware that the Govern-
ment did not intend to solve the labour problem by holding back the develop-
ment of the cotton industry. The Commission (whose eight members 
included three officials, one being chairman) recorded that the Director of 
Agriculture had for several years past appeared to follow a policy of aloofness, 
" and to have failed to identify himself with the planters' interests as he 
should have done ". The Commissioners added, " we feel constrained to 
say, also, that the Government appears to have tacitly accepted the position". 
They urged the Government to instruct the Department of Agriculture to 
give plantation crops the same attention and encouragement hitherto given 
only to native products.92 
At this time of high commodity prices and post-war optimism, economic 
activity was being stimulated not only by the high prices themselves but also 
by the Government's construction programmes, and there was once again a 
heavy demand for kasanvu labour. In October, 1920, new regulations were 
issued, designed to improve the conditions under which kasanvu labour was 
employed, but they were apparently less thorough-going than the circum-
stances warranted.93 
As early as 1917 it had been said that kasanvu must be expected " grad-
ually to smoulder out and die from inaction ",94 but it was discussed by the 
1920 Commission on apparently the tacit assumption that there was no 
immediate prospect of its being superseded as a means of securing the labour 
required by Government departments. The Commission recommended, 
however, that the continuation of kasanvu should not deflect the Govern-
ment's attention from the need to make substantial improvements in housing, 
feeding, and other working conditions, and it urged that kasanvu labourers 
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should be paid " the current rates of wages". Finally, there was put forward 
a somewhat inadequately thought-out scheme for " the grading of regular 
unskilled workers and for their definite recognition in the State Civil Ser-
vice ",96 The Commission's proposals for increasing the supply of labour to 
non-Government employers by indirect methods included the suggestion of 
a differential rate of poll-tax—Rs. 5 for those who could show they had worked 
for a prescribed period in each year and Rs. 17/50 for those who could not.96 
It was satisfied that a general increase of wages would not ensure a greater 
supply of labour : the daily needs of the native were so small that any 
increase in his wage would simply mean that a shorter period of work would 
suffice to satisfy them.97 The Commission's recommendation was that " a 
real and genuine effort should first be made to rectify the position by means 
of the indirect methods . . . advocated ", but felt bound to point out that " if 
these methods fail or even if they are only partially successful, there is no 
remedy but to accept the principle of direct pressure ",9 8 
It is remarkable that the recourse to compulsion, which in the form of 
the kasanvu system had originally been a temporary expedient, and had 
generally been regarded as justifiable only in respect of labour required by 
the Government for public purposes, should now in 1920 be suggested by an 
official Commission as permissible, if necessary, in order to provide labour 
for private employers.99 Compulsion was breeding compulsion. The greater 
the call for kasanvu labour, the greater the tendency for the wage rate in the 
" voluntary " market to be depressed relatively to what would have been the 
normal rate, freely determined. This would reduce the attraction of both 
Government and non-Government voluntary paid labour. Furthermore, in 
Buganda the low wage rates did little to stimulate the inflow of migrant 
labour from up-country districts. 
But the tide of public opinion, which frequently seemed to hold that a 
native could only be regarded as working if he was working for a European 
employer, and which urged tha t " special efforts should be made to encourage 
the natives in the more remote districts, such as Gulu, Lango, Teso and the 
West Nile, to go out to work " (when the natives of Lango and Teso were 
cultivating more than a third of the acreage of the chief export crop, cot-
ton),100 reached high-water mark in the recommendations of the report of 
the 1920 Commission. Thereafter change came very rapidly. 
Different views were beginning to be expressed. One administrative 
officer was particularly outspoken in putting his views before the Develop-
ment Commission. " The kasanvu system, or compulsory paid labour, should 
also be abolished . . . Such labour, compulsorily recruited, has no say in the 
rate of wages paid to it and the wages paid are always, to the best of my know-
ledge, below the current market rate. There is actually no labour question, 
as granted adequate housing, food and pay a sufficient supply would be forth-
coming for all requirements ". Planters, he said, had stated that it was 
impossible to pay a higher rate than was being paid at the time. If that was 
so, planting was of no economic value to the country.101 
In 1921, kasanvu was undermined simultaneously and rapidly from 
several directions at once. The earlier secondment of L. H. C. Rayne (who 
had died only a few months after commencing his enquiries) to deal with 
labour matters was followed early in 1921 by the appointment of a Labour 
Commissioner. He was to consult with the provincial administration and 
employers on all labour matters and make recommendations to head-
quarters. He was also instructed to examine the conditions of employment 
of both Government and private labour and to advise as to their improve-
95. Report of the Uganda Development Commission, 1920, loe. cit., pp. 13-16, paras. 48-68. 
96. Ibid., p. 16, para. 72. The suggestion came from a native official. 
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ment.102 His enquiries showed that the intense unpopularity of kasanvu, 
which had long been recognised, was largely explicable by the absence of 
any satisfactory provision for the men's welfare either on the journey or at 
the place of work. The usual conditions under which kasanvu labour worked 
had involved discomfort and very frequently great hardship and distress.103 
At the instance of the Labour Commissioner, a real attempt was at last made 
by the Government to make the accommodation and working conditions 
of departmentally employed labourers less bleak and discouraging and " by 
these improvements gradually to attract voluntary labour to replace 
kasanvu".1M But these efforts came too late. 
On October 11th, 1921, the Buganda Lukiko, under a misapprehension 
that they had power in this matter, wrote to inform the Provincial Com-
missioner, Buganda, that " after the most careful consideration, the Lukiko 
have decided unanimously that they do not desire kasanvu of any kind . . . 
to exist in Buganda . . . we pray you inform His Excellency the Governor in 
order that he may inform the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the 
Full Lukiko has finally decided to do away with kasanvu as from 31st 
December, 1921, as it is no longer fitting that it should be enforced. . . . "105 
At this juncture a series of events in Kenya played into the Buganda 
Lukiko's hands. The Kenya Governor's Circulars, enjoining district officers 
to use compulsion if necessary to ensure that farmers had sufficient labour, 
led to a public outcry. This caused the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Churchill, 
to issue a despatch to all Colonies and Protectorates, in which he made it 
clear that in future compulsion would no longer be tolerated except with the 
prior authority of the Secretary of State, which would only be given for 
specified public works and for a specified period.106 Uganda, like Kenya, 
had no choice but to conform, and it was clear that kasanvu had to go. 
In these circumstances the Government was able to accede to the 
wishes of the Buganda Lukiko with good grace. The kasanvu system ceased 
to be operative from 1st January, 1922, in Buganda, Bunyoro, and Toro,107 
and towards the end of that year it disappeared throughout the remainder 
of the Protectorate. 
There can be no doubt that the abolition of kasanvu greatly improved 
the welfare of the people of Uganda and the health of the country's economy. 
The transition to entire reliance on voluntary labour for all normal labour 
requirements except certain customary services, which continued to be per-
formed under the control of the native authorities, was at first remarkably 
smooth. It was facilitated by the slump in world prices at the end of 1921, 
which caused a disastrous reversal of fortune among the planters and native 
cotton-growers, but which, incidentally, eased both the demand for and the 
supply of labour.108 Difficulties only began to appear in 1923 as the prices 
of cotton and coffee recovered from the low level reached in 1921. On this 
and future occasions the remedy for the shortage lay, not in the coercion of 
the local population, but more and more in the attraction, into Buganda 
especially, of migrant labour from outside. The non-native plantations, 
however, never regained the proportionate importance in the economy which 
they had enjoyed before 1921—and still less the importance their spokesmen 
had claimed for them. It seems unlikely to have been mere coincidence that 
the greatest relative importance of non-native plantation industry occurred 
during the time when the kasanvu system was in force and was exerting a 
favourable influence both on the wage rate and on the actual numbers avail-
able for employment. 
It is true that the sharp rise in the wage rate in Buganda, which went with 
102. E.S.A. SMP 5590 (O.S.)/I/53. 
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the change from the use of kasanvu labour by the Government to exclusive 
reliance on voluntary supplies, was partly due to an adventitious factor 
contributing to the plight of the planters. This was the fortuitous link which 
in the immediate post-war period connected the economic interests of the 
inhabitants of East Africa with the silver-hoarding propensities of the 
Chinese, since this link was largely responsible for the change-over from the 
rupee currency first to the florin and then to the shilling, at the parity of one 
florin to the rupee. By these extraneous changes alone, the former wage-
rates, which on plantations in 1920 were between Rs. 3/50 and Rs. 6/-
(according to locality), unless overtly counteradjusted, became automatically 
raised by 50 per cent, in terms of sterling, compared with the same rupee 
rates calculated at the previous normal parity of l/4d. This, from the plan-
ters' point of view, aggravated the effects on wages of the removal of com-
pulsion and of the Government's " good employer " policy which accom-
panied the change. It is doubtful, however, whether the currency change 
did more than accelerate an upward adjustment that would in any case have 
followed the supersession of the compulsory system. 
It seems fair to conclude that the indirect effects of kasanvu on the 
wage rate, and the availability of labour itself, had served as unobtrusive 
props to the plantation industry, and that their removal was a main cause of 
the subsequent stagnation of the non-native plantations, during a period 
when coffee-growing by natives made rapid progress. The process of adjust-
ment after the 1920-1921 collapse of prices and the change in labour supply 
conditions was painful and prolonged. The acreage under coffee cultivation 
by European planters fell away from the peak reached in 1920, and numbers 
of estate-owners found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy.109 
The eclipse of non-native planting in Uganda in the 1920's after a bright 
and confident beginning in the preceding decade is perhaps of not solely 
historical interest. It may be seen as a particular example of the structural 
distortion that is liable to be produced in a developing economy whenever 
private economic calculations are made on the basis of prices which are 
themselves temporarily biased in one direction or another. So long as the 
bias continues, all may be well, at least for those in whose favour it works ; 
and the longer it persists the greater the tendency may be to treat the abnor-
mal situation as normal. In this respect uneconomic freight rates, protective 
import duties, racial discrimination in employment policies, and similar 
constraints, are analogous in their effects to the compression of private wage 
costs brought about during the kasanvu period in Uganda. If in such cases 
the abnormal influence is eventually removed, the cost of adjustment to be 
borne by those who have committed capital on the assumption that the bias 
would continue, may well be heavy, as it was in Uganda, especially if they 
have been unconscious of it and are unprepared. While if the consequences 
of change are in fact clearly foreseen by those who stand to lose, the reaction 
may be, not to make provision in good time, but to use political influence to 
resist the change itself. 
It may be feasible to eliminate bias gradually, so that the adjustment 
can also be gradual and its costs more easily borne. Thus if plantation-
owners are to be required to provide housing for a proportion of their casual 
employees, it may be quite practicable for the authorities to increase grad-
ually the percentage of workers on strength which the employer is to be 
required to accommodate. But in other circumstances a policy of gradual-
ness may impose even heavier costs than one of complete and outright 
change, or at least, heavier costs than the benefits arising from merely partial 
adjustment would warrant. For example, it would obviously be of no assis-
tance to plantation-owners, first to require them to build permanent houses 
with walls six feet high, and then a few years' later to insisted on nine feet. 
The degree of adaptation or commitment of organisation or capital to a 
109. R. L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, New York, Macmillan, 1928, Vol. I , p. 627. 
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temporary expedient may exclude the practicability or likelihood of a gradual 
adjustment to the intended extent. As has already been observed, in spite 
of hopes that kasanvu in Uganda would gradually disappear, and even though 
its operation gave rise to increasingly heavy social costs and administrative 
strain, the calls upon it latterly actually rose rather than diminished. The 
type of organisation required to attract and retain a wholly voluntary labour 
supply differed substantially from what was required to deal with kasanvu, 
and the very existence of the compulsory regime militated against the success 
of any attempt to bring in voluntary labour alongside it, except at an extra 
organisational cost that would have seemed disproportionately heavy. 
It may be equally misleading to assume, in the context of present-day 
development, that migrant labourers will succeed in gradually becoming 
wholly adapted to an urban life ; or that employers will gradually adjust 
their whole organisation from what is appropriate to the employment of 
large numbers, low in efficiency and earning low wages, to what is appro-
priate for smaller numbers, more efficient and earning higher wages ; or 
that it is good economic policy for the Government, in giving the lead to 
both sides, to encourage merely gradual adaptation on the part of employer 
and employed. 
The kasanvu period in the economic history of Uganda is relevant to 
present-day problems in another important respect. It illustrates the serious 
dangers that may arise when native institutions are used for purposes for 
which they were never intended. It was demonstrated in Uganda that 
whereas the properly traditional Buganda luwalo obligation (providing the 
labour required for the upkeep of native roads and buildings), even though 
unpaid, was accepted without serious objection, kasanvu, which at first 
worked well enough, but which could claim no more than borrowed 
authority, eventually degenerated into a practice that was ultimately 
thoroughly evil and harmful in its effects.110 Such dangers are the less likely 
to be taken fully into account in that they are often only incidentally reflected 
in the indices to which Governments have commonly referred, to assure 
themselves that " the country " is advancing—whether the export list (" that 
barometer of progress ", as one administrative officer in Uganda described 
it in 1911) or the yield from taxation or even the peoples' material standards 
of living. The dangers are still less likely to be fully weighed, if, for whatever 
reason, the central government is remote from the people on whose behalf 
it is planning and administering. 
In the kasanvu system there was, originally, the conscious intention to 
harness a powerful traditional social force, the customary powers of chiefs111 
to command the obedience of their people, to subserve new purposes. Most 
commonly, however, it is without any explicit prior intention that indigenous 
institutions come to be used for purposes other than those which give 
them meaning. But in either case the same unlooked-for result may in 
due course appear, a grave disruption of some previous social, economic, 
or ecological balance. 
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C H A P T E R I I I 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE ATTRACTION OF LABOUR, 
1922-1939 
The abolition of the kasanvu system at the end of 1921 in Buganda, 
Bunyoro, and Toro at first gave rise to no difficulty. The low price paid for 
cotton in 1921 increased the potential labour supply, because farmers grew 
less cotton and their 1922 incomes were lower. At the same time, the demand 
for labour fell off ; plantations were closed and public works programmes 
were limited by decreased revenue. These circumstances were unexpectedly 
favourable for the transition, and there seems to have been a certain faltering 
in the Government's execution of its expressed intention to adopt " a wise 
and far-sighted policy as an employer of labour ".1 
In the newly established Legislative Council attention was drawn to 
" the great amount of feeling existing among employers . . . at the rate of 
wages paid to native labour in Government employ, which is understood to 
be much in excess of the market rate. . . . " The Government did not agree 
that this was the case, " with the sole exception of the rate paid on coffee 
plantations ". Nevertheless, an assurance was given that the Government 
was taking " all possible precautions to see that interdepartmental competi-
tion consequent on the abolition of the kasanvu system . . . does not lead to 
an undue inflation of the wage ", and that in order to cut down the drawing 
of labour away from estates " the Government will further endeavour to 
reduce the rate of wages paid to permanent Public Works Department main-
tenance gangs working in the immediate neighbourhood of plantations ". 
(The actual rates then being paid by the Government varied from between 
Shs. 11/- and Shs. 14/- per month in the central districts of Mengo and 
Busoga, to between Shs. 6/- and Shs. 8/- in Toro, Ankole, and Kigezi, in the 
Western Province, and in the remote northern districts of Arua, Chua and 
Gulu.)2 There was also strong criticism of the Government's expenditure on 
a labour camp at Kampala, which was alleged to be unduly inflating labour 
costs. It was explained, however, that by housing and feeding employees 
the Government was hoping both to increase working efficiency and at the 
same time to keep down the direct wage rate.3 
The new policy was more explicitly defined in a despatch to the Secretary 
of State.4 The Governor said that he did not propose to take advantage of 
the situation to enforce a general reduction in the wages of unskilled labour. 
He wished, on the contrary, by continuing to pay a rate that would give the 
native a reasonable return for his labour, and by improving conditions of 
employment in other respects, " to seize this opportunity to bring the 
Government into credit as an employer ", and to impress upon the natives 
generally that unskilled labour might be adopted regularly as a reasonable 
means of livelihood, instead of being merely regarded as the last resort of the 
destitute. By keeping up wages during the depression it was hoped that even 
when more prosperous conditions returned many natives would remain as 
members of a " permanent labouring class " and thus prevent an undue 
inflation of wages in the future. A Labour Commissioner for the Protec-
torate would continue to be needed, and one of his main duties would be 
" the education of the employer, both Government and private ".5 
It is not altogether clear what precisely was meant by " a permanent 
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labouring class ", but it was an ideal commonly spoken of at this period. 
The Director of Public Works, for example, said in his 1922 Annual Report : 
" In view of the difficulties anticipated as a result of the abolition of kasanvu 
much was done to improve the conditions of voluntary labour, it being hoped 
that these improved conditions would lead to the creation of a permanent 
voluntary working class". He added, however, that although up to the 
end of the year there was no sensible shortage of labour, " a marked ten-
dency to decreasing output was noticed", and he expressed grave anxiety 
for the future.6 Such statements, imprecise as they often are, serve as a 
caution against the assumption of any automatic connection between 
" improved conditions " and increased output. 
The higher wages being paid in Buganda, and especially in Mengo 
District, seem to have powerfully stimulated the inward flow of migrant 
labour from the less favoured districts. The Labour Commissioner observed 
and reported their movements with assiduous care,7 now that Government 
and other employers alike depended on voluntary supplies. At this stage 
the Banyaruanda and Barundi, who were later to make up the most impor-
tant contingent in the army of migrants, seem to have been insignificant in 
numbers, but there were already a few Bakiga from the far south-west of the 
Protectorate near the Belgian border. The most important suppliers of 
migrant labour at this time appear to have been Banyankole and Banyoro 
coming in from the south-west and north-west, and Bagisu and Badama from 
the Eastern Province. There were less important contributions from the 
Batoro of the Western Province, from various other Eastern Province tribes 
while from the Northern Province there were a few Acholi, and—not yet 
numerically important but increasing—the first explorers from the tribes 
living beyond the Nile and Lake Albert in the far north-west of the Pro-
tectorate.8 
The beginnings of movement from the Northern Province had been 
encouraged through active recruitment by planters from Bunyoro. They 
had obtained permission in 1918 to seek volunteers in the West Nile District 
who might replace the local Banyoro who were being attracted into Buganda 
by higher wages. Some of the West Nile tribesmen, particularly the muscular 
Alur, were coming into Buganda on their own initiative. West Nile natives 
had become liable to pay poll-tax in 1917,9 and as a result the need for 
money for this purpose made a period of work outside their district indis-
pensable for many.10 
The filtering-through into Buganda of some of the Alur raised a recur-
ring question which the Government in these early years seems to have found 
exceptionally difficult to settle. Should the interests of the people of one 
district or province be protected to the detriment of the inhabitants of 
others ? A planter in Buganda, impressed by some of the Alur who had 
found work with him, asked in 1921 for permission to recruit more in their 
home area. He was told that in view of the very large migration of Banyoro 
into Buganda, it was not intended to encourage employers outside Bunyoro 
to obtain labour supplies from the West Nile, as the Bunyoro planters were 
becoming more and more dependent on that District as their sole source. 
The Governor in 1922 agreed with the opinion of the Provincial Commis-
sioners that policy in the matter must ultimately be that of " equal oppor-
tunity for all"—certain employers ought not to be privileged to recruit in 
particular areas to the exclusion of others. But it was nevertheless decided 
that for the time being the policy of " protecting " the Bunyoro planters 
should be continued. The year 1922 was difficult for most Uganda planters, 
and on balance it was evidently considered preferable to protect these 
employers from a high wage rather than their migrant employees from a low 
6. Annual Report of the Director of Public Works, 1922, p. 9. 
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wage. " If the door is thrown open to all employers the result will be a 
rapid rise in the price of Alur labour. This rise, coming at this critical 
moment, might have a disastrous effect on the Bunyoro plantations. . . . " 
By continuing to protect the Bunyoro planters, the administration allowed 
other employers still to obtain a proportion of the coveted Alur labour, 
" who will filter through to them in gradually increasing numbers, at a lower 
rate than if the price were forced up by competition in recruiting at the base 
of supply, and at the same time the Bunyoro planters will thus be helped to 
carry over this very difficult period " . n The Bunyoro planters did survive, 
and it would be difficult to demonstrate that the exceptional measures taken 
in their favour were not justifiable in the circumstances. Their privilege, 
however, was revoked in October, 1923, when the Governor ruled that, 
subject to safeguards laid down by Ordinance, recruiting by private indi-
viduals should be unrestricted throughout the Protectorate.12 
The Government, at this period, saw no virtue in a policy of aiming at 
deliberate local self-sufficiency in labour supplies, though at least one of its 
Provincial Commissioners found it difficult to share the Government's view. 
The Provincial Commissioner of the Eastern Province, who, during the shor-
tage of 1918, had objected strongly to an instruction to supply labour to 
Buganda,13 was equally insistent in 1923 that the Teso of his Province, who 
were wealthier from cotton than they had ever been, should themselves 
provide labour for public works in their own district, including road and 
bridge construction that would closely affect their future prosperity as 
cotton-growers. He considered that " to import labour from other parts of 
the Protectorate is wrong and can only add to the unwillingness of the Teso 
to volunteer ",14 For the Provincial Commissioner, evidently, the question 
was one of morality as much as of economic or administrative practice. The 
Government's view, however, was unambiguous. " His Excellency . . . has 
decided that it is wise to encourage the importation of labour from other 
sources into the big producing areas of this Protectorate. While the natives 
in any area are actively engaged in producing and partly transporting a 
valuable crop and are at the same time acquiring by this form of activity 
ample cash to enable them to meet their cash obligations and to satisfy their 
normal requirements, it is not reasonable to expect them also to work on 
departmental services and extraordinary works, such as road construction. 
His Excellency feels that any attempt to induce them to hire out their labour 
in these circumstances will fail, and is further calculated to have a dis-
couraging effect on production. . . . " The Governor would not consider 
having resort to compulsory labour until the Labour Commissioner was 
satisfied that the Public Works Department had unsuccessfully tried every 
possible means of attracting voluntary labour from all parts of the Protec-
torate.16 
Labour difficulties of this kind began to reassert themselves in 1923, with 
the recovery of prices, and the chief hope of meeting them, as these instruc-
tions illustrate, lay in stimulating migrant labour wherever it could be 
found and attracting it from less developed districts to the centres where it 
was most needed. Migrant labour streams would follow directions that had 
the logic of a plan for trunk railways,16 it was hoped, but in fact the labour 
flow by no means always followed the courses that seemed the most con-
venient or predictable from the map. Nor did migrants confine themselves 
neatly to the nearest employment areas to which they might be theoretically 
allocated : Bagisu, for example, were still spurning Busoga and coming 
further into Mengo in the thousands17 or going to Kenya. 
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Buganda was now receiving contingents from each of the three remain-
ing Provinces. A Labour Deputation to the Governor in September was 
given figures based on the experience of the previous eight and one-half 
months, showing that a monthly average of 2,000 labourers were coming into 
Buganda from the Western Province, 1,000 from the Northern Province and 
1,500 from the Eastern Province. 
Some European employers in Buganda were apprehensive of competi-
tion from the Baganda, who were said to pay higher wages and give more food 
during the cotton-planting season. One of them asked that " pressure should 
be brought to bear to prevent the Baganda from employing outside tribes 
as labourers, as this system was having a deleterious effect on the better 
tribes of the Protectorate ",18 Migrants from Toro and Ankole at this time 
were said to be responsible for producing at least a quarter of the Buganda 
cotton crop, and the problem of transporting the pickings to metalled roads 
would have been " almost insoluble " without their assistance.19 This influx 
sufficed to defer a labour famine in Buganda until 1924, although by the end 
of 1923 the Public Works Department was again beginning to complain of 
difficulties in all parts of the country excepting Kampala, where it seemed 
that " a floating labour population " was coming into being.20 The position 
was far more difficult in the Eastern Province, where in the two most impor-
tant cotton-growing districts, Teso and Busoga, an average of over Shs. 60/-
per head had been paid out to the adult male population. This was a large 
sum in relation to the monthly wage rate for unskilled labour, which in the 
previous year had been only Shs. 9/- to Shs. 10/- in the one district and 
Shs. 11/- to Shs. 14/- in the other.21 The successful cotton harvest sent up the 
market rate for unskilled labour in Jinja by nearly 100 per cent.22 
In 1924 the position seriously deteriorated, with both Buganda and the 
Eastern Province affected. Two successful cotton seasons had practically 
eliminated the supply of local labour. Most private employers were in diffi-
culties, the arterial road construction programme then under way was lagging 
behind schedule, and even essential public services, such as the handling of 
cargo at ports, were endangered. In addition, there was a major railway 
construction project pending, which would give rise to a heavy additional 
demand for labour,23 and the Inter-Colonial Railway Council perturbed by 
the difficulty of finding men to move the Uganda cotton crop, decided to urge 
both Kenya and Uganda to establish native recruiting organisations so as to 
ensure the availability of labour for Government work.24 Large numbers of 
migrants were continuing to come in from Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro, and the 
West Nile District, but it was estimated that at least 75 per cent of them were 
being absorbed by the Baganda for cotton cultivation.25 Moreover, there were 
all the ancillary activities connected with cotton. Cotton-buyers and ginners, 
working on a substantial margin of profit and having contracts to fulfil, were 
not disposed to quibble about the wage they had to pay, and much labour 
could be used up in this way in a short time.26 
These were the circumstances in which it was decided that a complete 
Labour Department for the Protectorate was indispensable. During 1923-4 
there were signs of a gradual shift in emphasis taking place in Uganda, as 
18. E.S.A. SMP 5711 (O.S.)/II/159. 
19. E.S.A. SMP 6847 (O.SO/69. 
20. Annual Report of the Director of Public Works, 1923. p. 10. para. 41. 
21. Proceedings of Legislative Council, 25th-26th May, 1922, p. 8. 
22. E.S.A. SMP 5711 (O.S0/139. 
23. E.S.A. SMP 5711 (O.S.)/III/221. 
24. E.S.A. SMP 5551 (O.S.)/145a. 
25. Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture. 1923, p. 4 ; 1924, p. 5. 
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elsewhere, away from an almost exclusive preoccupation with development 
for trade and towards a more socially interested policy of trusteeship 
directly on behalf of the native inhabitants. In November, 1923, for example, 
the Governor (Sir Geoffrey Archer), addressing the Legislative Council, 
referred to the budgetary implications of " the growing demands of all sec-
tions of the community and, particularly, the needs of the large indigenous 
population ",27 Public instruction ceased to be the exclusive responsibility 
of the missions and the first annual report of a newly created Department of 
Education appeared in 1925. The views of the European agricultural and 
commercial community began to exert a less overbearing weight in Govern-
ment counsels. 
Nevertheless, when labour policy was under consideration by the 
Government, the planting interests, in spite of the hard times they had 
recently experienced and of the smallness of their numbers (not more than 
100 in 1924),28 still claimed a considerable say, and in September, 1924, the 
Governor took care to explain the proposals for the establishment of a 
Labour Department to representatives of the Planters' Association, the 
Chamber of Commerce, and the Indian Association. There were objections 
that the wages proposed by the Government for its recruited labour (Shs. 
12/- for Northern Province labourers and a gunny bag and blanket) were 
unnecessarily high when " it was only possible to get two hours' really good 
work out of the labour ". Here, indeed, was an important part of the explana-
tion of the " labour shortage ". One reason put forward for this remarkably 
low output was inadequate diet ; but another reason was that competition 
for labour between employers had tended to take the form of a progressive 
reduction in the size of the tasks set—this indirect competition no doubt 
being less likely to court adverse comment from fellow-employers than the 
granting of direct wage advances. According to the Labour Commissioner, 
" any planter or Government Department endeavouring to secure a fair 
task from the porter becomes unpopular, and labour drifts away else-
where ",29 The derisory size of the task performed must obviously have 
resulted in a much larger demand for labour in terms of numbers than would 
otherwise have been necessary, and " target workers who might have been 
willing to perform a larger task for a higher wage would find it necessary to 
prolong their absence from home ". (As one employer put it, " Labour 
brought down-country from the more industrious tribes deteriorates owing 
to contamination by down-country labour ".) The small tasks did mean, 
however, that the migrants could also take on the more popular work 
offered by Baganda cotton-growers, generally in return for food and drink. 
Indeed, for the majority of migrant labourers working for planters or for the 
Government at this period, it was only by this means that they could feed 
themselves. The Provincial Commissioners viewed with considerable anxiety 
" the demoralising effect on the native caused by the task system, whereby 
men at times finish their day's work at 9 a.m.". They recommended united 
action by the principal employers to ensure that unskilled labour performed 
a full day's work in return for a good wage, but this recommendation elicited 
a succinct comment : " Employers cannot continue to dictate terms to 
labour until the supply exceeds the demand ". 
One suggestion for continued action put forward by a planter at a 
meeting called by the Governor was that a single private organisation might 
recruit for both Government and private employers alike, and that " a 
standard wage could then be agreed upon ",30 The Government, however, 
did not entertain this proposal, and in fact the Planters' Association had 
already decided to set up a recruiting organisation of its own to bring labour 
down from the less productive areas. This was arranged with the approval 
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of the Government, in spite of the fact that it would mean direct competition 
with the Labour Department.31 
The duties of the Government's Labour Department, however, were 
more extensive than those of a mere recruiting organisation. It was to be 
responsible " for studying and improving the conditions of migration and 
employment," as well as " for propaganda and recruitment in the outlying 
districts ",32 In practice it proved much easier to show results in recruiting 
than in improving the conditions of employment. 
It was estimated in September, 1924, that there were then in voluntary 
employment some 15,000-20,000 unskilled labourers drawn from nearly 
all the tribes of the Protectorate. This estimate did not include those working 
for native authorities nor, evidently, those at work on Baganda cotton-plots. 
The Public Works Department was employing about 8.000 of the total, which 
left them with a shortage of about 3,000. In addition, the extension of the 
Uganda Railway from Turbo to Mbulamuti, shortly to be undertaken, 
would call for another 8,000-10,000 men every month. 
The Government's scheme envisaged the recruitment of men for railway 
construction and Government services in the Eastern Province from the 
West Nile and the Acholi country, and for services in the rest of the Protec-
torate from Ankole and Kigezi.33 The planters' recruiting organisation also 
proposed to operate in the same areas,34 and it was permitted to use 
the special labour camps established along main routes by the Labour 
Department and to receive other assistance. Nevertheless, it was emphasised 
that " the very definite instructions issued by the Secretary of State " pro-
hibiting the recruitment of labour by District Officers for private employers 
were to be rigidly adhered to.35 
The planters had received an assurance, however (15th July, 1924), that 
it was " not the policy of the Government to push cotton production " in 
the various outlying areas where recruiting was about to take place.36 This 
was a decision with far-reaching implications. It seems to represent a volte 
face from the view held less than a year before. At that time—August, 1923— 
it was found that the poll-tax yield in the Western Province districts of Toro 
and Ankole was so low that the rebate was insufficient to provide the chiefs 
with adequate guaranteed salaries. This was due to the prohibitive transport 
costs of marketing local produce and to the " very large numbers " of 
natives of Toro and Ankole migrating to the central areas in search of employ-
ment. Some of these migrants sent the tax home, but the majority paid in 
the districts in which they had found employment. The Colonial Office view 
was that " the true remedy for the difficulty . . . appears to be to find some 
means of local development in these districts ". The Governor had stated in 
reply that he hoped to see at no distant date " definite progress in all forms 
of development in the Western Province. . . . I can assure your Grace that 
every possible effort is being made to promote progress especially in the 
matter of agriculture. . . . " 3 7 
The new, and different, policy was reaffirmed in 1925. The Department 
of Agriculture, apparently ignorant of the new arrangements, had sent an 
officer to the West Nile District to stimulate cotton production, with adverse 
effect upon labour recruitment there. The Director of Agriculture was then 
informed that " the policy of this Government is at present to refrain from 
actively stimulating the production of cotton or other economic crops in 
outlying districts on which it is dependent for a supply of labour for the 
carrying out of essential services in the central or producing districts. . . . " 
This policy was to be maintained " until such time as labour difficulties in 
the more central districts . . . became less acute ". At the same time, it was 
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also made clear that the intention was not, and never had been, to prevent 
cotton-planting in any district by natives wishing to do so.38 
This policy was from one point of view only an extension of the prin-
ciple already affirmed in the case of Teso39 in 1923, that "produc t ive" 
districts need not be required themselves to provide the labour necessary for 
their own capital construction programmes. In other words, productive 
districts, to avoid a temporary sacrifice of their present production, should 
call on less productive districts for the hire of the additional labour cur-
rently required. Now the principle was taken further, and the other districts 
were expected, not merely to supply the labour needed to augment the 
productive equipment of the already more productive districts, but— 
temporarily at least—to remain less productive themselves in order to be 
able to continue to do so. The Ormsby-Gore Commission commented : 
" At the present time it may be said that the cotton-growers are becoming a 
special class for whom all the other community services have to be provided 
by wage labour imported from outside ".40 
As the cultivation of cotton in Uganda was subject to detailed legislative 
control designed to maintain the quality of the crop and to check the spread 
of disease and the proliferation of inferior varieties, and as all seed had to 
be obtained from the Department of Agriculture, a policy of " not actively 
stimulating " cotton-growing, by not providing instructions and not dis-
tributing seed unless specifically requested, was little different from a policy 
of actual discouragement. The great success of cotton in Buganda and the 
Eastern Province certainly owed much to official stimulation in the early 
stages of its introduction, and now its very success there had the result of 
withholding similar aid from remoter districts. It is interesting, if un-
profitable, to speculate whether, if the country that is now the Uganda 
Protectorate had been opened up from the direction of Khartoum instead 
of from the Coast, there would have been a stage when the development of 
Buganda had to be postponed until after the solution of labour difficulties 
in the Northern Province. 
The wisdom of a policy of holding back the agricultural development of 
the outlying districts so as to stimulate an increased flow of migrant labour 
was questioned even in 1924. In the opinion of an officer who was Labour 
Commissioner for a short period of that year : " The present policy of dis-
couraging cotton cultivation in the remote parts of the Protectorate and 
bringing down the population of these districts to work in Buganda and 
Busoga will undoubtedly do much to alleviate the present shortage but it can 
in no sense be a permanent solution of the problem. The labour thus secured 
is poor in quality and most expensive and after a sojourn of three or four 
months in the more civilised parts of the country the raw and unsophisticated 
native will return home a different being, impatient of control and unlikely 
to do any work he can reasonably avoid ",41 
The medical authorities, too, whose focus of vision rarely coincided 
with that of administrators or labour officers, began to point out considera-
tions that had been overlooked. The possible resurgence of the scourge of 
sleeping sickness was an ever-present danger which large movements of 
population could not but increase. Restrictions had therefore to be imposed 
affecting both recruitment and reception areas.42 
Nor did the proposals meet with unanimous approval in non-official 
circles. At the special meetings held between Government representatives 
and those of the planters and the commercial world, there were indications 
of a minority of dissenting opinion. Attention was drawn to the danger that 
the wholesale importation of labour from the non-productive into the pro-
ductive areas might mean the depopulation of a country itself potentially 
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productive, and one speaker questioned outright whether it was justifiable to 
divide the Protectorate into " productive " and " unproductive " areas.45 
Nevertheless in 1924 official and non-official opinion was generally in favour 
of closing the labour gap by means of organised recruitment from the 
peripheral areas.44 
The Governor summarised the Government's intentions as, first, to 
organise and direct the flow of labour from " our outlying labour reservoirs " ; 
second, to offer inducements to such labour " sufficient to overcome the 
human disinclination for the continuous performance of monotonous and 
uncongenial tasks ", and by feeding and good living conditions to raise the 
physical capacity for work ; and, finally, to extract a full day's work from 
the labourer.45 
The new Labour Department went into full operation in January, 1925, 
and the results of its recruiting activities clearly showed how little control 
the Government possessed. For at the very time when the Labour Department 
was setting up its recruiting organisation in Ankole and Kigezi, voluntary 
labourers from the Belgian mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi were 
coming to be an important element in the migrant labour supply in Buganda.46 
It seems probable that they were entering the Protectorate in appreciable 
numbers as early as 1923. Various influences were creating a powerful 
incentive for Belgian Africans to cross the frontier and seek a spell of paid 
labour in Buganda. The fact of a common frontier, for instance, made 
migration easy. The route into Uganda from the Kingdom of Ruanda had 
traditionally been a means of escape from feud, famine, or oppression. In 
Buganda, the rising price and increased production of cotton in these years, 
and the construction of the Kampala-Masaka road, made the demand for 
labour grow when the supply within the Protectorate was decreasing, as more 
and more potential wage-earners took to cotton-growing instead. In Ruanda 
this was a period of acute food shortage, and migration to Buganda pro-
vided one way of relief. Wages in Uganda were higher, and the unfavourable 
franc-sterling exchange rate made them seem more attractive still. Finally, 
the Belgian administration was intensifying its efforts to raise taxes and thus 
making it more necessary for men to earn cash. 
The numerical importance of this foreign labour supply was not fore-
seen when the recruiting schemes were under discussion in Uganda in 1924. 
The supposition was that the labour to be recruited would be drawn from 
within the Protectorate.47 In the event, Belgian natives provided by far the 
greater proportion of the numbers recruited by the Labour Department. 
" The great majority " of the 11,700 labourers recruited in the south-west of 
the Protectorate by the Labour Department up to the end of September, 
1925, were from Belgian territory ; and part of the 5,200 obtained from the 
West Nile District were also of Belgian origin, coming from the Congo 
proper. Less than 2,000 were recruited from Lango and the Acholi country. 
And when at the end of September—apparently through drastic action on the 
part of the Belgian authorities—there was an abrupt cessation of the foreign 
movement, the Labour Department reported that in consequence it was 
" seriously short " of the amount of labour required.48 The reaction of the 
Uganda authorities was to redouble their efforts to attract labour from 
within the Protectorate, and 100,000 propaganda handbills were ordered for 
distribution amongst the principal tribes of south-western and western 
Uganda.49 
The flow of immigrants from the Belgian side was apparently soon 
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resumed, and at the end of the year, although the numbers recruited fell far 
short of the estimated figure, all demands had been met.50 The numbers of 
labourers coming into the centre on their own initiative had evidently com-
pletely upset calculations. 
In spite of the relatively small numbers with which the Labour Depart-
ment had had to deal, and of the efforts to popularise employment in the 
public service by higher wages and improved conditions,61 there was, at the 
end of 1925, little sign of progress in the creation of a " permanent labouring 
class ", which had been referred to at various times as the ultimate objective 
of labour policy.52 The new Department had applied most of its resources 
to recruiting and conducting labour. The Government no longer attempted 
to maintain a position of wage leadership. In the new schedule of Govern-
ment wage rates, announced in 1925, the recommended rate was never higher 
than that paid by private employers for similar work under similar con-
ditions. At one period in 1925, when private employers in the Kampala area 
were paying a cash wage of Shs. 18/- to Shs. 22/- per month for locally 
engaged labour, the Government rate still lagged behind at Shs. 14/-. To 
make up the resulting deficiency, recruited labour had to be used, at an 
average cost, including recruiting expenses and food, of about Shs. 23/- ! 
When this was realised, the Government wage rate in the area was increased 
to Shs. 18/-,53 which meant that the wage rate in the vicinity of the com-
mercial and administrative capitals was once again above the local poll-tax 
rate.64 
The spate of recruiting, especially in the West Nile District—which in 
January, 1925, was said to be " overrun with recruiters from all over 
Uganda "6B—was evidently less than satisfactory to some private employers. 
Suggestions were put forward, during the year, for eliminating some of the 
competition, but the official policy was reaffirmed, that in all districts where 
labour recruiting was permitted, there must be equality of opportunity for all 
employers, whether Government or private.66 
In the following year, however, the whole policy of meeting the labour 
shortage by attracting up-country tribesmen into the centre of the Protec-
torate was regarded much more critically. Sir William Gowers, who became 
Governor of Uganda in February, 1925, was far more apprehensive of the 
ultimate effects of these labour movements than his predecessor had been. 
During 1924 there had been warnings of unexpected difficulties and costs, 
especially medical ones ; for example, the death rate, incidence of sickness, 
and call upon medical services was far greater with imported labour than 
with labour drawn from local populations.67 
Now the Governor, in commenting on certain observations made by the 
Ormsby-Gore Commission,68 drew attention to the grave social consequences 
which in the long run might flow from current policy. When, among such 
people as the Baganda and the Basoga, labourers were introduced who came 
from tribes considered inferior and who worked under conditions which the 
Baganda and Basoga would not themselves accept, the latter inevitably 
tended to feel that unskilled manual labour was a form of employment 
suitable only for inferior tribes. There was even danger that the question 
might in time become one of " caste ", and in that event the Government, if 
the system of imported labour ultimately broke down, would be confronted 
with difficulties far more formidable than any that existed. There could be 
no question, Gowers said, " that the present system of imported labour should 
be regarded only as a temporary Snd even emergency expedient, and should 
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be abandoned in favour of the development within each district of a labour 
supply adequate for local needs from the tribes inhabiting the district, if 
this alternative is in any way practicable " . 
The question was whether the development of an adequate local labour 
supply within the producing districts was a practicable possibility. The 
Governor expressed cautious optimism. He was able to point to recent 
experience in the Eastern Province where, against all previous expectation, 
large numbers of natives from several cotton-producing tribes59 had been 
induced to volunteer for work on railway construction as the result of careful, 
continuous attention to housing, feeding and other employment conditions, 
by a small staff of specially detailed European officers. The task now was to 
adopt similar methods so as to achieve a substantial increase in the local 
voluntary labour supply in all the producing districts. " The problem will 
present varying difficulties according to local conditions. In Buganda, for 
instance, it may be necessary to continue a far higher standard of housing, 
feeding and sanitation with the organisation of labour battalions or pioneer 
corps offering special conditions of leave, clothing and equipment and fair 
prospects of promotion by length of service. In districts such as Teso, the 
natives of which have always evinced a marked reluctance to leave their 
homes and are engaged, both men and women, in the planting and harvesting 
of annual food crops, twice in the year, in addition to cotton, special condi-
tions will also have to be considered ". Allowing for these difficulties, there 
remained ample grounds for hoping that " a general improvement of con-
ditions and a close study of the problem by tribes and districts, combined 
with . . . a far greater economy in the use of labour than is at present observed 
either by the Government or by private employers, will ultimately produce a 
local labour supply sufficient to meet local requirements." The Labour 
Department would therefore be instructed to aim a t " the g radua l . . . replace-
ment of imported labour by local labour ", a policy that would necessitate 
far higher expenditure than had yet been contemplated. In the Governor's 
opinion, the existing system of dependence on imported labour was " fraught 
with economic danger to this Protectorate of so serious a nature that no 
expenditure up to the limit of the Protectorate's financial resources can . . . 
be considered excessive if its abolition can thus be secured ",60 
This was in accordance with the view expressed by the Ormsby-Gore 
Commission that " the same propaganda issued by the Government which 
has resulted in the rapid extension of cultivation must be directed to securing 
a greater participation by local natives in the public works, transport and 
other services necessary for the preparation and handling of the cotton crop 
for export ",61 
There was a simultaneous move away from the theory of a Protectorate 
divided into " productive " and " unproductive " areas. By February, 1926, 
the Government's development policy had undergone a significant change. 
The intention now was that " all districts should, as soon as the extension of 
transport facilities renders it practicable, become producing districts ". It 
was recognised, however, that the development of the " local labour 
policy ", whereby " each District should meet its own normal labour require-
ments from the native population resident in the District", would take time, 
and that in the meanwhile the producing districts' dependence on the non-
producing districts for labour would have to continue. " Young men in non-
producing districts should therefore be encouraged to seek temporary em-
ployment outside their tribal areas rathtr than stay idly at home. This 
migration of labour should as far as possible be controlled so that able-
bodied and physically fit men only migrate ",62 
It was not to be expected that the new policy would make an immediate 
impression upon the country's economy. Other conditions had to be ful-
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filled, notably, the discovery of cash crops suited to local conditions in the 
remoter districts ; knowledge to be acquired by the inhabitants of the most 
suitable methods of production ; the availability of means of transport whose 
cost would leave production worth-while. In Uganda, where the exportable 
produce of even the most favoured localities has to undergo a lengthy journey 
to the ocean port (750 miles, for example, from Kampala to Mombasa via 
Kisumu), transport costs have profoundly influenced the structure of the 
economy. In those parts of the country where there are few reliable roads 
and no railway, the costs may operate with penal effect. Nearly thirty years 
were to pass after 1926 before the Uganda Railway was to penetrate into 
Western Uganda, and migration into Buganda from the Western Province 
and elsewhere was destined long to continue. Moreover, so far as the pre-
dominant migratory movement was concerned—that from Ruanda-Urundi-—• 
the Uganda Government obviously had no direct power of control over the 
economic conditions prevailing at the source, even if it had wished to exert 
such influence. 
The movement of migrant labour into Buganda continued, especially 
from the south-west, and in 1926 there was little sign of approaching reple-
tion. The year was marked, however, by an increasing conflict of opinion 
between different branches of the Government about the desirability of 
having migrants in Buganda. The Public Works Department still had 
recourse to the Labour Department's recruiting services for about a third of 
its average monthly labour force of nearly 11,000, and many of the remaining 
two-thirds, although "locally engaged", were in fact of migrant origin. 
Frequently they would arrive as recruits and then desert63 in order to reappear 
as local men and claim the higher rate of pay. It was, in part, the familiar 
case of the refusal of the labourer to take the value of food fully into account 
in estimating the value of his earnings. It had been the policy to pay re-
cruited men Shs. 12/- plus rations, etc., as well as to provide accommodation, 
and to pay local men, who fended for themselves, Shs. 18/-. To the Govern-
ment the value of the ration was Shs. 4/-, to the migrant worker it was 
obviously far less—especially if he happened not to be partial to maize flour 
as a staple item of diet.04 A wage rate attractive enough to the migrant when 
offered to him in the country could not easily hold him in town, if it was less 
in money terms than the town rate paid to local people. The larger the gap 
between the two cash rates, the more likely it was that the recruit in town 
would forsake his labour camp and his ration and try for the bigger full cash 
wage. The labourer would make himself a temporary hut on a vacant piece 
of ground, and, since others did likewise, such plots became dangerously 
insanitary. The more often this happened, the more persistently these hungry 
wanderers tended to spread disease, and the more clamorous became the 
medical authorities' concern for the health of the resident population.66 
The Acting Governor minuted in June : " The Banyaruanda are a 
miserably poor l o t . . . and I have lately had under consideration the question 
of shutting down completely recruiting from [the south-west] until the health 
conditions in Kampala improve ". The intention was to recruit West Nile 
men for employment in Kampala so that the Public Works Department could 
dispense with its Banyaruanda. Fewer West Nile recruits were now needed 
for work on the railway extension, because members of the cotton-producing 
tribes in the vicinity were coming forward in 1926 as labourers in greater 
numbers than expected. No doubt the drop in the price of cotton paid to 
growers—from an average of Shs. 24/- per 100 lbs. in 1925 for the Eastern 
Province to an average of Shs. 17/- in 192666—was partly responsible for this 
unexpected success of the new policy of local self-sufficiency in labour 
63. It was stated on 20th May, 1926, that 41.6% of the labour recruited by the Labour Department between 
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supply. As a result, West Nile voluntary labour was in June " offering freely 
and in numbers largely in excess of the Railway Extension requirements ",67 
At this stage, however, other considerations came to the fore : private 
employers were still recruiting heavily and both the Labour Department and 
the Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province became apprehensive 
about the number of males who were away from their West Nile homes at 
work in other parts of the Protectorate. One estimate put the absent during 
the first six months of 1926 at about 6,400, or approximately 16 per cent 
of the adult male population.68 Uganda Government officials were at this 
time influenced to a considerable extent by the report of the Belgian 
Commission into Labour Problems in the Congo, in which it was recom-
mended inter alia that up to 5 per cent of able-bodied adult males might 
be withdrawn from their tribal areas for work elsewhere without harm, 
provided they were well cared for at their place of employment, and that a 
further 10 per cent might be employed by enterprises situated within 2 days' 
march of the labourer's home.69 It was concluded in Uganda that for the 
time being no further recruitment in the West Nile District by the Labour 
Department could be justified, and that in future the proportion of adult 
males away from home should not exceed 10 per cent. Recruiting in the 
south-west was therefore reluctantly continued, although a strict medical 
examination was now imposed, which resulted in a rejection at Mbarara of 
70-75 per cent.70 Unfortunately, no attempt to accept recruits on a selective 
basis was likely to be satisfactory if those rejected were already well inside the 
country, as was in fact the case. Those rejected would simply resume their 
long journey independently ; indeed, those in need of assistance might 
actually be less likely to receive it, although they were at liberty to make 
use of local hospitals if they had sufficient confidence and initiative to do so. 
Here was one example of the tendency of a migrant labour system, at 
least in the long run, to impose its full cost on the section of society making 
use of it, and of the disinclination of that society to accept the imposition. 
Sooner or later the employer-beneficiary of such a system must come to 
terms with the fact that the migrant whose services are in demand is not mere 
' ' labour ", but a being who retains an obstinate attachment to his own com-
munity of dependents and friends, and who is apt to draw that community 
in with him if possible—with all its claims for recognition as an addition less 
to man-power than to population and to responsible society. It must be 
admitted, however, that the full development of a sense of social responsi-
bility extending beyond the boundaries of sovereignty is a late growth in 
societies of far greater maturity and cohesion than the colonial Protectorate 
of Uganda in the early 1920's, where in Government circles there were linger-
ing traces of the earlier habit of referring to the employing community as 
" the General Public " and still occasional references to the native tribes of 
the country as " material ". 
Nevertheless, in Uganda during this period the trusteeship theory was 
beginning to impinge more directly on practical economic and labour policy 
than ever before. The speech of the Acting Governor to the Legislative 
Council in December, 1926, bore the imprint of changing ideas : " I desire 
to take this opportunity to impress upon the people of this Protectorate . . . 
that labour is neither a chattel nor a commodity, but human, and must be 
dealt with from the standpoint of human interests. . . . " There were limits 
to the effectiveness of legislation. Employers, if they wanted to have loyal 
and cheerful service, must demonstrate a keen human interest in the welfare 
of their employees ; good houses, good food, medical attendance, a know-
ledge of their language, and wages commensurate with the work they were 
doing, were essential elements in labour practice. " It is only by raising the 
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standard of living that we can induce the native to work harder in order to 
satisfy his ambitions ",71 
Most of these exhortations contained nothing new ; the change lay in 
the fact that during 1926 the Labour Department was for the first time making 
a serious attempt to bring about improvements and in the process was dis-
covering how necessary they were. The Department brought to light housing 
and feeding conditions in private employment t ha t " could hardly be worse ". 
Here was one of several paradoxes concealed in the labour problem : 
the Government, in conformity with the ideal of creating a permanent 
labouring class, pleaded that employers should co-operate in the policy of 
improving employment and living conditions, but the employers might argue 
with some justification that so long as there was little sign of the growth of a 
permanent labouring class it was uneconomic to invest more than a mini-
mum in the health and physical welfare of drifting groups of unskilled 
workers. This would be particularly true of those employers—notably the 
ginners—whose demand for labour was concentrated at one season of the 
year. Yet private employers undoubtedly underestimated the degree of trans-
formation that is possible within only a period of months when raw un-
skilled labour is properly fed and looked after. For example, it was claimed 
at that time (1926) that recruits who re-engaged for a second contract of four 
or six months' work on the railway extension were from 40 to 90 per cent 
more efficient as a result of adequate feeding and supervision.72 
In the course of the prolonged discussion and argument which took 
place in the middle 'twenties on the " imported labour " question, it is sur-
prising how little was said of those who collectively comprised the most im-
portant group of employers, the Baganda. It is true that although undoubtedly 
these native employers absorbed the majority of the migrants entering 
Buganda, the scattered distribution of transient workers among them did 
not give rise to such dangers as those produced by numbers of drifting 
migrants in and around the chief towns. Much concern was expressed about 
the propagation of disease by migrants in the course of their movements 
about the country, but the main fears of the medical authorities were largely 
on account of the comparatively high social costs of human aggregation, 
which were especially liable to arise in Kampala through the huddling-
together of aliens as ill-adapted to the sanitary discipline of urban life as the 
urban amenities were to the presence of the outsiders. So long as the migrant 
was working for a Muganda farmer, not only were risks of concentration 
reduced, but the worker's diet also tended to be more varied and to his 
taste, and the debility and disease due to an inadequate and unsuitable 
town diet were greatly reduced. The fact that the Baganda employed large 
numbers of migrants was therefore not in itself cause for great concern. 
But what if many Baganda suddenly found it necessary to dispense with 
paid labour ? This is apparently what happened in 1926, partly, no doubt, 
because the drop in the price paid for cotton during the 1926 buying season 
meant that the Baganda had less cash available for paying wages, but also 
because of the effects of unfavourable weather in the following months.73 
It is significant that the easing of the Public Works Department's labour 
problem during 1926 was said to be " partly due to the increasing flow of 
men seeking work from Ruanda to Kampala which had been set in motion 
by the previous recruiting activities of the Labour Department, and partly 
to the fact that owing to the partial failure of the cotton crop many men were 
thrown out of employment ".74 So far as the very rough and incomplete 
migrant labour statistics available for later years enable one to judge, the 
more direct social costs which the system is liable to impose, such as heavy 
pressure on local and central medical services and an increased incidence of 
crime, tend to be heaviest, not necessarily when the total number of migrants 
71. Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 15th December, 1926. 
72. Ibid. 
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is highest, but rather when adverse fortune hits Baganda employers and 
reduces their capacity to afford the luxury of paid labour. 
In retrospect, therefore, much of the " imported labour " argument was 
beside the point in its assumption that the major cause of embarrassment was 
the recruitment and importation of labour, especially as the proportion of 
Government labour in Buganda actually recruited was steadily falling away 
and in February, 1927, dropped to nil. The Public Works Department con-
tinued to employ large numbers of migrants, Banyaruanda in particular. 
Disguised as they were as " local labour ", most of these men enjoyed neither 
the rudimentary care afforded by legislative protection to recruited labour 
nor recourse to the fortifying supplements to wages available to genuinely 
" local " labourers possessing their own permanent homes and smallholdings 
near their place of work. The situation in Kampala from the point of view 
of public health actually deteriorated when the non-recruited labour set free 
by the temporarily impoverished Baganda cotton-growers made it possible 
to dispense with the imported labour system, as had been so strongly 
advocated. 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Government labour 
policy became somewhat imprecise and hesitant, of which there were signs 
in discussions of the wage level. In December, 1926, for example, an equi-
vocal answer was given in the Legislative Council to a member who wanted 
to know " whether the experiment of labour camps and the introduction of 
a Labour Department are justifying the large expenditure involved and are 
increasing the efficiency of labour and averting an increase in the wages of 
unskilled labour ? " The Chief Secretary, in the course of his reply, said 
that " the primary object of the Department is to create an efficient and 
adequate labour supply and not to depress wages, but the Department is now 
recruiting at the same rate of w a g e s . . . as in 1924 ",75 Instructions issued to 
the Labour Department in June of the same year were also vague : rates of 
pay were to be reviewed at frequent intervals " to see that they are in close 
correspondence with the realities of the labour situation ",76 
This reluctance to define a clear wage policy can well b3 understood. 
The Uganda Government of the time seems to have been suspended impo-
tently between the opposite poles of its previously expressed labour policy. 
If a permanent labouring class was to be created from among the Baganda 
and other cotton-growers, the wage rate held out would have to be high 
enough to compare favourably with what could be earned by growing the 
cotton crop, one year being taken with another. Yet the more closely the 
wage rate approached this relatively high level, the more powerfully it 
operated as a magnet on the very tribes whose migration inwards it was 
hoped to check. An analogous dilemma confronts the present-day adminis-
trator when pressed to raise the minimum urban wage rate to the " family " 
level. 
Early in 1927 the medical authorities again protested strongly about the 
continuing menace to the health of the native population—and of Kampala 
in particular—incurred through drawing into Buganda migrants from the 
unhealthy areas of Ruanda and Ankole ; " much sickness and death and 
expenditure " had already been caused by this source ofinfection. The Labour 
Department, in accordance with standing instructions, reviewed wage rates 
and recommended a cut in the maximum monthly rate for Government 
unskilled labour in Kampala from Shs. 18/- to Shs. 16/-, to correspond " more 
closely to the realities of the labour situation ". But in the following months 
there was no sign of any slackening in the stream of immigrant labour coming 
into Buganda from Ruanda. 
A minute from the Governor of 30th May, 1927, suggests that he was 
veering towards a policy of making the best of the inevitable. He recognised 
that immigrant labour presented a very serious menace to health. " In some 
75. Proceedings of the Legislative Council, December, 1926. 
76. E.SiA, SMP 3408 (O.S.)/98. 
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ways it would be most satisfactory if the whole of this immigrant labour 
from Ruanda could be stopped. This, however, is practically impossible ; 
and inefficient though it may be, it forms a very considerable and important 
contribution to the total labour supply of the Protectorate. If it were entirely 
shut off there would be nothing to take its p l a c e . . . . " Medical responsibility, 
so far as the immigrants were concerned, had to be accepted, " not only for 
their sakes, but for our own ". A Committee would be appointed " to ascer-
tain all the facts regarding immigrant labour and to make recommendations 
as to what remedial measures within the financial resources of the Protec-
torate, can be taken ". 
This Committee, set up in August, 1927, with the Provincial Com-
missioner, Buganda, as chairman, reported in January, 1928. Its findings 
were less useful than had been hoped. Some fragmentary statistics of immi-
gration from Belgian territory were collected by means of road counts, but 
they did not give an estimate of the total number of natives from foreign 
territory entering Uganda or Buganda per year. A later estimate, based on 
these statistics, put the immigration from Belgian territory in the south-west 
at about 46,000 per annum, but it is not clear precisely how the figure was 
derived. Nor did the report estimate the average length of stay of the 
immigrants, nor the extent of settlement, nor suggest the proportions in 
which they were distributed among different employments. It was thought 
that only a comparatively small number found employment with non-native 
employers and the great majority with Baganda cotton farmers, but no 
further details were obtained on this important point. 
One fact clearly emerged, however : that migration from Belgian terri-
tory was now accepted as a net advantage to Uganda, even if it entailed extra 
costs in defence of public health. The Committee referred to " the beneficial 
effect on the labour marke t" of the migration and considered that it was 
undesirable to restrict in any way the flow of labour to Kampala and other 
centres of employment. " Any measures, therefore, which may be adopted 
for its control should be . . . such . . . as to attract rather than to deter poten-
tial labour ". 
It was not migration as such, but the uncontrolled movement of immi-
grants into Kampala and their existence there, often in extremis, which had 
given rise to fears on the score of public health. To meet these dangers it 
was now proposed to house all recruited and also all homeless casual labour 
in permanently constructed and medically equipped accommodation near 
the town. The financing of this scheme was not studied in detail, but it was 
intended that payment for all housing and food should eventually be 
recovered.77 
The task of controlling migration was made more difficult by the lack 
of contact between the British and Belgian authorities. Apart from some 
measure of practical co-operation on border administration between the 
respective local officials, the two administering Governments had not 
established any simple, direct means of communicating with each other on 
matters of common interest. In December, 1927, an informal exchange of 
information took place between the two authorities, which revealed a serious 
lack of knowledge by Belgian officials of conditions in Uganda. The Ruanda-
Urundi authorities were then apparently under the quite mistaken impression 
that many thousands of their people were being recruited annually by 
Government, Railway and private employers in Uganda, and that of this 
number the Government and the Railway took the vast majority. In fact, 
the Railway Administration employed no Ruanda-Urundi labour, and the 
Uganda Government now employed considerably less than 2,000, none of 
whom were recruited, whilst the " vast majority " found work in native 
plantations.78 
77. B.S.A. SMP R30/I/1 ; R30/II/1. 
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Fortunately for Uganda, the Belgian authorities seem at that time to 
have favoured migration from Ruanda-Urundi no less than did the British. 
They adopted the view that emigration was a necessity, for the country was 
over-populated : " le Ruanda-Urundi ne peut reserver a sa population qui 
etouffe dans ses frontieres des possibilites d'expansion suffisantes ". The 
least failure of a harvest had grave repercussions : food shortage amounting 
to famine occurred at intervals, in spite of the authorities' efforts. The 
population was increasing rapidly, and many natives welcomed the oppor-
tunity of working abroad so as to improve their lot. In these circumstances 
it was probable that even if there had been no Belgian occupation of the 
territory, migration in search of available land would have occurred. 
Taking these considerations into account, the Government concluded 
that it could not, without detriment to the interests of the native inhabitants 
under its administration, eliminate migratory population movements. It had 
an obligation, however, to see that these movements did not become a 
source of abuse. In particular, it intended to prevent an excessive outward 
movement that might endanger the health of the community and to guarantee 
as far as possible security and justice for migrants leaving the country. 
Hitherto, the movement into British territory had been clandestine and was 
opposed by local authorities and native chiefs, but in future the movement 
was to have official blessing.79 The Belgian authorities at this juncture 
(1926-27) were therefore in favour of emigration, provided they could be 
satisfied that the natives concerned would receive satisfactory treatment 
while abroad. 
As if to emphasise the gravity of the problem of over-population in 
Ruanda-Urundi, 1928 was marked by crop failures and famine without 
parallel during Belgian administration of the country. Ruanda was particu-
larly affected. A drought which set in in May, 1927, persisted throughout 
1928 and continued to afflict the country during the early part of 1929. The 
dearth extended to Urundi, which had already been heavily drawn upon for 
supplies to relieve Ruanda.80 The effects on the migratory movements into 
British territory were most marked. Exceptionally large numbers crossed 
the border into Uganda, although not all came as far as Buganda. Records 
suggest that about 50,000 immigrants came from the south-west and about 
8,000 from Tanganyika, which was also affected by the drought.81 So severe 
was the disaster that some escaped into Uganda without thought of returning. 
Hitherto, family migration into British territory seems to have been negligible 
in extent. The Belgian Annual Report for 1928 refers to the deep attachment 
of the people of Ruanda-Urundi to their country, but it also records that 
some families in the ravaged areas, after the experience of successive crop 
failures and with no likelihood of an early improvement in the conditions 
against which they had been vainly struggling, had determined to abandon 
the region and establish themselves in a more favourable land.82 In 1933 
many of these families were still abroad. The Belgian authorities reported 
that there were then about 9,000 natives from the parishes of Gabiro and 
Kibunga—areas that had suffered particularly severely during the 1928-29 
famine—whose return could no longer be expected, " parce-que, depuis 
plusieurs annees, ils ont pris racine dans le pays ou ils resident ",83 
The great famine years of 1928-29, therefore, were of considerable 
importance for Uganda, and especially Buganda, not merely for the boost 
given to the numbers of temporary migrants coming in from Belgian terri-
tory, but for establishing a new habit, that of coming to Uganda, not simply 
to work and then to return, but with the object of settling permanently. This 
indeed was the kind of emigration which the Belgian authorities could regard 
79. Rapport presente par le Gouvernement Beige au Conseil de la Soci6te des Nations sur I'Administration 
du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'annee 1926, pp. 85-6. 
80. Rapport . . . au sujet de 1'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'annee 1928, pp. 66-72. 
81. E.S.A. SMP R/30/21/14. 
82. Rappor t . . . au sujet de 1'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'annee 1928, p. 67. 
83. Rappor t . . . au sujet de l'Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'ann^e 1933, p. 124. 
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with approval. The famine, though in fact its worst effects had not fallen in 
the most densely populated regions, had given ample cause for concern. 
Despite the unceasing efforts of the administrators to bring relief, the pro-
longed failure of the rains had produced a major catastrophe, and in the 
Ruanda-Urundi Annual Report for 1928 the conclusion was drawn that a 
policy of internal transfer of population could not meet the problem of over-
crowding, and that emigration would be necessary as a supplementary 
remedy.84 Undoubtedly the emigration desired was emigration of the settle-
ment type. 
Migration of this sort, however, was far from being the most useful 
from the point of view of the Uganda Government. Uganda authorities 
were interested in the Banyaruanda and Barundi movements as potential 
labour supplies, and though they acknowledged a moral obligation to protect 
the health of the migrants once within the country, they were not eager to 
incur the cost of providing social services which they could justifiably avoid. 
As was to be expected, the immigrations of 1928 and 1929 had included 
a considerable number who entered the country to save their lives rather than 
to hire themselves out as labourers, and their presence was a charge upon the 
community that led, in 1930, to another examination of the immigrant 
labour situation. The Labour Commissioner was instructed to consult with 
the Provincial Administration and medical authorities and to suggest meas-
ures for control. The two aspects of the problem were set clearly before him : 
" This immigration of labour is of considerable economic importance to us, 
poor though the labour is, and should not be unduly discouraged. We 
cannot, however, accept the benefit and ignore the contingent liabilities".85 
The Labour Commissioner in due course produced a scheme which pro-
vided for the selective admission of immigrants through the establishment 
of special camps near the border. The famine and near-famine conditions 
in Ruanda-Urundi during the past three years had brought on a wholesale 
immigration, which included many who were physically unfit and who could 
never hope to obtain more than casual employment but who were apt to 
introduce and spread disease. The scheme was drafted " with a view to 
checking the influx of such undesirables, while at the same time securing a 
steady flow of employable labour. . . . " A control camp was to be set up at 
a suitable point on each of the two main immigration routes—one leading 
to Mbarara from the south-west, the other running from the Kyaka Ferry 
(over the Kagera River) into Masaka—where all immigrants would be 
medically examined. Those who were fit or could be rendered fit within a few 
days would be given a pass and allowed to proceed, while " those suffering 
from dangerous diseases or so debilitated as to be unemployable " would be 
returned over the border. Recruiting would be concentrated at these camps, 
and transport provided to convey recruits to places of employment. The 
scheme was supposed to produce a beneficial effect on the whole labour situa-
tion : " As the knowledge spread that food, shelter and medical attention 
were available the moment the Uganda border was passed, and further that 
employment could be obtained almost immediately, a steady stream of 
immigrant labour would be forthcoming in sufficient numbers to meet all 
requirements. Moreover, this labour could be relied upon to be up to a fair 
standard of physical fitness. . . . " There would also be a great saving, since 
recruitment near the point of entry would largely do away with the wander-
ing gangs of semi-starved Banyaruanda then so prevalent along the Mbarara 
and Masaka roads. 
For various reasons, the Labour Commissioner's scheme was not 
adopted. One experienced administrator pointed out that " the African 
native invariably dislikes European schemes for his protection and better-
ment and I therefore believe that your camps will be unpopular with Ban-
yaruanda, who will then develop new routes of entry into the promised 
84. Rappor t . . . au sujet de 1* Administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'ann^e 1928, p. 62. 
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land ". Moreover, towards the end of 1930, no doubt partly because of 
more normal conditions in Ruanda-Urundi, the proportion of incapacitated 
immigrants in the country was found to be considerably less than had pre-
viously been feared. The capital costs of the scheme would be heavy, and 
revenue at the time (November, 1930) was diminishing. Finally, the proposals, 
if carried into effect, would be open to misconstruction by the Belgian 
authorities. In spite of the fact that the scheme was originally designed for 
the betterment of Belgian natives visiting Uganda, it was felt that some of 
the measures proposed—for example, the establishment of camps near the 
border, the provision of free food and shelter and motor transport to the 
scene of employment—" might very well be construed by the Belgian 
Government . . . as the foundation of a scheme deliberately designed to 
attract Belgian labour into Uganda for the benefit of Uganda and not as a 
scheme designed to limit immigration to those only who are physically fit ".8 6 
With the shelving of the scheme on these grounds, immigrant labour 
from the mandated territories was left to its own devices for many years. It 
was not until the Second World War that steps were finally taken towards 
improving the conditions under which immigrants made the journey of some 
150 to 300 miles between the southern borders of Uganda and the employ-
ment centres of Buganda. In the 'thirties and early 'forties the majority of 
the travellers made the journey on foot, and there is no doubt that the hard-
ships of the march through long stretches of uninhabited country meant 
that the labour they were able to offer at the end was generally of very poor 
quality, poorly remunerated, and therefore likely to remain of that quality. 
One hesitates, however, to condemn the decision taken in 1930 against 
the measures proposed. Certainly the costs of the unassisted journey in 
terms of human suffering continued to be high. Yet these hardships were 
risked by the immigrants of their own free will. And from the employers' 
point of view, if the quality of the labour on reaching Buganda continued to 
be low, the wage also remained low for most of the 'thirties ; in 1938 it 
was still only regaining the level reached before the slump.87 
There was also the danger that the scheme might have been either a 
costly failure or too great a success. The intention was to attract " a steady 
stream of immigrant labour . . . in sufficient numbers to meet all require-
ments ",88 but what if " requirements " themselves sharply diminished, as in 
fact they did over the next few years ? The slump in cotton and coffee prices 
begun in 1929-30 had a marked effect on the employing capacity of the 
Baganda. Cotton-growers began to find that if they continued to employ 
immigrant labour on the scale which former cotton prices had made pos-
sible, the cost would in general be as much as the resultant crops were 
worth.89 
Immigration from the south-west was considered to have returned to 
normal in 1930. It ceased to be artificially swollen by emergency movements 
of population in flight from famine, and the number recorded as entering 
from Belgian mandated territory is only about 20,000, or half that of the 
previous year. Tanganyika supplied about 16,000.90 No Uganda figures are 
available for 1931, but the movement was probably roughly on the same 
scale as 1930. 
These numbers, though substantially less than in the years immediately 
before the depression, exceeded the demand, and wages were subjected to 
severe pressure. The Government was therefore faced with a difficult 
decision : how far could it maintain a policy of " not depressing the wage 
rate " when its own general revenue was in precipitate decline ? In April, 
1921, the employing Departments of the Government had received instruc-
tions which represented an uneasy compromise between the demands of a 
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" generous employer " policy and those of economy. " The policy of this 
Government is to endeavour to set up reasonable conditions for [unskilled 
labour] which might be expected to attract good men to remain in it with 
some permanency. To this end it is not the intention of the Government to 
take advantage of every period of depression . . . to reduce the wages of 
those who have remained for several years in their present employment. 
This policy, however, does not . . . prevent the engagement of temporary 
casual labour at the wages for which such labour is willing to work ". An 
important proviso was added. Since labourers who were paid an inclusive 
rate of wages and had to purchase their own food were always inclined to 
feed themselves inadequately and unsuitably in order to save as much pay as 
possible, a drop in the rate of wages would, unless there had been a corre-
sponding fall in the local cost of food, tend to stimulate this tendency, which 
it was obviously desirable to discourage. It was therefore proposed that the 
wages of this class of labour should not be reduced except to correspond with 
a drop in the price of local food supplies. In addition, " this consideration 
. . . clearly does not apply to labour who are retained in full or are working 
in proximity to their own gardens ",91 But the general effect of the circular 
seems to have been to keep Government wage rates for a time above the 
level paid by private employers. 
The question came up again in 1932, when there was again a very sub-
stantial inflow of labour from the mandated territories, A Tanganyika source 
suggests that an influx of at least 25,000 Tanganyika natives and 20,000 
Belgian natives must have entered Uganda via the Tanganyika routes alone.92 
In August of that year, labour was available in Kampala for Shs. 8/- per 
month and in some cases even for Shs. 6/-, while Government and the 
Township Authority were paying Shs. 12/-. Taxpayers complained. The 
Government was perturbed to find that apparently " an unskilled labourer 
in Kampala is prepared to work for a wage which does not amount to more 
than the actual cost of food he consumes . . . or at least which does not 
exceed that amount by more than one or two shillings ". Was this due to the 
existence in Kampala of " large numbers of out-of-work ' foreigners ' "— 
residents either of Provinces other than Buganda or of territories other than 
Uganda ? The Provincial Commissioner, Buganda, was asked whether, in 
view of the general effect on the labour market, any steps towards repatriating 
such foreigners should be taken. He was also asked to advise " on the pro-
priety or otherwise of a reduction of present wage rates by Government ". 
An enquiry showed that a monthly budget for an alien labourer would then 
be : food, Shs. 6/-, rent, Shs. 1/-, so that even with a wage of Shs. 10/-, 
assuming taxation met, there would not have been enough for a man to 
repatriate himself. The medical authorities considered that at Shs. 7/- per 
month the wage was " not only insufficient, b u t . . . the conditions of living 
of natives drawing such a wage are detrimental to the health of the com-
munity at large ". There were other disquieting signs : a marked increase 
in theft and larceny, and the hospitals again overburdened. The Provincial 
Commissioner's advice was uncompromisingly in favour of maintaining the 
wage at Shs. 12/-. " Without this wage the labourer is unable to maintain 
himself in a fit condition and is thus unable to perform a full day's work". 
And any further reduction in wages paid by Government would also mean 
a further reduction in wages paid by private employers. 
Far from reducing the wage paid by public employers, the Government 
now considered the possibility of fixing a statutory minimum wage, at least 
for Kampala. The idea was soon abandoned, however, for the Government 
realised that, once a minimum wage of Shs. 12/- was prescribed, there would 
probably be an increase in unemployment. " In fact news that the minimum 
wage rate was fixed in Kampala by law might well tend to stimulate the 
immigration and might well intensify the difficulties ". Accordingly, no 
91. E.S.A. SMP R10/6/20a. Cf. supra, p. 35. 
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minimum wage was imposed.93 Miserable conditions prevailing in Kampala 
caused many to leave, and in 1932 the migrant flow was said to be outward 
rather than inward.94 Then, as the price of cotton began to recover from the 
lowest level of the slump of 1933, more and more Baganda gradually resumed 
their practice of employing immigrant labour. 
The struggle to maintain the wage in Kampala in 1932 was a foretaste 
of minimum-wage problems to come. Uganda was still far from the stage 
where minimum-wage legislation is usually regarded as an essential part of a 
country's economic foundation, but the 1932 circumstances were in some 
degree analogous to the more familiar problem posed by the existence of a 
community of landless, unskilled labourers in an industrial or urban centre. 
The immigrant labourers unable to obtain work with the Baganda, who were 
forcing the wage rate in Kampala down to the " sweated " level, were not 
for the most part landless, but many of them evidently found themselves in a 
similar position through having been stranded away from home districts by 
the receding tide of wage rates. The only reserve price on the individual's 
labour was the level at which the sole alternatives were recourse to crime or 
relapse through inanition into the care of the public health authorities. 
The failure to maintain the wage rate in the commercial capital also 
implied failure in the policy of creating a permanent class of wage-earners 
from amongst the Baganda cotton-growers—an admission signified by the 
virtual disbandment in 1931 of the Labour Department, which was to have 
executed that policy. The Labour Department, especially after 1927, had at 
last been able to devote most of its attention to the inspection and improve-
ment of conditions under which men were employed. These functions had 
in 1926 been regarded as fundamental to the policy of " the development 
within each district of a labour supply adequate for local needs from the 
tribes inhabiting the district", and some success was achieved, particularly 
in persuading estate employers to improve standards of accommodation.95 
In 1931, however, when, under pressure of external economic forces, the 
Government was moved to drastic economies, the status of the Labour 
Department was no longer sufficient to protect it from dismemberment and 
it was reduced to a single Inspector of Labour. 
Even allowing for the degree o f f o r c e majeure imposed by the depression, 
it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Government was now disillu-
sioned over the prospects of promoting local self-sufficiency in labour 
supplies through the efforts of a Labour Department charged with the 
responsibility of raising employment conditions to a sufficiently attractive 
standard. It must by now have been clear that migrant labour would con-
tinue to converge upon Buganda, irrespective of whether active recruitment 
was being pursued in outlying districts, and that the effect of creating attrac-
tive conditions was not to tempt the local people away from cotton- or coffee-
growing but merely to enhance the magnetic pull on the remoter tribes. At 
the same time, it would become more difficult to preserve such conditions 
against erosion through increased competition from incoming ' foreigners'. 
The collapse of wages and prices in 1931 and 1932 threw into relief 
another aspect of Buganda's position as the centre of concentration for immi-
grant labour, namely, the cost to the Baganda themselves when adverse 
market conditions forced them to suspend the hiring of migrant porters. When 
these unemployed retainers stayed on in Buganda, unable to return to their 
homes or unwilling to do so without the earnings they came for, they made 
it difficult for the Baganda themselves to find jobs. Thus the Acting Pro-
vincial Commissioner commented in 1932 : " At present the supply of 
labour exceeds the demand, and labour is consequently cheap. This state of 
affairs is partly due to the Labour Department, who brought in a large 
number of races alien to Buganda and did not see that they were repatriated 
93. E.S.A. SMP RlO/6/pasiwi. 
t . E . i .A. SMP RIO/6/31 ; Annual Report of the Inspector of Labour for 1932, p. 2. 
95 . Labour Department Annual Report for 1928. 
54 
. . . at the end of their contracts, and it is also partly due to the Baganda 
themselves who encourage these immigrant natives to plant their [small-
holdings] and do their work and when they can no longer afford this they 
wonder why they cannot compete economically with experienced workers in 
a labour market ",96 Baganda who wished to maintain their income for the 
payment of tax, luwalo commutation, rent, school fees, and for the purchase 
of various imported necessities (cloth in particular), were faced with disa-
greeable alternatives. Either they could extend their cotton acreage in spite 
of the prevailing low prices (and the large increase in the area under cotton 
in Buganda between 1929 and 193397 suggests that this is what many did), 
or they could seek paid, unskilled employment, at exceptionally low wage 
rates resulting from the competition of stranded immigrants. 
The effects of this competition on the wage rate in Buganda were 
illustrated in 1934, when it was found that locally engaged labour in the 
Eastern and Northern Provinces (where relatively little migrant labour is 
employed) was receiving from Shs. 7/- to Shs. 15/- per month plus rations, 
whereas in Buganda the range was between Shs. 6/- and Shs. 12/-, without 
rations.98 
These low wage rates were associated with employment conditions that 
justified the view expressed by a Provincial Commissioner in 1937 (when it 
was less of a commonplace than it would be if voiced today) that " many of 
our difficulties are due to the abundant supply of cheap, poor labour. If 
labour were scarce and wages higher, more care would be taken not to waste 
it, but to increase efficiency by training the men and providing better and 
more attractive conditions " . " Yet what could be done—quite apart from 
the fact that the country's resources were deemed only sufficient to support 
a single permanent Inspector of Labour—if the immigrants themselves, as 
temporary workers, were willing to accept these unsatisfactory terms of 
service ? 
A general description of the employment conditions prevailing in cotton 
ginneries, undertaken in 1934, revealed a sorry picture of owners' neglect and 
indifference. More than half the total labour then employed by ginneries 
throughout the Protectorate was of the migrant class (8,460 out of 14,418), 
especially in the ginneries of Buganda and Busoga. With a few exceptions 
labour accommodation was unhygienic by any standards ; in Buganda 
rations were rarely provided and workers had to furnish their own food as 
best they could. A Congo migrant at one ginnery said : " I came to look 
for work ; I have been working here for eight days. I do not know what my 
wages are . . . I am on night work and work for my food during the day. Of 
course I am tired, but what can I do ? During the night I work for money, 
during the day for food . . . When the engines stop at night we only rest, we 
do not eat. When I arrived I was told to go and sleep in one of three small 
beehive huts close to the ginnery. There are eight Bakongo and two Baganda 
in these three huts ",100 
There was a similar situation in the same year in some of the mines in 
the Western Province. Two of these, situated near routes into Buganda from 
Ruanda, offered employment to migrants at from Shs. 2/- to Shs. 9/- per 
month and no food, or Shs. 2/- to Shs. 7/- per month and food that was 
described as " inadequate ". The plentiful flow of immigrants over recent 
years had not encouraged efforts to develop and retain a permanent or even 
semi-permanent staff of labourers.101 
The Government was properly concerned at the situation revealed, 
especially in the cotton-ginning industry, but a solution was not simple to 
find. " The main difficulty we have to face in connection with housing and 
96. E.S.A. SMP RIO/6/24. 
97. From 199,035 acres in 1929 to 318,311 acres in 1932 and 350,878 acres in 1933. (These figures may not 
be strictly comparable as the method of assessment was changed at this time.——Ed.) 
98. E.S.A. SMP U2/14 (1934). 
99. E.S.A. SMP RU1/1 (attachment), 93. 
100. E.S.A. SMP R62/4. 
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feeding is that the great majority of the natives will prefer living in filthy 
nbisina102 rather than in a sanitary and well-organised compound, and will 
take a higher wage and feed themselves miserably rather than accept a low 
wage and be well-fed. One of the main questions, therefore, is how far we 
can legitimately and fairly place on the employer by Rule the onus of assis-
ting the Government to save the native from himself. . . . "103 
It was decided, nevertheless, to bring pressure to bear on employers under 
the Masters and Servants Ordinance, but when new Employment Rules were 
circulated in draft form for the advance information of employers in 1935, 
there was great opposition, especially to the clauses relating to housing, diet, 
and hours of work. The usual difficulties barring the way to improving the 
health and efficiency of native unskilled labourers were further confirmed. 
The minimum diet judged satisfactory by the medical authorities for a man 
doing moderately hard work would cost, the employers claimed, Shs. 6/- to 
Shs. 7/- per month. But if employers were required either to provide rations 
on this scale or to pay the full cash equivalent, migrants would be even more 
likely than hitherto to demand the inclusive wage and to fend inadequately 
for themselves. A cash difference of as little as Shs. 2/- could produce this 
result. " As a large proportion of the labour employed in the country is 
from Ruanda, and as these men only come to earn enough to pay their taxes 
and to do this in the shortest possible time, it is natural that they should 
prefer to take Shs. 12/- a month without rations, hoping to live, or rather to 
half-starve, on Shs. 1/- a month ".104 The new Rules were finally withdrawn, 
although their appearance in draft form administered a salutary jolt to 
laggard employers and to ginnery owners in particular. The reason for the 
withdrawal was that the whole question of the Protectorate labour supply 
and its control was again thrown into discussion by several concurrent 
developments towards the end of 1935 and in 1936, as world prices were 
recovering from the depression. 
The Uganda Government was now well aware of the unsatisfactory con-
ditions of employment widely prevalent. Simultaneously, the Colonial Office 
was laying considerable emphasis on the importance of adequate inspection 
of labour in the Colonies, especially in mines, factories, or other industrial 
undertakings.105 The planters, on the other hand, complained at a conference 
in December, 1935, of a falling-off in the labour supply. This was considered 
to be due in part to restrictions on immigration from Tanganyika, and in part 
to a falling-off in the numbers of migrants from other districts within Uganda. 
The planters blamed the policy of " pushing the production of economic 
crops in the remoter areas ". In fact, the restrictions on immigration from 
Tanganyika had been in operation since 1933 and their aim was to prevent 
the spread of a sleeping-sickness epidemic. The Government had no inten-
tion of raising these restrictions, nor was it prepared to keep the Protec-
torate's outlying districts as labour reserves. The Governor, Sir Philip 
Mitchell, reaffirmed the principle that " the natives of this Protectorate are 
entirely free to go to work for others or to cultivate land for themselves ",106 
The Secretary of State was assured in March, 1935, that " i n no circum-
stances is pressure brought to bear by the Protectorate Government to induce 
natives to hire out their labour ". The policy was " to extend guidance and 
assistance in the cultivation of economic crops to the native populations in 
all districts ". The exodus from the West Nile country, it was pointed out, 
had decreased rapidly since 1931, largely owing to the spread of native 
production.107 
The implications of this policy for non-native employers in the central 
areas must have been apparent : a diminution in supplies of labour from 
within the Protectorate would have to be made up, either by a further attempt 
102. Small beehive-shaped huts made of grass. 
103. E.S.A. SMP R62/4. 
104. Annual Report of the Medical Department, 1936, p. 11. 
105. G.B. Colonial Office, Circular Despatch of 9th November, 1935. 
106. E.S.A. SMP R49/20. 
107. E.S.A. SMP R49/20. 
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to attract local labour through offers of higher wages, or by increased reliance 
on foreign immigrant labour. The Government had suggested the first of 
these alternatives as the one planters should pursue. It was rejected, however, 
not merely on grounds of cost, but also for reasons which recall the fears 
expressed ten years earlier. The planters said that the tribes in question were 
well known to be averse to labour on plantations, for social rather than 
financial reasons ; there was a definite stigma attached to the work because 
it had been done for years by less advanced tribes.108 
As production and employment revived in the middle 'thirties, Uganda, 
and above all Buganda, was becoming dependent on foreign labour to a 
greater extent than ever before. At the same time, it must be remembered 
that the possibilities of economic development in the outlying districts were 
still restricted by high transport costs, so that Buganda continued to benefit 
from substantial supplies of migrant labour from within the Protectorate. 
Of the Western Province, for example, in 1936, it was said : " In spite of 
agricultural development and local opportunities for earning money, many 
natives still rely upon finding work in Buganda to enable them to meet their 
taxes and other needs . . . . " In the Kigezi District of the Western Province it 
had been noticed that " Crowds of well-dressed peasants had returned from 
their annual visit with enough money to meet their obligations, and it was 
impossible to avoid the impression that a spirit of adventure prompted these 
excursions, quite as much as economic pressure ".109 
It was against a background of incipient rather than actual labour short-
age, and of doubt as to the adequacy of the existing provision for labour inspec-
tion, that a senior administrative officer, J. F. McD. Elliot, was asked in 1936 
to conduct an investigation into the labour conditions then prevailing in the 
Protectorate. His report110 is in some respects an ambiguous document, 
from which it is difficult to extract conclusions. It seems, however, that 
despite the cries of " shortage ", employers in the industries heavily dependent 
on casual migrant labour, and notably ginneries and coffee and tea estates, 
were in many cases managing to attract most of the labour required.111 
Elliot felt unable, however, to predict how long this state of affairs would 
continue. He pointed out, for instance, that the economic development of 
the West Nile District, which supplied 32.4 per cent of the labour employed 
by the private concerns he visited, and the increasing tendency for West Nile 
natives to come to Buganda, not to seek work, but in order to grow cotton on 
their own account on land leased from Baganda, meant that the supplies of 
labour from the West Nile District were bound to decrease. On the other 
hand, it was impossible to predict the future of the labour entering the Pro-
tectorate via the West Nile from the Congo and the Sudan.112 Nor was it 
possible to predict how many would enter Uganda from Ruanda-Urundi 
along the south-western route. 
Immigration from the south-west in 1936, the year of Elliot's investiga-
tion, was considered to have been far higher than in previous years. It was 
probably over 100,000, a record figure, and Elliot found at the end of 1936 
that there was " on the whole . . . a sufficient supply of labour ", although he 
thought demand was " gradually overtaking supply ".113 
The reasons for the heavy immigration from Ruanda-Urundi in 1936 
are not immediately apparent. It is true that there was a marked revival of 
economic activity in Uganda and that one might expect this to have led to a 
corresponding increase in the demand for labour. Exports, which are a good 
indicator of prosperity, rose in 1936 to about £4f million from an average of 
some £3 J million during the three preceding years, largely because more 
cotton was exported. If most of the increased cotton income went to the 
108. E.S.A. SMP R49/20. 
109. Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner, Western Province, 1936, p. 45. 
110. J. R, McD. Elliot, Report of an Investigation into Conditions Affecting Unskilled Labour, Entebbe Govern-
ment Printer, 1937 (referred to hereafter as the Elliot Report). 
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Eastern Province and not to Buganda, it is nevertheless true that there had 
been a substantial increase in the amount of cotton planted in Buganda ; 
this again suggests an increase in the demand for immigrant labour. But 
the real explanation for the rise in immigration is probably to be sought, 
not in the forces governing the demand for labour, but in those affecting its 
supply. 
The supply of labour from Ruanda-Urundi was much augmented by 
Belgium's abandonment of the gold standard in March of 1935. The depre-
ciation of the franc in terms of sterling brought into play a new stimulus to 
emigration from the Belgian territories.114 Elliot visited Ruanda-Urundi in 
the course of his enquiries and found that at the ruling rate of exchange— 
a bank parity of 7 francs 34 centimes to the shilling—the wage rate paid in 
Uganda appeared very attractive when converted into Belgian currency. He 
obtained the impression that it was " just as hard for a native to earn a franc 
in the Congo as it is for him to earn a shilling in Uganda ". This was perhaps 
an exaggeration, but Uganda had clearly become more attractive financially. 
To this incentive was added the desire to escape the unpaid communal labour 
required in Ruanda-Urundi for the construction and maintenance of roads 
and other public works. Elliot found that the chiefs were quite willing to allow 
their people to go to Uganda, recognising that they could quickly earn their 
taxes there.115 
There is no doubt that a large part of this increased immigration was 
absorbed by the Baganda. Elliot remarked, " Every Administrative Officer 
in Buganda met during my investigation impressed upon me the really very 
extensive numbers of labour employed by the Baganda, especially in the 
cultivation of cotton. No exact details can be given, but it appears that if the 
source from which the supply emanates was to dry up or be greatly restricted, 
it might have a serious effect on the output of cotton in the Buganda Pro-
vince."116 But the non-native employers benefited no less. The record 
influx of 1936, shared between non-native and native employers, again pro-
vided Uganda with an apparently easy solution to her labour problems ; 
to attract labour, employers had neither to raise wages nor improve con-
ditions of work. In spite of Elliot's view that " many employers now realise 
that it is in their own interests to look after their labour properly", it is 
clear from his report that some of the plantation-owners had not allowed 
themselves to be influenced in practice by the Governor's remark at their 
Conference in 1935 that " badly fed, badly housed, primitive native labour 
drawing five or six shillings a month is probably the most expensive means in 
the world with which to do anything ",117 Why was it that what seemed 
common sense to the outside observer was evidently not so from the point 
of view of many employers ? 
Undoubtedly one reason, in 1936, was the persistent financial insecurity 
engendered by two ruinous depressions since the end of the First World 
War. Employers were understandably hesitant to embark on costly schemes 
for the provision of permanent accommodation and amenities for labour, 
when they still had no assurance that world commodity prices would remain 
high enough to enable them to recoup the outlay. Within the Government itself 
confidence was scarcely greater. At the end of 1935, it had been decided 
that the financial position had recovered sufficiently to justify new capital 
expenditure, and a Development Committee met in 1936 in order to draw up 
a programme of works, but its chairman, the Treasurer, was unwilling to 
suppose any certainty of rising Government revenue in the five years ahead, 
and no scheme was admitted that would have committed the Government 
to an increase of recurrent expenditure.118 
114. The abandonment of the gold standard by Britain in September, 1931, would have influenced immigra-
tion in the opposite direction, and helps to explain the comparatively small annual rate of inflow for the 
depression years. 
115. E.S.A. SMPC 835/1. 
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Another long-standing reason was that employers could not feel certain 
that workers whom they might feed, train, and accommodate on a liberal 
scale would remain in their service long enough to repay in higher output 
what had been invested. It was, and is, a case where those who take refuge 
in a half-way house are unlikely to manage the whole journey. For unless 
the conditions offered are sufficiently pleasing to hold an employee semi-
permanently, the employer may well find justified his fears that the expense 
is not worth-while. In Buganda, as had been amply demonstrated, there was 
scant likelihood of persuading the local cotton-growers to take up regular 
unskilled employment. The peculiarly unfettered " landlord and tenant " 
system of tenure provided competing attractions to migrant employees in 
the shape of temporary or permanent tenancies on mailo land. This fact 
increased the chances that employees on non-native plantations would leave, 
if employers, by increasing tasks or other devices, tried to get more work 
than was customary so as to offset the greater costs incurred. The employer 
of labour recruited on contract could also argue that his risks of unrequited 
expenditure on the efficiency and welfare of his labour were made greater by 
the difficulty of bringing deserters to book, and by the fact that the Govern-
ment would not countenance contracts for periods of longer than six months. 
The two views were therefore not so wholly incompatible as might at 
first appear. The output that could be obtained from underfed, badly housed, 
untrained labour might indeed be so small that the wage paid, low as it was, 
did not prevent labour costs from being high. On the other hand, while a far 
higher output might ultimately be obtained from labour on which more had 
been spent, uncertainty as to future prices and as to the labourer's willingness 
to remain long in employment could well mean that the risks of being a 
" model employer " appeared prohibitive. Some of the causes of this un-
certainty might have been removed by the Government, but the costs, 
financial or otherwise, which would be inflicted on the community in the 
process were usually too great. This applied, for example, to the recurrent 
demand from certain employers for a system of registration, and to the pos-
sibility of allowing contracts of employment of more than six months' 
duration to be made with tribesmen who were considered incapable of 
realising their meaning. 
The labour situation in the following year, 1937, presented a complex 
picture of much that was unsatisfactory, but the remedies were not self-
evident. Elliot's enquiry had shown how dependent the various non-native 
industries of Uganda were on immigrant labour. There was believed to be 
little tendency for the proportion of migrant labour originating within the 
Protectorate to increase, and the Government continued to recognise a duty 
" to afford facilities for production where they occur and to give the peasants 
the option of home farming or temporary migration ",119 This excluded the 
possibility of any policy designed to restrict new development for the benefit 
of older economic centres. There was a conviction among the planters 
themselves that it was illusory, at least in Buganda, to suppose that local 
cotton farmers could be induced to contribute substantially to the labour 
supply ; their dependence on migrant labour was likely to continue in-
definitely.120 The mines in southern Ankole, employing about 8,000 men in 
1937, were also largely dependent on labour from Ruanda-Urundi and 
Kigezi.121 Finally, there was the certainty that without the contribution of 
other labour the Buganda cotton crop would seriously diminish. 
From all these points of view the Protectorate had a direct interest in 
the size and quality of the immigrant labour flow from Ruanda-Urundi. 
But if the immigrants were to be allowed to make their own way uncontrolled 
and unaided into the country, as had for so long been permitted, there would 
continue to be grounds for reproach, and the burden on public health 
119. E.S.A. SMP R111/1/149, et passim. 
120. E.S.A. SMP R49/20. 
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services would continue. Yet there were cogent reasons for reluctance to 
embark upon elaborate measures of control, financial, political, and admini-
strative. And the question had again been raised—though in a minor key— 
of how far all this intermixing of population would prove to be wise. A survey 
of the extent of settlement by non-Baganda in the Entebbe District in 1936 
raised as a point for consideration " whether the increase of these aliens . . . 
will be beneficial in the long run, to the country, by reason of their industrious 
habits and their example of working with their own hands rather than 
employing others, or whether miscegenation in future years will tend to 
lower the standard and culture of the Baganda. Certain it is that if the influx 
continues as at present, within fifty years the Baganda . . . will lose their 
identity as a race ".122 
In November, 1937, it was decided to appoint a full Committee of 
Enquiry before coming to conclusions. The Committee's terms of reference 
required it to review further the supply of voluntary unskilled labour in the 
Protectorate and to provide information on the size of the required labour 
supply, on recruitment, on the composition and utilisation of the labour 
force then employed, and on the tendency of labourers to settle away from 
their homes. It was also instructed " to recommend any measures not incon-
sistent with Government's policy . . . which might be taken by employers and 
by administrative and legislative action to improve the present position ",123 
The main lines of Government labour policy were placed before the 
Committee. The principle was reaffirmed that " while no native will be 
prevented or discouraged from hiring out his labour . . . there can be no 
question of compelling him to do so or of withholding from the natives of any 
district the opportunity of being able to grow an economic crop when it is 
economically practicable to afford them this opportunity". However, 
labour movement from a particular area might have to be restricted on 
medical grounds, or to prevent an excessive exodus of males that would 
threaten the general well-being of the tribes concerned. No action would be 
taken to prevent labourers from settling permanently outside their districts 
of origin, but they would be required to meet the same tax and tribal obliga-
tions as the natives of the district to which they had migrated, " thus ensuring 
that the authority of the local Native Administration is preserved ". Finally, 
Government responsibility for the regulation and improvement of employ-
ment conditions was affirmed.124 
The Committee took care to set the problem of labour supply in its 
proper perspective : " Uganda is pre-eminently a land of peasant producers ; 
and it is but right to remark that non-native endeavour has never been and 
can never be of more than subsidiary importance in the economic structure of 
the Protectorate ". Export figures left no doubt on this score. In 1937 the 
total value of Uganda's domestic exports was £5,702,736, of which cotton 
and cotton-seed, entirely native-grown, accounted for £4,661,366, and a sub-
stantial share of the remainder consisted of other produce of native origin. 
At the same time, non-native enterprise had an essential place in the fields of 
processing and marketing, and the problem of creating a regular supply of 
labour to meet the requirements of these other non-native industries had 
received little deliberate consideration.125 As Elliot had predicted, the demand 
for labour had now once again overtaken the supply, but the deficiency was 
not great and was mainly seasonal, corresponding to the busy periods of the 
agricultural year.126 As was now common knowledge, the supply came 
increasingly from outside Uganda, especially from Belgian territory. " So 
long as the flow of immigrant labour continues unabated it is not to be 
expected that employers will refrain from making use of it ; for although 
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such labour is largely of inferior physical quality, it seems, at first glance, 
cheap, and is reasonably easy to obtain " , m 
The influx of immigrant labour was continuing at a very high level. Data 
collected by the Committee confirmed earlier estimates that Banyaruanda 
were entering Uganda looking for work at the rate of about 100,000 a year, 
and Buganda continued to be the main pole of attraction. This was the case 
not only for immigrants from Ruanda-Urundi but for others. Men converged 
on Buganda from Tanganyika, from the neighbouring districts of Kigezi, 
Ankole, Toro, and Bunyoro, and from the distant district of West Nile. The 
West Nile migrants alone were said, in 1937, to number some 14,300, but this 
number included people from the Belgian Congo and the Sudan who had 
entered Uganda through that district.128 
The 1938 Committee was uneasy at the extent of this dependence on 
foreign man-power, regarding it as the most intractable feature of the 
labour problem. The Committee was convinced that " sufficient potential 
man-power does exist within the Protectorate to meet its own needs for wage-
earning labour ". The average monthly numbers in unskilled employment 
in the Protectorate in 1937 amounted to 83,200, of whom immigrants formed 
a very substantial proportion, whereas it was estimated that the potential 
working population of the country was 837,000, out of a total population 
estimated as 3,692,000. Allowing for the man-power expended annually on 
the production of the main native-grown economic crops, the somewhat 
doubtful conclusion was reached that " there is in the whole Protectorate 
the equivalent of over a quarter of a million men who could have been 
occupied in wage-earning employment if the remuneration had been suffi-
ciently great to divorce them entirely from subsistence agriculture. The 
unskilled labour problem of the future will be to open up outlets from this 
reservoir of such a gradient as to furnish a steady flow of man-power to 
industry ",129 
It is hardly surprising that the 1938 Committee was unable to go far in 
suggesting how this problem could be solved. Compulsion in any form was 
excluded ; so was any policy of withholding opportunities for local economic 
development ; while any attempt to interfere with the wage rate would have 
risked opposition from employers who would see no good reason for not 
being allowed to buy labour in the cheapest market. There remained exhor-
tation, and this, though it seems a slender basis for what was to be achieved, 
was in fact recommended. It was suggested that " administrative officers " 
should take every opportunity of pointing out to the native peoples under 
their care the existence of a duty to the community to do a reasonable amount 
of work; and, while exercising complete impartiality, " they should help the 
individual to weigh the relative merits of economic production and of wage-
earning in his own case and should be able to advise him where wage-
employment can probably be found ". It was hoped in this Way to open up 
local sources of labour which might " contribute substantially to the attain-
ment of rendering the Protectorate labour market independent of outside 
supplies ".130 
The Committee also recommended " the encouragement of an adequate 
flow of immigrant labour until such time as an indigenous supply has so far 
developed as to meet current requirements ", without facing the inconsis-
tency such an objective involved.131 Twenty years earlier the Government 
had hoped that the kasanvu system would gradually give way to voluntary 
labour, whereas it was only when the compulsory supply was abruptly cut 
off that a voluntary force took its place. Now it was supposed that cheap 
Banyaruanda labour might gradually be replaced by labour from within the 
Protectorate. Yet so long as the foreign supply continued, the wage rate and 
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conditions of employment offered in areas of abundant supply would tend 
to be held too low to be sufficiently attractive to call forth additional Pro-
tectorate labour. There were many indications of the depression of wage 
rates and of the persistence of sub-standard employment conditions in the 
main area where Banyaruanda labour was concentrated, namely Buganda. 
However, the 1938 Committee's report indicates that there had been a 
definite improvement in accommodation and rationing, and the Committee 
was able to record that " in every quarter there was a realisation that the 
employer alone is able to break through the vicious circle created by ineffi-
ciency and low standards of wages and of conditions of employment " ; but 
it is significant that it was again outside Buganda that the greatest improve-
ment was observed in the accommodation provided at ginneries—•" in 
Buganda some progress in housing has been made but not to the extent 
achieved elsewhere ". Similarly, no rations were issued in Buganda, contrary 
to the practice of ginneries in other districts.13'2 
The fact that employment conditions in Buganda lagged behind those 
offered in other parts of the Protectorate was a reflection, not merely of the 
predominance of migrant labour in that Province, but of the readiness of the 
resident Baganda having these migrants in their midst to make good the 
non-native employers' neglect to their own advantage. Native landowners 
augmented their incomes by allowing immigrants to build grass huts on mailo 
land conveniently near the place of employment, in return for a small rental, 
and both landowners and tenants were quite willing to supply them with 
food in return for odd jobs performed after the day's work or at week-ends. 
This was not the only convenience afforded to non-native employers by 
the Baganda attitude towards the immigrants. The Baganda landlords' 
willingness to grant tenancies to aliens had the effect, in a sense, of lowering 
the supply price of labour. It did so in two ways : first, the migrant who had 
entered Buganda with a view to ultimate settlement would be the more 
willing to accept a low wage and indifferent working conditions because 
wage-earning was not his sole object ; secondly, the numbers entering would 
increase, and therefore competition for work would be greater than if the 
bait of possible eventual settlement were absent. But it is a measure of the 
importance of this bait that by June, 1937, there were already 28,000 non-
Baganda settled on homesteads in Buganda, 27 per cent of them from 
Ruanda-Urundi.133 
Whatever the internal conflicts of interest produced by this process, so 
long as the Baganda, collectively, welcomed immigrants, whether as em-
ployees134 or as tenants, there would be little prospect of success for any pro-
posals to discourage the movement. The 1938 Committee not only took the 
view that on the contrary the movement should be encouraged, at least for 
the time being, but again put forward specific recommendations for the 
construction of camps along the main south-west route to assist the travel-
lers.135 No suggestion was made, either in the Government's statement of its 
labour policy or in the Committee's report, that the extent of settlement 
might call for intervention ; so long as the immigrant-settler obeyed the 
local native authority, the Government evidently did not intend to interfere.136 
In the Bukoba District of Tanganyika a similar state of affairs had come 
about, owing to events in Buganda, and there the authorities had taken a 
different attitude. The Bahaya, like the Baganda, had been in the habit of 
using Ruanda-Urundi labour " to perform such heavy agricultural and other 
work as is not reserved by custom for the woman " ; but in 1937 they found 
that the bulk of their former labour now preferred work in Uganda. In an 
attempt to counteract the attractions of the neighbouring territory, the 
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134. 1938 Labour Committee put at roughly 50,000 the amount of paid labour used by Baganda farmers. 
(Report, para. 60.) 
135. 1938 Labour Committee Report, paras. 207-212. 
131. Ibid., para. 165. 
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native authorities were offering inducements to Belgian migrants to settle in 
the country. The Bahaya knew that the immigrants would have to work as 
labourers for several years while their smallholdings were in process of 
preparation, and it was evidently considered worth-while to sacrifice land 
not then in use in exchange for a temporary advantage in labour supplies. 
In this case it was considered necessary to remind the native authorities that 
they must ensure that no land be allocated in this way which would later be 
needed by the tribe itself.137 
There was a further implication in the acceptance of immigrant African 
settlement by the Government and by the Baganda. As it increased and 
especially if, as was likely, settlement tended to " snowball", because people 
at home got to know of their kinsmen's being safely installed abroad, the 
time would soon come when agricultural land in central Buganda would be 
fully tenanted and thus give rise to a population surplus faced with the alter-
natives either of moving into the less densely settled inland districts or of 
becoming permanent wage-earners, dependent on industrial or urban 
employment. 
The 1938 Committee had considered the problem of " the creation of a 
regular wage-earning class ", which had been frequently referred to in earlier 
days but never closely examined. It visualised such a class as complementary 
to the supply of seasonal workers who, better organised, would continue to 
form a large proportion of the Protectorate's labour force. The creation of 
such a class was thought to be practicable, even from amongst some of the 
Baganda, provided the conditions offered were pleasing enough to compete 
effectively with the income the peasant could derive from agriculture. As a 
community emerged from self-sufficient subsistence agriculture, there would 
be some members who preferred " the regularity of wage employment to 
the hazards inseparable from the production of cash crops ".138 But the 
Committee recognised that most large-scale, non-native industries would 
need to have recourse to non-local sources of labour, and to attract a resident 
labour force therefore meant offering the labourer facilities to make a home 
for himself and his family on or near the employer's land. The goal was to be 
the establishment of rural social centres on a " village " model. The Com-
mittee favoured the granting of a Government subsidy to employers providing 
social services. Surprisingly, the net advantages to the employer of a per-
manent local labour force were not discussed ; they were presumably taken 
to be self-evident. The implications, however, were clearly recognised : the 
class of permanent wage-earners would tend to become entirely divorced 
from the land, wholly dependent for their own and their families' wants upon 
their wages, which would have to be adjusted to the full sum of their needs. 
" They will live in circumstances increasingly urban in character, buying all 
food with money and obtaining accommodation not from their employers, 
but on payment of an economic rent. Unemployment and maintenance in 
old age, conditions which are at present absorbed by the resilience of the 
tribal system, will claim State cognizance ".139 
The Government's Statement of Conclusions on the 1938 Report was 
published in 1940,140 after taking public comment into account. Uganda's 
dependence on immigrant labour was now implicitly recognised and accepted, 
and an experimental labour camp was built at Mbarara on the main south-
west route in the course of the year. Nevertheless, the recommendation 
that " the formation of a class of workers exclusively dependent on wages 
should be encouraged " did not evoke approval, in spite of the idea's long 
history. The Government statement pointed out that if a class of unskilled 
workers exclusively dependent on wages came into existence, wages would 
need to be raised three or four times above their current level, and industry 
137. Tanganyika Territory Annual Report of Bukoba District, 1937 (unpublished). 
138. 1938 Labour Committee Report, paras. 185, 158. 
139. Ibid., paras. 186-189. 
140. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Labour Situation in the Uganda Protectorate, 1938, 
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would have to meet the cost of sickness and unemployment benefits and of wel-
fare. Industrial housing estates would also have to be developed. " All this is 
probably inevitable to a certain extent, but it seems to Government that the 
forces making in this direction are already powerful enough and need no 
stimulation . . . The Government is not therefore prepared to encourage— 
even ' cautiously'—such a development, but recognises its obligation to be 
prepared for it as it occurs, to guide it, and to control it as far as possible in 
order that bad working or living conditions may not be avoidably created " . 
The Government adopted a similarly cautious attitude to the suggestion 
that the establishment of rural social centres by large employers should be 
officially encouraged. It did not dissent from the suggestion that employers 
providing social services in these centres might qualify for a subsidy, but it 
would await more definite proposals.141 
The Uganda Government's labour policy during the inter-war period 
was characterised by two interconnected and recurring themes, although 
neither was consistently followed. One was that of creating a permanent 
labouring class ; the other visualised greater self-sufficiency in labour 
supplies and less dependence on a foreign element. At the close of the 
period, the full implications of stimulating the growth of a class of per-
manent wage-earners had been revealed, and the intention to do so was 
renounced ; it was not until after the Second World War that the question 
of labour stabilisation received serious attention. The view was also implicitly 
accepted that the prospect of the country as a whole, or of the districts within 
it, becoming eventually self-sufficient in meeting unskilled labour require-
ments, was extremely remote. Any apprehension that may have been felt as 
to the future social costs of tribal admixture in Buganda did not weigh 
heavily against the fact that the Baganda and employers generally considered 
the foreign migration beneficial, and against the obvious difficulty of putting 
into practice any control scheme that might be devised. It could have been 
said that the same social dangers were attached to internal migration, and 
the case against internal movement had also been argued on moral and on 
medical grounds, but here too there was no disposition on the part of the 
Government, then, to prevent these movements from following their natural 
course, except in special circumstances. Their natural course was defined in 
part by the manner in which the country was being developed, but the prin-
ciple had long been accepted that there could be no justification for deliberately 
discriminatory development with the object of maintaining some districts 
as " labour reservoirs " for the benefit of others. For example, although 
during the 'thirties the extension of the Uganda Railway with the object of 
opening up the Western Province was deferred, this was done on account of 
the general depression rather than from a desire to maintain internal labour 
supplies. 
The inhibiting effects of depressed world prices for raw material on 
economic development in Uganda and, not least, on the efficiency and 
energy with which labour policy was administered, persisted until the out-
break of the Second World War. In October, 1938, the Government's capital 
construction programme was still proceeding on the recommendations of the 
cautious Development Committee of 1936. This could not be described as 
part of a co-ordinated development plan. 
Even at the end of the decade, the country's main products were still 
subject to low and unstable prices. In the latter part of 1939, the Governor 
drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the consequence of Uganda's 
dependence on world prices : stability and security in the world produce 
markets were the first condition of " wholesome and enduring development " 
and the raising of living standards. In the first six months of 1939, prices of 
tropical raw materials had been " at a level perilously near the cost of pro-
duction ",142 In January, 1940, the Governor was still not in favour of re-
141. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Labour Situation in the Uganda Protectorate, 1938. 
Statement of Conclusions by Government, Entebbe, Government Printer, 1940, pp. 1-2, 4. 
142. U.P. Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1939, p. 4. 
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establishing a full Labour Department (after its reduction to an Inspectorate 
in 1931). He recognised the low wage levels, bad housing, low standards of 
nutrition, and the general lack of provision for welfare, but he thought little 
could usefully be done beyond what was already being done while produce 
prices remained as they were.143 This was perhaps to underestimate the 
potential value of a Labour Department in persuading non-African employers 
of African labour to act in their own long-run interests. During 1938 and 
1939, when wage rates were slowly rising,144 and when some employers were 
again experiencing a labour shortage, there were several illustrations of the 
possible gains from greater expenditure on labour. The most noteworthy of 
these was the experiment over a period of five months arranged by Dr. 
L. J. A. Loewenthal, during the building of Kampala Railway Station in 1938. 
Two hundred Banyaruanda, members of a tribe notorious for poor physique 
and inefficient work, were given a full diet, which included meat and certain 
medical supplements, and it was shown that it was possible in as little as 
two months to build up these supposed weaklings to the level of efficiency of 
the normally much superior West Nile tribesmen. The nutrition expert 
recorded that " these [Banyaruanda] could be given the hardest manual 
labour and become as good as any other type of local labour in physical 
condition and output of work. In fact, the results showed that the extra 
output paid for the extra diet several times over ". The Medical Department 
commented that the result was of great interest because " the constant 
attempts . . . to improve the diet of Africans employed in industrial under-
takings have always been opposed on the grounds of cost ".146 To judge from 
the 1939 Annual Medical Report, the significance of this experiment was not 
altogether lost on private employers.146 The mines had also discovered, in 
1939, that to improve the terms on which men were employed was not 
necessarily mere philanthropy. They found that rising wage rates did not 
necessarily mean rising costs. " Wage rates tended to rise but were not reflec-
ted in working costs, as the effect of higher wages and better feeding of 
resident labourers combined with improvements in methods of operation 
was to increase the individual's output ",147 A gold mine in Ankole, for 
example, found that output trebled when an issue of half a pound of meat per 
day was made to its employees.148 
These and other similar experiences recorded during the later 'thirties 
might have suggested that the capacity of industry to improve employees' 
real wages was not entirely dependent on world prices of raw materials, and 
that a reconstituted Labour Department might soon have paid for itself. 
The Governor, however, continued to hold that the existing arrangements 
for the supervision of labour conditions in the Protectorate were less inade-
quate than they may have appeared. At the close of the inter-war period, 
full-time responsibility for the oversight of labour matters remained concen-
trated on a single European Inspector with an African assistant. The task 
was shared with the Provincial Administrations and with various specialist 
officers, Medical Officers and Inspectors of Mines and of Factories. The 
Governor claimed that, in view of the restricted revenue available, the 
relatively small field of employment would not justify the establishment of a 
full-fledged Labour Department. In March, 1940, he pointed to the fact that 
143. E.S.A. SMP Rl/161. 
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the total number of workers in private non-native employment amounted to 
only about 40,000, or roughly 1 per cent of the population, and that a sub-
stantial proportion of these—about 40 per cent—had in 1938 been concen-
trated on three large plantations, a sisal estate and two sugar plantations. 
The two sugar companies, founded in 1924 and 1929 respectively, by 1938 
accounted for about two-fifths (approximately 20,000 acres) of the total area 
under cultivation by non-native agricultural enterprise. Subordinate to agri-
culture, there were 141 active ginneries, three tobacco factories and five coffee-
curing works, and in addition seven saw-mills. There remained the mines, 
employing in 1938 a daily average of 10,600 men. The low wage level, more-
over, was not readily susceptible to increase by any legislation that a Labour 
Department might enforce. The depressing influence on wages of the former 
luwalo obligation (a month's unpaid labour for the benefit of the native 
authority) had already been removed. The levy was now explicitly in mone-
tary form, though commutable in labour, and local authorities now had to 
compete in the market for their labour supplies like any other employer ; the 
effect of this was obviously favourable to the wage level. On the other hand 
the presence of thousands of immigrant labourers willing to accept low wages 
and to live poorly worked in the opposite direction. " It might be suggested 
that the remedy is to impose minimum wages by law, and I should be willing 
to consider that, provided every country producing for the same markets 
did the same. . . . In any case, it seems to be very doubtful if that method is 
in fact applicable to unskilled, largely casual labour which is employed to a 
great extent according to the seasons, in conditions which are at any rate very 
easy going, even if they are in some respects objectionable ". He was satis-
fied that under the arrangements already in force improvement had been 
striking and was continuing.149 However, as the war proceeded, conditions 
were to be revealed before which these somewhat complacent views became 
no longer tenable. 
149. E.S.A. SMP Rl/165. 
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C H A P T E R I V 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE ATTRACTION OF LABOUR, 
1939—1952 
At the outbreak of war in September, 1939, the Government announced 
that its policy was to maintain the supply of immigrant labour at the level 
necessary for local agriculture and industry during the war, and that steps 
had been taken to ensure that this essential need should not be prejudiced 
by military recruitment,1 so far as avoidable. Simultaneously, however, the 
immigrant labour from Ruanda-Urundi showed a perverse independence, 
and during the first few weeks of the war the supply virtually dried up. 
Various explanations were put forward : a coincidental tightening-up of 
sleeping-sickness regulations at the Kyaka Ferry crossing near the Tangan-
yika border ; the depreciation of sterling ; more attractive employment 
opportunities on the Belgian side ; and-—probably the most important— 
the immigrants' unfounded fears of being conscripted by the British authori-
ties. Immigration from Ruanda-Urundi had been unusually low in 1939, 
even before the outbreak of war, and when it appeared to be stopping 
altogether, considerable concern was felt by the Uganda Government, and 
the country's vulnerable dependence on foreign man-power outside its full 
control was again underlined. The total employed population of 80,000-
90,000 (apart from employees of African farmers) was only about 2 per cent 
of the Uganda population of close on four millions. However, as the 1938 
Committee had shown, of this 80,000-90,000 a large proportion were of immi-
grant origin, and therefore fluctuations in the foreign contribution to the 
labour supply caused the employers a degree of anxiety quite dispropor-
tionate to the numerical importance of the immigrants in the population as 
a whole. Public announcements were made denying the rumours that Ban-
yaruanda were to be taken for military service, and by the end of the year 
the flow began to resume more normal dimensions. It continued to be 
unusually slack, however, until the latter half of 1940, when it was no doubt 
stimulated by the Belgian devaluation of 7th June. This established the Congo 
franc sterling exchange rate at 176.625 francs to the pound, and thus effected a 
depreciation of 32.7 per cent,2 more than offsetting the British adjustment of 
the previous September. Records show 57,299 entering via Kakitumba Bridge 
in the latter half of 1940, as against only 14,383 during the first half of the 
year.3 
Fortunately, although there was still no formal understanding between 
the Belgian and Uganda authorities on the subject, it had become known 
during 1939 that the Belgian administration was quite willing for labour to 
go to Uganda and had no intention of interfering. There were particular 
times when the departure of labour might cause inconvenience, especially 
if the whole burden of planting fell on the women ; but the Ruanda-Urundi 
authorities recognised that migration to Uganda helped natives to find means 
of paying their taxes.4 It was ascertained that Belgian officials were in no 
way responsible for the temporary cessation of immigration on the outbreak 
of war.6 
The need for a regular exchange of information between the two 
administering authorities nevertheless became increasingly apparent. Uganda 
was in difficulties whenever labour fell short of requirements, more especially 
1. U.P. Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1939, p. 11. 
2. Bulletin Hebdomadaire de la Kredietbank, 5th November, 1950, p. 353. 
3. Annual Report of the Inspectorate of Labour, 1940, p. 4, Appendix I. 
4. E.S.A. SMP C835/A.102/14. 
5. E.S.A. SMP R306 I/letter dated 18/xii/'39. 
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since it had become a war objective to produce greater quantities of cotton, 
coffee, sugar, and other marketable crops.6 But difficulties were no less when 
the labour supply threatened to overflow the market. This happened again 
towards the end of 1940, when the Labour Inspector warned of unemploy-
ment in sight if the influx continued at the current rate.7 The alarm proved 
premature ; partly, no doubt, because of the wartime encouragement given 
to increased cultivation of economic crops, and partly because of the military 
recruitment of resident natives of Uganda. In 1941, however, adverse reports 
from the medical authorities once more reminded the Government of 
responsibilities still unfulfilled. The solitary camp established at Mbarara in 
1940 had done little to reduce the hardships of the journey, and the question 
of substantial investment in accommodation for the travellers was raised 
yet again. By 1942, the difficulties foreseen became an immediate and urgent 
reality ; in June of that year the Labour Advisory Committee (which had 
been established in 1941 under another name) was called upon to concentrate 
its attention on the immigrant labour question. The need for a full enquiry 
had been revealed during the investigation of a strike at one of the two large 
sugar estates, and by the findings of a medical enquiry that had presented the 
Government with a disturbing picture of the plight of the typical immigrant 
labourer in Buganda. Immigrants were arriving in Mengo District in an 
exhausted, devitalised state, most of them extremely undernourished and 
many suffering from disease. They had no opportunity for recuperation 
before starting work, and if they were too ill to work they starved. There was 
evidence that the death-rate at one of the sugar estates was " staggeringly 
high ". The immigrants' desire to accumulate as much cash as possible 
during their short stay in Uganda meant that a large proportion of casually 
employed Banyaruanda maintained life on the cheapest possible diet, with 
the familiar result that their health was still further undermined. The un-
controlled entry of thousands of these immigrants in search of work con-
stituted " a very grave social problem ".8 
The reason for this aggravation of a long-standing evil is not far to 
seek. The low prices paid for cotton in 1942 (an average of Shs. 8/25 per 
100 lbs. in Buganda) had resulted in a large fall in the acreage which growers 
wished to plant, both in Buganda and elsewhere in the Protectorate. The 
decrease in Buganda was from 481,966 acres in 1941 to 307,154 acres in 
1942, and the supply of immigrant labour was therefore greater than Buganda 
could absorb. The number of Banyaruanda suffering from malnutrition 
treated in hospitals was much larger than usual, and the problem of destitute 
Belgian immigrants made itself felt as far east as Jinja.9 
The experience of 1942 illustrated again the costs, in terms of disease, 
imported and spread, and of destitution and of the relief of these conditions, 
that were inseparable from Buganda's dependence on immigrant labour, and 
the fact that these costs are likely to arise, not necessarily when the rate of 
immigration is at its highest—the numbers recorded as entering from the 
south-west in 1942 (68,820) being well below the numbers considered to have 
entered the country in 1936 and 1937—but when there is a maladjustment 
between supply and demand. 
A tour of investigation undertaken on the Labour Advisory Committee's 
behalf by a senior Medical Officer and the Inspector of Labour was particu-
larly interesting in providing long-lacking information on prevailing condi-
tions in Ruanda-Urundi and on the views of the Belgian authorities about 
possible control measures. The investigators were impressed by the effects 
of the pressure of human and animal population on the diet and health of the 
Banyaruanda even in their home country. Despite the efforts of the Belgian 
administration to promote intensive cultivation of the mountainous country 
6. U.P. Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1941, pp. 11-12. 
7. E.S.A. SMP R306 1/67. 
8. Second Report of the Labour Advisory Committee, Organisation of the South-Western Labour Migra-
tion Routes, Entebbe, Government Printer, 1943, pp. 23-24 ; Annual Report of the Inspectorate of 
Labour, 1942, pp. 1-2, para. 5. 
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characteristic of the Ruanda and Urundi kingdoms, the majority of the people 
lived in a state of sub-nutrition. The efforts of the Belgian authorities to 
improve these conditions paradoxically acted as a stimulus to the migration to 
British territory. The Vice-Governor of Ruanda-Urundi stated that one of 
the reasons why the Banyaruanda sought employment in Uganda was the 
unpopularity of low-paid, forced work, particularly on swamp-clearing, even 
though this was entirely for the people's own benefit. Other reasons were 
the generally easier working conditions in Uganda, where there was less 
" discipline ", and the higher wages obtainable. The Belgians confirmed the 
fact that they were adopting a neutral attitude towards these movements, 
seeking neither to prevent nor to increase them.10 
The 1940 devaluation of the Congolese franc served artificially to exag-
gerate the Uganda wage rates when converted into Belgian currency. 
Moreover, knowledge that these attractive wage rates were being paid 
probably spread faster than accurate information about the likelihood of 
work actually being available. These exceptional circumstances very 
probably played a part in aggravating the unemployment problem of 1942. 
It might be supposed that the relatively high wage rates, from the immi-
grants' point of view, would have encouraged them to spend an adequate 
proportion of their earnings on food, but in fact they did not do so. Appar-
ently, the majority did not even ask for the advance of pay to which they were 
entitled after 15 days' work and which would enable them to buy food, but 
preferred to work for their sustenance for local Baganda. " The picture, 
therefore, is of an African of normally poor physique, his resistance still 
further lowered by a long journey with insufficient nourishment, attempting 
to maintain himself by working for his food, and, in addition, endeavouring 
to perform a task which can only be performed by a man in good physical 
condition. It is not surprising to find that the death-rate among such people 
is high " u 
There are obvious difficulties in attempting to assist or legislate for 
people who do not understand the need for taking care of themselves. There 
could be no certainty that the imposition by statute of an increase in wages 
would improve matters : indeed, its effect would probably have been to 
stimulate further immigration and unemployment. On the other hand, the 
need for enforcing other improvements in working conditions was patently 
clear from the 1942 enquiries. There was obviously little use in providing 
food and shelter for immigrants on their way to and from work if the con-
ditions under which the work was carried out were conducive to sickness and 
death. The Labour Department was accordingly reconstituted on January 
1st, 1943, and one of its main tasks was the drafting of up-to-date labour 
legislation which would supersede the Masters and Servants Ordinance 
dating from 1913. To meet the recurrent problem of unemployment, it was 
proposed to limit immigration ; monthly requirements were to be calcu-
lated, and only the required quota of labourers, all of whom must reach a 
reasonable standard of physical fitness, permitted to cross the frontier. 
The Labour Advisory Committee, however, foresaw serious difficulties, 
administrative and political, in connection with any scheme directed to the 
regulation of supply. There was also the risk, of which administrators had 
long been aware, that attempts at control might frighten away the timid and 
suspicious Belgian immigrants and replace the labbur surplus by a labour 
shortage. It was therefore recommended that no attempt be made, at least 
for the time being, to introduce measures for the selective control of entry. 
The major practical recommendation put forward was the provision of an 
organised system of rest camps along the main immigration routes between 
the mandated territories and Kampala, at which travellers in each direction 
could be assured of food, shelter, and medical care. A camp-building pro-
gramme was submitted, calling for capital expenditure of £55,000. The 
10. Ibid., pp. 13, 18, paras. 4, 11, 12. 
11. Second Report of the Labour Advisory Committee, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
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return for this—quite apart from humanitarian considerations—would show 
itself in a more constant and more healthy labour supply than the country 
had attracted in the past.12 
In 1943 and 1944 the alternative hazards of surplus and shortage in 
Uganda's labour supply were again encountered in quick succession. 
Following upon two seasons of unsatisfactory cotton prices (1940-41 and 
1941-42), the Government, after negotiations with the United Kingdom 
Government, was able in January, 1943, to announce not only a satisfactory 
price for the 1942-43 crop, the average price paid in Buganda being Shs. 
13/75 per 100 lbs., but the welcome news that the purchase of the crop would 
continue to be guaranteed until after the war. The guaranteed minimum 
price subsequently announced in advance for the 1943-44 crop stimulated 
planting, and the acreage in Buganda rose from 307,154 acres in 1942 to 
414,658 acres in 1943. Unemployment among the immigrant Banyaruanda 
so far disappeared that in July, 1943, it was reported that they were demanding 
wage increases from Baganda farmers. They were no longer satisfied with a 
range of Shs. 7/- to Shs. 9/- per month without food, and wanted an increase 
in the cash element to Shs. 12/- : the sugar estates were now paying Shs. 
12/-, food, and a " war bonus " of 50 cents per completed week.13 The offer 
of such extra inducements was itself a measure of the labour difficulties 
acutely affecting some non-native employers. The sugar companies' ability 
to obtain labour on contract from the West Nile had been adversely affected 
by the decision to give priority to military needs and to local food produc-
tion.14 It was not a decision easily made. The West Nile tribes were highly 
regarded as the chief source of recruitment for the combatant forces, as well 
as for the heavy labour in such essential industries as sugar-cane and sisal-
cutting and the handling of timber, but their own communities had to be 
protected against the risk of famine if too many able-bodied males left before 
adequate planting had been assured. The decision increased the dependence 
of the deprived industries on labour supplies from elsewhere, in particular 
on the Banyaruanda, and, as an emergency measure in 1943, on the Basoga.15 
But at this very time, there was a marked falling-off in the number of 
Banyaruanda entering Uganda. Entry from the mandated territories in the 
first five months of 1943 was only about 50% of that recorded for the corres-
ponding period of the previous year. This probably represented mostly a 
delayed reaction by the Banyaruanda to the hardships unemployment had 
imposed.16 A number of years like 1942 would have robbed Uganda of much 
of its attraction even for the Banyaruanda. It was therefore decided, in 1943, 
to issue food to migrant travellers at certain points along the route, in the 
hope that this would once again revive the flow. 
A few months later, as famine again descended on Ruanda, the stimulus 
proved to be only too successful. The District Commissioner, Ankole, asked 
for instructions : Might he issue extra rations to the semi-starving ineffec-
tives ? Would this encourage an influx of others ? Could the Belgians be 
approached with a view to checking the entry of people obviously too weak 
to reach Kampala ? Here again was a problem in which humanitarian relief, 
economics, politics, and administration were inextricably entangled.17 By 
December the influx of starving refugees had reached grave proportions. 
12. Second Report of the Labour Advisory Committee, pp. 9-11, paras. 12-15. 
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There were large numbers of women, children, and ineffectives, less than 
10 per cent of those entering were fit for employment, and Uganda's own food 
supplies were being threatened. According to one report, many refugees 
said they had no intention of returning to Ruanda.18 
With the concurrence of the Belgian Congo Government, it was reluc-
tantly decided to ban all immigration from Ruanda-Urundi from 1st January, 
1944. Co-operation between the two administrations seems to have been 
fairly effective in enforcing the prohibition.19 There was an immediate 
reaction on the part of employers. The Planters' Association expressed grave 
concern at the stoppage of immigrant labour and feared that there would be 
serious repercussions on essential production.20 
By March, 1944, the loss of potential labour entailed by the ban's con-
tinuance had become the dominant consideration in Uganda, but it was 
learned that the Belgian authorities were unwilling to allow the departure 
of adult males to be resumed until assured of adequate food-planting.21 
There followed an important meeting on 20th April, 1944, between the 
Acting Uganda Labour Commissioner and the Vice-Governor-General of 
Ruanda-Urundi, M. Jungers, at which the differing immediate interests of 
the two administrations were reconciled and some of the longer-term 
implications of recent events considered. The Belgian authorities were 
carrying out a concerted agricultural campaign in which the participation of 
all able-bodied men was needed, but the Vice-Governor-General nevertheless 
agreed to the resumption of movement after July, 1944, even though this 
would involve difficulties on the Belgian side. It was his intention, however, 
to insist that in future the employment of Banyaruanda in Uganda should 
conform with a Ruanda-Urundi Ordinance governing recruitment for employ-
ment beyond the frontier. The Ordinance laid down inter alia that all such 
recruitment should be by contract and it provided comprehensively for the 
welfare of the recruit and of the members of his immediate family authorised 
to accompany him. These regulations were already in force in respect of 
Ruanda workers employed by mines in the Belgian Congo, the cost of 
recruitment and transport to the scene of employment amounting to about 
£20 per head. 
The Belgian administration was evidently still not aware of the peculiar 
circumstances under which the majority of immigrants were employed in 
Uganda. It was explained that recruitment by contract then accounted for 
only about 16 per cent of the Banyaruanda coming into Uganda. Another 
24 per cent, taken on by non-natives at the place of employment, were casual 
labourers employed by the month, and the balance of about 60 per cent were 
similarly employed by African employers as casual workers. The Uganda 
representative did not think it would be possible to enforce the provisions of 
the Ordinance in respect of these native employers, and it was eventually 
agreed that in order not to disrupt Uganda's war economy enforcement 
would be waived until after the end of hostilities. In a subsequent exchange of 
correspondence, the Belgian authorities explained the disadvantages, from the 
point of view of Ruanda-Urundi social well-being, of allowing men to leave 
for Uganda unaccompanied by their families. They stated that they would 
henceforth welcome the recruitment in Ruanda-Urundi of men with their 
wives and children, for a minimum period of a year.22 
Meanwhile the immigration stoppage continued to have serious reper-
cussions in Uganda, especially on the sugar plantations. There was con-
siderable demand for labour : war production and military recruitment took 
their toll. The supply of labour was restricted, partly by administrative 
measure and partly by economic factors. In famine-stricken districts, the 
administration refused to allow men to leave who were needed for the 
18. E.S.A. SMP R306/5/23, 53. 
19. E.S.A. SMP R306/5/49. 
20. E.S.A. SMP R306/5/74. 
21. E.S.A. SMP R306/5/88. 
22. E.S.A. SMP R305/5/97-100. 
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emergency planting of food. At the same time, soldiers' family remittances 
and the denudation of shops sapped people's willingness to work for wages.23 
If the ban on entry had again demonstrated Uganda's dependence on 
foreign labour supplies, the recurrence of famine, which had made the pro-
hibition necessary, had also shown how precariously conditional upon good 
harvests the welfare of the Ruanda people still remained, despite all the 
efforts of the Belgian administration to ensure adequate food reserves. The 
Ruanda-Urundi Government was again acutely conscious of the problems 
posed by over-population and was now tentatively exploring possible means 
of relieving the congestion by the settlement of Banyaruanda families in 
substantial numbers in neighbouring territory. This emerged clearly in the 
course of the meeting between M. Jungers and the Uganda representative, 
although the question was not further pursued at the time. 
What were Uganda's interests in the matter ? Officials in Uganda on 
various occasions in the past had made contradictory assumptions. Elliot, 
for example, had suggested in 1936 that Banyaruanda who were settling in 
Uganda offered " the most fruitful prospects of a permanent labour supply 
for the Protectorate ",24 A similar view, not unanimously held however, was 
expressed at a meeting of officials in November, 1943. The opposite, and 
probably more realistic, view was that the settlement of immigrants would 
not necessarily contribute to Uganda's labour requirements, since experience 
showed that settlers preferred to follow the example of the local people and 
themselves become farmers. If Banyaruanda were to be admitted on long 
contract with their families, it would probably be necessary to make their 
ultimate repatriation a condition of their entry. 
The question is clearly not one that can be answered on economic 
grounds alone. The difficulty of answering it on the broader plane of inter-
territorial social policy, however, was evidently not matched by any corres-
ponding difficulty in the minds of the immigrants themselves. Independently 
of any agreement or long-term policy which the two Governments might 
seek, it was observed that when Banyaruanda immigration resumed its 
normal course after the middle of 1944, many men made the journey accom-
panied by their families. The tendency for increasing numbers of immigrants 
to settle in Uganda, which first became appreciable after the famine of 1928-29, 
undoubtedly gained further momentum from the famine of 1943-44. In 1945, 
when the recorded immigration from the south-west again reached pre-war 
levels, there were signs that definitive family immigration was still on the 
increase, although there had been a full recovery in Ruanda from the 
hardships of the previous year.25 
In spite of more immigrants arriving, non-African employers' labour 
needs were not fully satisfied. The price of cotton was rising (an average of 
Shs. 15/- per 100 lbs. being paid in Buganda in 1945) ; the direct effect on 
local labour supplies of the absence of large numbers of able-bodied men away 
in the armed forces26 continued to be aggravated by the saturating effects of 
the remittances they sent home, especially since the general shortage of con-
sumer goods continued. As a result, wage rates rose, and the Labour 
Department noted that " the difficulty of obtaining labour was the chief 
reason for a more general issue of full rations by employers. . . . " 2 7 
But the wage rate was now no longer left to find its own level. In 
Uganda, as in other colonial territories, a profound if gradual and unspec-
tacular change in the Government's social policy occurred during the war 
years. The inspiration for the revolution in thought of which it was an expres-
sion became cumulatively powerful. On September 15th, 1939, the Secretary 
of State emphasised his desire to see social services and development activities 
23. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1944, p. 2, para. 3. 
24. Elliot Report, p. 34, para. 87. 
25. Rapport sur 1'Administration Beige du Ruanda-Urundi, 1945-6, Brussels, 1948, p. 65 ; Annual Report 
of the Labour Department, 1945, p. 2, para. 5. 
26. Approximately 57,000 men from Uganda enlisted. 
27. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1945, pp. 1-3, paras. 4, 9. 
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in the Colonies disturbed as little as possible.28 In the following fateful 
summer, the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed. In 
June, 1941, when Lord Moyne circularised Colonial Governments to urge 
that the wealthier colonial residents reduce their living standards in the 
common war effort, he made clear his recognition that " throughout the 
Colonial Empire [there are] large populations . . . whose standard of living 
is now so low that the same policy cannot and should not be applied to them, 
even in wartime ". On the contrary, it was " an imperative duty to do all that 
is practically possible to raise the standard of living of such people, even 
during the war period, alike for humanitarian, political, economic and 
administrative reasons ",29 
Lord Hailey, speaking in 1943, said of the quickened interest in the wel-
fare of people of backward areas, of which Lord Moyne's remarks are an 
indication, " Historians will doubtless differ as to the cause which has secured 
so wide a support for these feelings. It may be an instinctive revulsion against 
the teachings of power politics ; it may in part be a legacy of the recent 
depression period, which has had so revolutionary an influence on modern 
social and economic thought ",30 The Hot Springs Food and Agriculture 
Conference of the United Nations of the same year, developing into more 
concrete form the economic and social clauses of the Atlantic Charter, 
recommended inter alia that the Governments represented " by virtue of 
their determination to achieve freedom from want for all people in all lands 
should affirm the principle of mutual responsibility and co-ordinated action ". 
The first objective defined was " to promote the full and most advantageous 
employment of their own and all other people and a general advance in 
standards of living. . . . " The adoption in 1944 by the General Conference 
of the International Labour Organisation, at Philadelphia, of the " Social 
Policy in Dependent Territories Recommendation " carried these principles 
directly into the sphere of colonial economic and labour policy. 
In Uganda the wage rate came to be looked upon less exclusively from 
the point of view of the employer's ability to pay and more from the stand-
point of the employee and his needs. A Cost of Living Committee, of which 
the Labour Commissioner was a member, kept " constant watch " on pre-
vailing wage rates in 1943, and war bonuses were paid to help the lower-paid 
employees of Government " to meet the enhanced cost of living due to war 
conditions ",31 The Government appears to have been satisfied that other 
employers could be relied upon to follow advances in official wage rates by 
making similar adjustments themselves. There was probably good reason 
for this assumption, so long as a labour shortage persisted, although in 1945 
Baganda employers tried to form " rings " to keep down the local wage 
rates to the pre-war level.32 
There was, it is true, reluctance to fix minimum wages in urban areas, 
on the grounds that wage rates in the adjacent rural areas would then be 
forced up to the detriment of African employers growing essential economic 
crops, and that an excessive amount of labour would be drawn into the towns. 
Nevertheless, it was during this war period that it became the practice of 
Government to concern itself with the adequacy of the unskilled labourer's 
wage, and to ensure, if not by minimum wage legislation, then by alternative 
means, that wage rates sufficed to enable him to meet his basic needs. The 
concept of a " cost of living " applied to the African labourer seems to mask 
a sudden break with former ideas, implying a certain continuity in the need 
for cash, which one does not associate with the habits of the " ta rget" 
worker. The extent to which Africans living in different parts of the Pro-
tectorate had developed a regular need for money nevertheless still varied 
considerably. In 1941, for example, the Provincial Commissioner of the 
28. U.P. Sessional Paper, No. 1 of 1940, p. 10, para. 3. 
29. G.B. Colonial Office Circular Despatch of 5th June, 1941. 
30. Lord Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples, London, Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 21. 
31. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1943, p. 6, para. 26. (For reasons which are not clear, " where 
practicable, arrears of bonus to labourers were given in the form of khaki shorts ".) 
32. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1944, p. 7, para. 23. 
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Western Province said that in many areas the peasant was content to produce 
and sell crops only to the value of the amount of tax required of him, " witness 
the ripe cotton left unpicked on the trees " ;33 and towards the end of the 
war it was clear that for many employed Africans, higher wages still meant 
a falling-off in the desire to work rather than a stimulus to greater effort. 
Thus while many employers raised wages so as to keep in step with Govern-
ment cost of living awards and to attract additional labour, the tendency on 
the part of those already employed was often towards greater absenteeism 
and the adoption of " go-slow " methods.34 
The comment of the Labour Adviser to the Secretary of State, who visited 
East Africa in 1944-45, was typical : " The dominant problem throughout 
East Africa is the deplorably low standard of efficiency of the worker ; that 
is to say, the exceptionally small output characteristic of the entire country. It 
has always been a conspicuous weakness in the East African economy, but 
it has been greatly accentuated by war conditions, and universal opinion, 
which was confirmed by my own observation, declared that performance 
had deteriorated steadily during the whole of the war ",35 The main reasons 
cited by Major Orde Browne were familiar and were related directly to war 
conditions : the absence of many of the better African workers and of 
European supervisory staff on war service, and an unusually copious circu-
lation of money among the African population at a time when supplies of 
imported goods were exceptionally low. Employers, in these circumstances, 
tended to offer " better conditions " in the negative form of giving easier 
tasks or of accepting a smaller output, as well as in the positive form of 
improved feeding, bonuses, etc.36 
Although these conditions were temporary and exceptional, they illus-
trate some of the more persistent characteristics of migrant labour : that a 
prosperous peasantry does not contribute eagerly to its supply ; that the 
migrant labourer's chief incentive to work is the desire to earn money for 
immediate and tangible purposes rather than as an uncommitted reserve 
against future needs ; and that he has little cause to be bound, whether out 
of self-interest or of obligation, to identify himself as " a good worker " in 
the eyes of any particular employer. 
The Uganda Government, as the war proceeded, became more and 
more the directing force in a partially controlled economy, and probably the 
most complex of its tasks was that of allocating man-power by inducement 
rather than by direction. The problem of balance arose at every turn. The 
claims of the military37 had to be set against the man-power needs of those 
non-native employers who were themselves engaged on " essential produc-
tion " of sugar, sisal, timber, rubber, pyrethrum and tin, and against the 
administrator's fears for the well-being of the families left behind by soldiers. 
A balance had also to be struck between the need to maximise the output of, 
e.g., sugar and the need to insist on an improvement in the conditions of 
employment prevailing in that industry—if necessary, by withholding assis-
tance in attracting fresh labour supplies. The sugar industry posed another 
problem : while on the one hand there was an urgent demand for greater 
quantities of sugar, there was also, at times, great danger that famine might 
make it impossible to feed the large labour forces employed on the two main 
estates.38 Then there was the problem of how to stimulate the production of 
one peasant crop against another and how to balance the call for increased 
peasant production in general against the man-power claims of the military 
and of non-native employers. 
The institution of guaranteed controlled prices was one of the key 
33. E.S.A. SMP R61(N.S. 6537)/92-3. 
34. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1945, pp. 1-2, para. 4. 
35. G. St. J. Orde Browne, Labour Conditions in East Africa, London, H.M.S.O., 1946, Col. No. 193, p. 15, 
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36. Ibid., pp. 15-17, paras. 35-42. 
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instruments used in the balancing process. In addition to the two main 
African economic crops, cotton and coffee, various hitherto relatively minor 
products became " essential " in the war effort, e.g., groundnuts, maize, rice, 
and sesame. Prices were fixed within the limits set by opposing considerations, 
of which one was the desire to pay a " fair " price to the grower, taking into 
account his increased cost of living. The problem was how to raise prices to 
growers without still further curtailing the number of local people who were 
willing to take up wage employment, for it was imperative that the country 
should not become still more dependent on the unpredictable labour supply 
from Ruanda-Urundi.39 
The Government was now able to raise the wages of its own employees 
a little less hesitantly than before the war, because the bulk buying arrange-
ments with the United Kingdom for Uganda's principal crops made Govern-
ment revenues more predictable. Non-African plantation-owners, too, were 
at last benefiting from higher prices for their products, which enabled most 
of them to follow the lead of the Government in advancing wages. 
On the other hand, investment in permanent labour accommodation by 
private employers still required more confidence in future prosperity than 
many could muster. Among the smaller concerns, in the tile- and brick-making 
and timber industries, for example, little or no attempt was made to 
provide housing if it could be avoided.40 This was natural enough, since the 
construction of permanent buildings would normally require a larger pro-
portionate expenditure for a small than for a large firm. Plantations in 1945 
showed great variation in their assessment of future prospects. The Labour 
Adviser observed that along with some excellent examples of progressive 
and modern plans for accommodation and feeding there were many cases of 
employers resting content with temporary accommodation of the wattle-
and-daub type, characterised by low initial, but heavy recurrent, cost.41 
Minimum standards were laid down under the Uganda Employment Ordi-
nance and Employment Rules, 1946, but the uncertainty was recognised 
which employers felt even then about the future trend of world prices for 
primary products.42 The cautious Uganda employer was hesitant for other 
reasons : in many cases he remained unconvinced that higher standards of 
employment conditions, improved rations, better housing, medical treatment, 
and welfare provisions, would repay themselves through the worker's 
increased efficiency,43 Moreover, in the early post-war years, the technical 
problems of devising low-cost, permanent suitable buildings had made little 
headway towards solution. The difficulties were enhanced in Uganda by the 
fact that any imported constituents had to bear the cost of the long railway 
haul from the coast. 
The Government or its Labour Department might be convinced that 
these expensive provisions would in the long run result in greater working 
efficiency, although in laying down minimum standards of employment the 
legislator could not be expected to limit the requirements imposed to what 
every employer could afford. The employer himself, on the other hand, still 
had no means of ensuring that Africans who might benefit physically from 
model conditions would remain long enough to repay the investment. In 
1947 the Labour Department itself was still saying that the average unskilled 
labourer was " usually totally unaware that the diet which he provides for 
himself with money is often inadequate for his health or for his output as a 
successful worker ",44 and in spite of—or because of—his ignorance, the 
labourer usually persisted in preferring to make his own arrangements 
rather than to accept a lower money wage plus rations. If the generous 
provision of food did not necessarily bring its due reward in terms of greater 
39. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1946, pp. 4-5, para. 13 ; Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1943, 
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contentment and efficiency, the return from the provision of healthy but 
costly accommodation would be a still more distant prospect and, so long as 
labour turnover remained high, would have seemed to call for philanthropy 
rather than for business judgement. 
The limitation that even contract labour could be engaged for no more 
than six months at a time had long been a bone of contention between 
employers and Government. The administrator's point of view was clearly 
expressed by one of the Provincial Commissioners in 1941 : " Plantation 
managers have often said they would pay the passages of the labourers' 
families and provide suitable quarters, etc., if the law allowed a longer term 
(12 months) at work. But my impression . . . is that it is neither practicable 
nor desirable for the employer to force, by process of law, the contract 
against the labourer. I have suggested to planters that the work should be 
made so attractive in various ways that the labourer is willing to extend his 
service or return to the same work after a holiday. No doubt this does happen 
in a great number of cases, though the planters will never admit it as a 
practical solution to their difficulty ",45 There was certainly a persistent 
tendency among some employers to seek short cuts to the solution of their 
labour problem. In 1945, for example, two of the largest estate employers, 
who had been in difficulties over their labour supply throughout the war, 
sought permission to recruit in the Sudan. Their hope, in the Labour 
Commissioner's view, was to be able " to break into fresh recruiting areas 
where the African is still unsophisticated and still prepared to accept work 
under any conditions in return for a little more money than he can earn at 
home ",46 Opposed to this, the Commissioner's consistent recommendation 
was judicious investment by the employer in the welfare of those already 
engaged, so as to enable labour strength to be maintained by reducing 
excessive turnover. 
Whatever justification there might have been for the Labour Com-
missioner's strictures, there is little doubt that the law at times went too far 
in placing upon employers responsibilities that might more appropriately 
have been borne by the State. For example, under the 1946 Uganda Employ-
ment Ordinance, employers outside the main urban areas were obliged to 
provide accommodation conforming to minimum specifications which 
involved very considerable capital expenditure. Under the Employment 
Rules supporting the Ordinance, employers of one thousand or more were 
required to provide " adequate and suitable hospital accommodation in 
accordance with plans and specifications approved by the Director of Medical 
Services ",47 Where a number of plantations and mines are adjacent, it 
would surely have been more economic to have required a local authority 
to provide accommodation in a centrally situated settlement or large village 
than to oblige each employer to build houses, a dispensary, or a hospital 
within his own estate or compound. Much will depend on the social habits 
of the tribes supplying the labour, but a compact settlement offers many 
potential advantages over scattered groups of dwellings on individual estates. 
It gives a stimulus to the establishment of a convenient shopping centre ; 
it makes it more feasible to provide electricity and running water, which 
would be too costly to supply to dispersed settlements ; and it would even 
ease inspection. Furthermore, one large hospital may be much more useful 
than several smaller units costing the same amount to build and to equip. 
Such possibilities depend, of course, on the degree of concentration of mines 
or estates, and the potential advantages of concentration will be more than 
counterbalanced if the places of employment are widely scattered. Neverthe-
less, these are possibilities worth exploring, of which the drafters of the 
Ordinance were not aware. 
Undoubtedly, however, many Uganda employers, without the spur of 
45. E.S.A. SMP R305/27. 
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the explicit requirements of the Employment Ordinance, would have been 
content to continue to accept the inevitability of a high labour turnover and 
low individual efficiency, and would have lacked the courage to try to improve 
the quality of their man-power by judicious investment in accommodation 
and amenities. Other employers in East Africa were becoming aware of the 
economies to be gained from stabilisation. The Labour Adviser referred in 
1945 to the fact that even without the administration's encouragement, the 
great sisal plantations had in almost all cases an appreciable resident labour 
force established with families, which as a rule remained for a number of 
years.48 In 1947, the Joint East African Board informed the Secretary of 
State that it fully recognised the necessity for stabilised labour, decently 
housed in convenient villages. " The important objective at the moment is 
to decrease the number of workers who have one foot in the reserve and the 
other in employment ".49 But these statements implicitly related to con-
ditions in Tanganyika and Kenya rather than in Uganda, for it was in those 
two territories that conditions favourable to stabilisation were emerging. 
In Kenya and Tanganyika there were beginning to be areas where the popu-
lation could no longer maintain itself on the land solely by farming. Further-
more, it was easier to persuade workers to stay put if they were a very long 
way distant from their home country and if they did not have the opportunity, 
open to migrants in Buganda, of transferring their services to neighbouring 
African employers or of starting to farm locally on their own account. 
Here, probably, lies a large part of the explanation for the reluctance of 
Uganda employers to make efforts to reduce their turnover, for in Uganda in 
the areas where non-African enterprises were located there was still land 
available on which those who desired could settle. The attraction of settling 
on the land was likely to outweigh any incentive employers might offer to 
induce people to stay with them longer. When in 1947, for example, a 
leading Uganda company described proposals for a housing scheme on one 
of its estates, and for the provision of medical, educational, and recreational 
facilities on a generous scale, a Government official frankly pointed out that 
the Banyaruanda who remained in Uganda were motivated more by the hope 
of adopting the Ganda way of living than by the wish to settle in the country 
as permanent labourers, and that consequently a labour force permanently 
resident on the estate was unlikely to be achieved despite the modern and 
liberal conditions of employment proposed.50 These comments probably 
exaggerated the difficulties of stabilising labour in Uganda in competition 
with the " stabilisation " offered by the Muganda landlord, but they illus-
trate the fact that non-African employers in Uganda, and especially in 
Buganda, have had less chance of success in attempts at labour stabilisation 
than employers in other parts of East Africa. They also indicate that even 
among officials the wholehearted adoption of stabilisation as a primary 
objective in labour policy has, in Uganda, been a comparatively recent 
development. 
It is true that in the immediate post-war years labour stabilisation begins 
to be referred to in the Labour Department's Annual Reports, but the 
references do not suggest that the formation of a class of workers wholly 
dependent on wage-earning for their own and their families' maintenance 
had yet become a dominant theme of social policy^ The problems involved 
in converting a casual and migrant labour force inte a community of workers 
specialising in paid employment clearly arise in most acute form in urban 
conditions, but it is noteworthy that the Development Plan for Uganda of 
1946 does not refer to the subject. Two short paragraphs are devoted to 
" Urban Development " and to " African Housing ", recognising the urgent 
need for housing schemes for which it allocates £500,000, but there is no dis-
48. Orde Browne, op. cit., pp. 21-22, para. 57-8. 
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cussion of the bearing of housing on the supply and efficiency of labour.51 
The most ambitious housing schemes in the immediate post-war period 
produced two estates in the Kampala area, at Naguru and Nakawa—the 
former designed for the higher income group of wage-earners and the latter 
mainly for unskilled workers—and another at Jinja, the Walakuba Estate. 
But at the end of 1952 the total accommodation provided, including the 
smaller estates erected at most District Headquarters, was only sufficient to 
cater for about 2,400 wage-earners—little more than 1 per cent of the Africans 
in employment in 1952.52 
Nevertheless, stabilisation was now engaging a good deal of the Labour 
Department's attention. A conference of the Labour Commissioners of the 
East African territories held in November, 1949, " recognised the great 
importance of the progressive stabilisation of labour in the planned economic 
development of the East African territories ", and drew attention particu-
larly to the necessity to lower the cost of housing construction, and to the 
desirability of seeing that any houses that were built should be capable of 
accommodating families. The Conference also recorded its view that " the 
essence of the problem is that the African urban or industrial worker must 
be assured of at least the same degree of social security as he enjoys when 
living in his home area ".53 But in Uganda, labour stabilisation did not really 
get under way until 1953 when an African Housing Officer was appointed 
and the formation of an African Housing Department announced. 
The fact that the annual immigration from Ruanda-Urundi continued 
on a large scale after the Second World War no doubt partly accounts for 
the prolongation of the Government's reluctance to deal realistically with 
the many-sided problem of labour stabilisation, even though there had been 
intermittent affirmations of its desirability, in some form, since the early 
'twenties. 
The growing strength of the Labour Department did mean, however, 
that progress was at last possible in bringing about improvements in the 
country's labour supply in directions which had long been neglected, for 
example, by the establishment of labour exchanges and by the regular 
inspection of the larger workshops, factories, and estates, to ensure that their 
working conditions were satisfactory. But the most striking achievement in 
post-war labour administration was the successful inter-territorial liaison that 
has been maintained on all matters of common interest in connection with 
migrant labour between Uganda, Tanganyika, and Ruanda-Urundi. Periodic 
meetings between representatives of the three territories since 1948 have been 
most useful in permitting the exchange of information on immigration prob-
lems, to the advantage of all concerned. 
Many of the problems discussed at these conferences have been only 
indirectly related to economic policy. The long-delayed camp-building pro-
gramme, for example, modified in accordance with the changing needs 
dictated by the immigrants' much greater use of road and lake transport, 
was completed with the full knowledge and concurrence of the Belgian and 
Tanganyika authorities. Medical questions have been frequently on the 
agenda : the repatriation of incurables, for example, and proposals for 
minimising the risk of the spread of sleeping-sickness by migrant travellers. 
Similarly, there has been recognition and discussion of the difficulties of 
reconciling the desirability of recruitment at or near the immigrants' homes 
with the fact that so far as the majority of employers in Uganda are con-
cerned—the Baganda—it is not a practicable possibility. 
Some of the topics discussed at these meetings have also had a more 
direct bearing on Uganda's economic problems : for instance, it now 
proved possible to obtain much more readily than hitherto information on 
the factors influencing the size of the migrant labour flow from Belgian 
51. E. B. Worthington, A Development Plan for Uganda. Entebbe. Government Printer. 1947. pp. 78-9 
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territory into the Protectorate. These factors have naturally been of particular 
concern at times when the influx appeared to be diminishing. Such was the 
case in 1950 when recorded entries fell from 110,897 to 70,725. On that 
occasion the Belgian representatives suggested various reasons for the 
falling-off in numbers, such as the increasing pace of development throughout 
Ruanda-Urundi, and especially in the building industry at Usumbura and 
the tin mines in the Kibungu area—although these cannot have affected more 
than a few thousand workers. Another factor was the abolition of unpaid 
labour for chiefs and its replacement by a small tax. Communal labour on 
the roads had likewise been replaced by paid labour. Both these obligations 
had previously given rise to a good deal of emigration. Native-grown coffee 
at the high post-war prices provided a substantial source of income for those 
able to benefit from it, while the devaluation of sterling in 1949 automatically 
made Uganda wages less attractive when converted into francs. 
The Uganda Government's anxious concern over the numbers of 
Ruanda-Urundi immigrants may be seen as the counterpart of its tardiness 
in actively encouraging the stabilisation of labour. The falling-off in numbers 
in 1950 seems indeed to have stimulated thought on the matter. The Annual 
Report of the Labour Department for that year commented on the difficulties 
experienced by the non-African estate-owners, who were in danger of seeing 
their labour forces progressively diminishing. They had to compete not only 
with the higher wages paid by urban industrial employers but also with the 
easy-going conditions offered by the African farmer. " The remedy available 
to the agricultural employer, and this is denied to most industrialists, is to 
establish the nucleus of a stable labour force by encouraging labourers to 
settle on his land with their families and by providing conditions and 
amenities which will ser.ve to retain labour in spite of the higher wages paid 
in the towns and the attraction of African employment ",64 It is significant 
that this remedy is described as being " denied to most industrialists ". The 
apparent implication that most urban employers must continue to rely on 
the labour supplied by workers having only one foot in the town indicates 
that as late as 1950 the problems of urban stabilisation of labour had not been 
given serious thought. Housing estates at Kampala and Jinja were being 
built, but it was recognised that " even with the extension of these estates it 
will be many years before the housing conditions of the lower-paid wage 
groups in these two towns are likely even to be approaching the satisfactory ",65 
Even the policy of stabilisation on plantations was somewhat irresolutely 
endorsed. When, for example, arrangements were made for the recruitment 
of Banyaruanda and Barundi by the sugar companies, the Government 
reserved the right to repatriate all recruits at the end of the period of contract, 
although recognising that it might be desirable when the time came to allow 
employers to retain the services of those who were willing to remain longer.66 
In 1951 and 1952, stabilisation came much closer to being accepted as 
the central aim of labour policy, despite a recovery in immigration figures. 
The number of immigrants from Ruanda-Urundi rose to 86,000 in 1951 and 
to 76,000 in 1952. Internal migrations were also well maintained : recorded 
movements from the north-west showed 24,896 in 1951 and 27,797 in 1952, 
and the less reliable figures from the south-west of the Protectorate suggest 
that about 29,000 adult males in 1951 and 28,000 injl952 came out to seek 
work from Kigezi and at least 14,000 in the same years from Western 
Ankole. But in spite of these substantial contributions to the labour supply 
at the centre, the total demand for labour rapidlf increased, and it was 
estimated that the total number of 202,000 persons in paid employment on 
30th September, 1952, showed a rise of at least 20,000 during the year, as a 
result of the growing rate of industrial development. The need to stabilise 
and, by better supervision, to make the most of the existing supply of labour 
54. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1950, pp. 6-7, paras. 19-20. 
55. Ibid., p. 21, para. 87. 
56. Uganda Labour Department H.2. File, A/10/3/1/444/15. 
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was therefore intensified, as the Labour Department recognised. In 1951 a 
guide to employers was prepared, suggesting practical ways in which an ade-
quate, efficient, and stable labour force could eventually be ensured, the 
essence of the remedy being " good supervision, decent working and living 
conditions, a balanced diet, an adequate incentive and firm but sympathetic 
handling " ; and it was noted t h a t " a few of the more progressive employers 
. . . have realised that if they are ever going to have an adequate and stable 
labour force, families must be catered for and they are now building quarters 
which can be converted into semi-detached family accommodation. . . . " 
At the same time, however, the Government's own contribution to stabilisa-
tion in the urban centres lagged behind. The Walukuba Estate at Jinja 
could not keep pace with the needs of married men, and in Kampala the 
bachelor accommodation provided at Nakawa was not attractive at Shs. 
5/75 per month for a bed-space, compared with only half that figure paid by 
the worker for sleeping in a grass hut outside the town.57 
In 1952 the problem was explicitly stated : " The question is how to 
change from a low-wage, low-output economy based on unstable immigrant 
labour to a high-wage, high-output economy dependent on a stabilised 
labouring class receiving a wage on which a worker can support his family 
without recourse to the hidden subsidy of his tribal land which at present so 
often produces both his food and his housing ",58 In the urban areas, how-
ever, a large gap remained between the statement of the practical problems 
stabilisation posed and their solution. How could the vicious circle be 
broken, by which low productivity and low wages in part were caused by, and 
in part contributed to, the worker's inability to house himself adequately 
with his family near his place of work ? One essential point was beginning 
to be recognised : the large discrepancy between the standard of building 
which municipal regulations conventionally demanded and the quality of 
accommodation which the worker could afford, and there was no simple 
way in which this discrepancy could be eliminated. Building standards might 
have to be lowered for the time being, but it was essential that the housing 
available should be adequate for the worker and his family. This meant not 
merely good houses but the provision of essential services to go with them— 
water, for example, lighting, schools, and dispensaries. On the other side, 
the more the worker's productivity rose, the higher the rent he could afford 
to pay. The problem still to be worked out was how the objective could be 
achieved without requiring a disproportionately large subsidy to bring the 
cost of the minimum adequate provision of accommodation and services to 
coincide with what the worker could reasonably be expected to pay. In 1952 
the answer to this problem was not yet in sight. 
57. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1951, p. 27, paras. 102-3. 
58. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1952, p. 6, para. 7. 
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A P P E N D I X 
IMMIGRANTS ENTERING UGANDA FROM THE SOUTH-WEST 
1938-1951 
1938 71,516 1945 101,141 
1939 24,819 1946 138,130 
1940 75,024 1947 109,306 
1941 73,400 1948 88,518 
1942 68,820 1949 110,897 
1943 59,580 1950 70,725 
1944 42,127 1951 86,232 
For the sources of these figures the reader is referred to a statistical appendix 
contributed by Powesland to (A. I. Richards, Ed.) Economic Development and 
Tribal Change (Cambridge, Heffer, pp. 254-5). The figures are given there in much 
greater detail, the source of each figure is carefully cited, and sources of error are 
discussed. I regret that I have been unable to find comparable figures for earlier 
years. 
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